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SUMMARY 
 
The law, as laid down in a code, or in a statute or in a thousand 
eloquently reasoned opinions, is no more than capable of 
providing all the answers than a piano is capable of providing 
music.  The piano needs the pianist, and any two pianists, even 
with the same score, may produce very different music.
1
   
 
 
Cases that reach the Supreme Court are ‘hard cases’ where the result is not clearly dictated by 
statute or precedent.  To reach a decision in these cases, a judge must exercise discretion and 
the non-legal factors that influence discretion have been the subject of extensive debate.  
Theoretical and empirical studies examining the influences on judicial discretion have 
focused on demographic characteristics and facets of the judicial personality including 
political ideology and attitudes. Personal values are related to these factors and have been 
demonstrated to play a role in decision making.  This thesis demonstrates a relationship 
between personal values and judicial decision making in the Supreme Court.  
 
This thesis translates theories and techniques used in psychological research to examine the 
role of personal values in judicial decision making.  A novel method of assessment of value 
expression in judgments was developed.  This method revealed a different pattern of values 
expressed in the majority and minority judgments of cases that divided the Supreme Court, 
demonstrating a relationship between values and judicial decisions (value: decision 
paradigm).  This was confirmed by an empirical study of legal academics.  Drawing on this 
novel method, a series of Supreme Court cases were analysed to develop a theory of 
                                                 
1
 Lord McCluskey, Law, Justice and Democracy. The Reith Lectures 1986 (Sweet and Maxwell Ltd 1987) 
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discretion, division, uncertainty, and values, suggesting that the influence of values is 
mediated through largely subconscious instinctive responses in cases where the outcome is 
perceived as uncertain.   
 
The role of values has significant implications in the debates surrounding judicial diversity, 
which have centred on overt characteristics, how the judiciary are seen.  The study of judicial 
values has revealed tacit diversity in the Supreme Court which is associated with judicial 
decision making. The value: decision paradigm provides a new framework to analyse judicial 
decision making, judicial division, and the exercise of judicial discretion and the 
subconscious influences on these processes. 
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DEFINITIONS 
 
This thesis is an empirical study of judicial decision making combining terms from law and 
psychology.  The key terms used in this thesis are defined below.   
 
Close call: A decided case which divided the court and where the majority and minority 
opinions are separated by a single Supreme Court Justice.  These are cases where the court is 
divided (majority: minority) 3:2, 4:3, or 5:4. 
 
Consensus:  Judicial agreement on the outcome of the appeal. 
 
Consensus judgment:  A judgment written in support of the majority position. 
 
 Decision:  The outcome of an appeal.  
 
Divided case: A decided case where two or more Supreme Court Justices dissent from the 
majority decision. 
 
Division:  Where the Supreme Court Justices are divided on the final outcome. 
 
ECHR: European Convention of Human Rights 
 
ECtHR:  European Court of Human Rights 
 
Judgment:  Formal written ruling of the court or individual members of the court.  In 
discussing the psychological account of systems based reasoning, the term judgment is 
defined more simply as a reasoned decision.  The term is used in this way by psychologists 
and there was no sufficiently accurate substitute.   
 
Justice: Judicial member of the UK Supreme Court 
 
18 
 
Lead judgment:   In the Supreme Court, the lead judgment is the one which is published first.  
It will usually represent the majority opinion in the case and typically contains a detailed 
statement of the facts. 
 
Minority cases:  A decided case where more than one Supreme Court Justice disagrees with 
majority but it is not a close call. 
 
Opinions:  Views on the outcome. 
 
Single Dissent:  A decided case, where only one Supreme Court Justice disagrees with the 
final outcome of the appeal and delivers a dissenting judgment.   
 
 
Psychology 
 
Heuristics:  Heuristics are intuitive responses which function as mental shortcuts in decision 
making.  The thesis centres on the affect heuristic which operates when you have an 
immediate positive or a negative reaction to some idea, proposal, person, object or argument 
and occurs outside awareness or subconsciously.  
 
Dual process reasoning: This is the two stage account of decision making brought to public 
attention by Daniel Kahneman in his book ‘Thinking Fast and Slow’.2  It suggests that 
decision making is governed by two systems, the intuitive system 1 and the logical reasoned 
system 2. 
 
Judgement:  In the context of the psychology of decision making a judgement is the process 
of forming an opinion based on the available evidence.  It encompasses a process of weighing 
alternatives within a given context. 
                                                 
2
 D Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011) 
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PREFACE 
A Response Grounded in Psychology and Law 
 
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the 
logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose 
which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and 
repose is not the destiny of man.  Behind the logical form lies a judgment 
as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, 
often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment it is true, and yet the very 
root and nerve of the whole proceeding.
3
 
 
The letter on behalf of Lord Dyson, Master of the Rolls, highlighted that some aspects of 
judicial decision making remain shrouded in a myth of objectivity and impartiality.
4
  This 
myth is fuelled by the importance and finality of Supreme Court decisions.
5
  Yet, the 
Supreme Court judiciary decide cases, where the answer is not clearly dictated by the 
‘evidence and arguments’, hard cases where judicial discretion plays a role.  It is now widely 
recognised that in exercising discretion, a judge is often making an ‘inarticulate and 
unconscious’ judgement which may be influenced by facets of the individual personality.  
This is particularly true of cases which divide judicial opinion as Lord Dyson acknowledges; 
                                                 
3
 OW Holmes, 'The Path of Law' (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 465 – 466, italics added. 
4
 See letter on previous page, from Simon Carr Assistant Private Secretary to the Master of the Rolls, Lord 
Dyson. JA Segal and HJ Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge University 
Press 2002);  J Malbon, 'Extra-Legal Reasoning' in Ian   Freckelton and Hugh  Selby (eds), Appealing to the 
Future:  Michael Kirby and His Legacy (Thompson Reuters 2009);  Justice Michael Kirby, 'A Darwinian 
Reflection on Judicial Values and Appointments to Final National Courts' in James Lee (ed), From House of 
Lords to Supreme Court  Judges, Jurists and the Process of Judging (Hart 2011).  
5
 JA Segal and HJ Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge University Press 1993);  
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I am not surprised that there are differing opinions, that is inevitable at 
this level, with the nature of the cases that we hear.  They are complicated, 
they are difficult.  Some of them involve questions of judgement and 
almost philosophy, I mean, approach to life.
6
 
The extensive research into the psychological processes of human decision making 
undermines the assumption that decision making is under complete conscious control.  
Indeed, psychologists have highlighted the importance of subconscious mental processes and 
the factors that may influence these processes in decision making.  This thesis empirically 
examines one potential influence on judicial decision making, personal values.   
 
Although, there are many jurisprudential, philosophical and sociological discourses on the 
relationship between values and the law, this thesis draws on the psychological role of values 
as a potential subconscious influence on judicial decision making rather than entering into a 
debate on the role, legitimacy or justification of values in judicial decisions.
7
  In this context, 
this thesis draws upon theories and techniques from psychology to address the socio-legal 
question ‘how do judges decide hard cases?’  The research relates themes of legal thought to 
psychological theory and employs empirical, experimental and qualitative methods to start to 
develop a psychological model of the role of values in judicial decision making.   The aim of 
this methodological approach is not to develop a normative theory of values in judicial 
decisions, but rather to provide an empirical insight into the role of values in judicial 
                                                 
6
 Lord Dyson speaking in an interview for the Guardian celebrating the second anniversary of the opening of the 
UK Supreme Court <http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/video/2011/oct/25/supreme-court-deliver-justice-
video?INTCMP=SRCH>accessed 20.1.2012 
7
HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press 1961); LL Fuller, The Morality of Law, vol 152 (Yale 
University Press 1977); R Dworkin, 'Political Judges and the Rule of Law' (1978) 64 The Proceedings of the 
British Academy 259; S Jørgensen, Values in Law: Ideas, Principles and Rules (Juristforbundet 1978);  J Rohr, 
Ethics for Bureaucrats: An Essay on Law and Values, vol 36 (CRC Press 1988); Segal JA and Spaeth HJ, The 
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge University Press 2002); R Dworkin, Justice in 
Robes (Harvard University Press 2006); B Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide:  The Role of 
Politics in Judging (Princeton University Press 2009); R Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University 
Press 2011) 
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decisions in the context of the psychology of decision making. Adopting this methodology 
provides an original inter-disciplinary approach to the literature surrounding judicial 
decision-making.   
 
This thesis has a particular focus on the role of values in the exercise of judicial discretion.  
Judicial discretion is an element of the legal system which enables flexibility in the 
application of the law to achieve justice in a particular case.  The psychological dual process 
theory of decision making, used in this thesis, views the exercise of discretion within the 
context of a choice which involves both conscious reasoning and judgement and 
subconscious influences.
8
  The dual process of decision making encompasses system 1, a 
relatively unconscious quick instinctive response, and system 2, a more conscious reasoned 
deliberative approach.  Both systems are activated in decision making and the instinctive 
system 1 response is either affirmed, rejected or modified by system 2 reasoning.  Where 
system 2 reasoning does not provide a clear answer, the decision remains anchored in the 
initial system 1 response.
9
  As such where the judicial choice is clearly dictated by legal rules 
and principles, the exercise of discretion and system 1 influences are limited.   However, 
where the outcome is not clearly dictated, uncertainty remains and judicial discretion and the 
influences on the exercise of judicial discretion play a greater role in the decision making 
process.
10
   It is argued in this thesis that the influence of values in legal judgments is 
mediated through these system 1 influences which are facilitated by the perception of 
uncertainty and that psychology provides a framework for understanding this process.   
                                                 
8
 D Kahneman and A Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames (Cambridge University Press 2000) 
9
 D Kahneman, P Slovic and A Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge 
University Press 1982) 
10
 EW Thomas, The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and Principles (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 
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This research draws on cases where there is uncertainty in the law to examine the role of 
values in judicial decisions and identify the relationship between value preferences and 
judicial decisions (the value: decision paradigm).  It is difficult to quantify the level of 
uncertainty in any case, but this thesis takes as a starting point those cases which closely 
divide judicial opinion, which are by definition hard cases, “cases in which the result is not 
clearly dictated by statute or precedent”.11   “Hard cases” within this context, are viewed on a 
continuum of uncertainty, from those cases that closely divide judicial opinion, to cases 
where a single Supreme Court Justice views the outcome as uncertain, to cases which achieve 
consensus on the outcome but differ in the underpinning reasoning.  This thesis draws on the 
continuum of hard cases, framing divided judicial opinion within the context of uncertainty, 
to further refine the role of values in judicial decisions and identify the limits of the value: 
decision paradigm. 
 
In 1978, Dworkin described discretion as “like the hole in a doughnut, it does not exist except 
as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction.”12  In doing so, Dworkin recognised 
that the exercise of discretion is constrained, not least by precedent, legal principles and the 
judicial process.
13
  The psychological systems theory of decision making also recognises the 
external and internal constraints on decision making.
14
  The law both frames and constrains 
the decisions but other more intrinsic factors may also constrain the decision making process 
and the influence of personal values.
15
  To start to investigate the constraints on the role of 
values in legal decisions, the thesis analyses the values of Supreme Court Justices.   In doing 
so, it recognises the judge as an individual who is making a contextual decision within a 
                                                 
11
 R Dworkin, 'Hard Cases' (1974 - 1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 1057, page 1057. 
12
 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, vol 136 (Harvard University Press 1978), page 31 
13
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collective decision making process and assumes that in judgments, where discretion is 
exercised and values are expressed, that the reasoning is a reflection not only of the context 
but also the individual.   
 
The value: decision paradigm has significant implications for many debates surrounding 
judicial decision making and the role of the judiciary.  Within the confines of this thesis, I 
have chosen to address one, the implications of the value: decision paradigm for judicial 
diversity.  This was selected as it was central to many of the academic and popular debates 
surrounding the judiciary at the time of writing.
16
 
 
This thesis draws on the psychology of decision making to reveal the influence of values  on 
judicial decision making and starts to develop a model of judicial decision making grounded 
in both psychology and law.  The value: decision paradigm has significant implications for 
how we understand judicial decision making and provides a foundational tool for future 
debate and critique in this important area of research. 
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Chapter 1 
Judicial Decision Making 
 
Those with a taste for fairy tales seem to have thought that in some 
Aladdin’s cave there is hidden the Common Law in all its splendour and 
that on a judge’s appointment there descends on him knowledge of the 
magic words Open Sesame…. But we do not believe in fairy tales 
anymore.
17
 
 
It is widely accepted that judges in the final courts of appeal have a considerable amount of 
discretion. The exercise of this discretion plays a significant role in judicial decision making 
particularly where the law is uncertain.  It is the factors that influence this discretion which 
are the subject of this thesis.   The overarching hypothesis is that the exercise of judicial 
discretion and ultimately judicial decisions are influenced by personal values.    Drawing on 
theories and techniques from psychological research, this thesis examines the role of personal 
values in judicial decision making and reflects on the implication of such a role on wider 
debates surrounding judicial diversity and judicial selection.  A novel method was developed 
to systematically identify, code and analyse personal values as espoused in legal judgments.  
Although personal values have been theoretically related to the exercise of judicial discretion 
and legal judgments, this is the first study to use a psychological framework to empirically 
assess this relationship.   The introductory chapter sets out the theoretical frame of reference 
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for this thesis, reviewing judicial discretion and the psychology of personal values and 
decision making.  These areas are discussed in depth in the later chapters. 
 
1.1 Judicial discretion 
Judicial discretion can be defined in a number of ways.  It is defined in this thesis within the 
context of legal realism which situates discretion within the context of decision making.  As 
highlighted by Oliver Wendall Holmes, judicial decision making is the embodiment of ‘the 
preference of a given body in a given place and time.’18  A judicial decision is a contextual 
choice and the judge exercises discretion within the context of the choice.
19 
 Judicial 
discretion in this context acknowledges that the law cannot anticipate every individual 
circumstance to which it may be applied and discretion must be used to achieve a result.  This 
contextual definition of discretion has been previously used by Robertson to analyse 
decisions in the House of Lords.
20 
  This is qualified by the definition set out by Lord 
Bingham who suggests that discretion is only exercised when a decision is unclear: 
[I]f, being governed by no (clear) rule of law, its resolution depends on 
the individual judge’s assessment (within such boundaries as have been 
laid down) of what is fair and just to do in a particular case….But when, 
having made any necessary finding of fact and any necessary ruling of 
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law, he has to choose between different courses of action, orders, penalties 
or remedies he then exercises discretion.
21
 
Lord Bingham’s quote highlights that the exercise of discretion is not without constraint.  
Indeed, it is accepted, as highlighted by Lord Dyson, as Master of the Rolls, in the letter at 
the start of this thesis, that all judges are constrained by the judicial oath, which ensures 
fairness, impartiality and independence.
22
   The decision must also be exercised within the 
bounds of statutory and common law.
 23   
 Yet, the law is uncertain, as Cardozo suggests, ‘as I 
have reflected more and more on the nature of the judicial process, I have become reconciled 
with uncertainty, because I have grown to see it as inevitable.’24  This uncertainty is inherent 
in the process of ‘reducing the general to the particular’ and when the law is uncertain, 
judicial discretion plays a greater role in the decision making process.
25
  
 
The exercise of judicial discretion has been studied in many contexts.
 26
   This thesis 
examines the exercise of judicial discretion within the context of the UK Supreme Court.  
The UK Supreme Court opened in October 2009 and replaced the appellate committee of the 
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House of Lords.  It serves as the final court of appeal for all UK civil cases and criminal cases 
from England, Wales and Northern Ireland and only hears appeal on arguable points of law of 
greatest public and constitutional importance.
27
   
 
1.2 Hard cases and close calls 
Although it has been argued that judicial discretion plays an important role in every legal 
judgment, the influence of judicial discretion is more apparent in a ‘hard’ case.28  ‘Hard’ 
cases were defined by Ronald Dworkin as ‘cases in which the result is not clearly dictated by 
statute or precedent’.29   In these cases interpretation of legitimate legal reasons, including 
precedent and prior statutory interpretation, lead to two opposing decisions.
30
   As such ‘hard 
cases’ are causally indeterminate, in that the outcome cannot be dictated from legitimate legal 
sources alone.
31
  Indeed, Paterson argues in these cases, there is real uncertainty about the 
legal rules that should be applied as ‘many cases do not have right answers which the Law 
Lords could divine if only they were sufficiently discerning.’32 
 
By definition, all cases that reach the Supreme Court are hard cases. Both parties have valid 
arguments demonstrating that the balance of societal interests rests in their favour and have 
precedent or the intention of Parliament to support their cases.  Such cases cannot be simply 
decided on the strict application of the law.  To reach a decision the Supreme Court Justices 
must interpret the law and exercise discretion.   
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1.3 Discretion and division 
In Lord Reid’s seminal paper in 1972, ‘The Judge as a Law Maker’ (quoted above), he 
dispelled the myth that judicial decision making is simply the application of the law and 
highlighted the important role of judicial discretion.  Indeed, it is argued that the division in 
the courts of appeal provides empirical evidence of the exercise of discretion.  Common law 
final courts of appeal worldwide are rife with minority and dissenting opinions.
33
   Although 
less than the US Supreme which has a rate of division of 57%, almost one quarter of cases 
(23%) decided in the first four years of the UK Supreme Court divided judicial opinion, of 
which 8% were close calls.
34
   
 
The rate of division in the Supreme Court is unsurprising as Lord Dyson acknowledges; 
I am not surprised that there are differing opinions, that is inevitable at 
this level, with the nature of the cases that we hear.  They are complicated, 
they are difficult.  Some of them involve questions of judgement and 
almost philosophy, I mean, approach to life.
35
 
It is in these divided cases, where strict application of the law does not provide a clear result, 
that the exercise of discretion and the factors that may influence it are discernible.    
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There is a subset of cases within the Supreme Court where the impact of judicial discretion 
plays a critical role. These are the cases that Brice Dickson refers to as the ‘close calls’,    
cases where the judges are closely divided and the final outcome rests on the exercise of 
discretion of an individual Supreme Court Justice.
 36
  As Lord Reid suggests ‘the law is what 
the judge says it is’, in close call decisions of the Supreme Court, the influence of the 
exercise of discretion by an individual Supreme Court Justice will have a significant impact 
not only on the parties involved but on society as a whole.
 37
    In such cases the Supreme 
Court Justice as an individual becomes central to the decision as Lord Phillips acknowledges 
when he stated ‘if you sit five out of twelve judges on a panel and reach a decision 3:2 it is 
fairly obvious if you have a different five you might reach a decision 2:3 the other way’.38 
 
Judicial discretion is not limited to cases which closely divide judicial opinion.  There are 
many forms of judicial division, from those closely divided cases to cases which achieve 
consensus on the final outcome but not in the underpinning reasoning.  In these cases too 
judicial discretion plays a role and as with the close call cases, the importance of an 
individual cannot be underestimated.  In recognising the individual, this research moves from 
the general to the particular and examines the importance of personal factors that might 
influence their decision making process.  
 
                                                 
36
 This term was used by Brice Dickson.  B Dickson, 'Close Calls in the House of Lords' in James Lee (ed), 
From House of Lords to Supreme Court; Judges, Jurists and the Process of Judging (Hart Publishing 2011). 
37
 Lord Reid, 'The Judge as  Law Maker' (1972 - 1973) 12 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 22, 
page 22.  
38
 ‘The Highest Court in the Land: Justice Maker’, (BBC4, 27 January 2011) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00dhn8n>  accessed 3.08.2015 
31 
 
1.1 Factors which influence judicial discretion. 
It is accepted that even decisions in hard cases are constrained by the facts, the applicable 
law, institutional norms and customs. 
39
  Despite these constraints, the judiciary have 
recognised that individual intrinsic factors may also play a role in the exercise of discretion as 
Lady Hale suggests:   
[The] business of judging, especially in the hard cases, often involves a 
choice between different conclusions, any of which it may be possible to 
reach by respectable legal reasoning.  The choice made is likely to be 
motivated at a far deeper level by the judge’s own approach to the law, to 
the problem under discussion and to ideas of what makes a just result.
40
 
Lady Hale is not alone. Many judges suggest that in hard cases non-legal characteristics of 
personality play a role in judicial decision making, particularly in the final courts.
41
  The 
personal characteristics that influence the exercise of judicial discretion have been a source of 
much academic debate.  The vast majority of work in this area is doctrinal with some 
empirical work, largely carried out in the USA.
42
  The personality traits which have been 
associated with judicial decision making fall into two categories, elements which can be 
perceived as a conscious positioning such as activism and political ideology and those which 
play a more subconscious role including moral principles, demographics, instincts and 
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personal values.
 43
  These characteristics are not independent of each other, for example 
moral principles may influence political ideology which in turn has been related to judicial 
activism.
44
   
 
1.1.1 Role orientation and judicial activism  
In psychology, role orientation is an attitude toward a given situation and is defined by the 
range of appropriate behavioural alternatives in that situation.  It is related to attitudes in as 
such that an attitude will only be expressed in behaviour if that behaviour is appropriate to the 
situation (role orientation).   Role orientation is typically viewed in a legal context as an 
element of the judicial personality which encourages a conscious positioning of the legal 
decision.   Early judicial studies classified role orientation in two different ways.  The first 
was defined in the late-1960s by Glick and Vine.
 45
   The authors identified four different role 
orientations related to the judicial perception of the purpose of the law.  These were the 
ritualist, the adjudicator, the policy maker and the administrator. The second classification 
was related to the decision with the role orientations of law-maker, law interpreter and 
pragmatist.
46
 Studies using both classifications identified a relationship between role 
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orientation and judicial discretion.
 47
  One empirical study also identified an interaction 
between role orientation and attitudes in the judicial decisions on sentencing.
 48
  
 
Although these early conceptualisations of role orientation were well regarded, the 
classifications were difficult to reproduce and validate empirically. Subsequent role 
orientation research has focussed on a refined classification which identified two forms of 
judicial role orientation, the ‘activist’ versus the ‘non-activist or restraintist’ orientation.49  
There are several different definitions of these terms however the definition by Gibson in 
1981 is most frequently adopted.  Gibson defined ‘restraintism’ as the following of 
precedents, strict construction of the constitution and deference to legislative intent.   He 
defined ‘activism’ as subordination of precedents, statutes and deference to the judge’s 
personal attitudes, values and goals.
50
    
 
One of the key proponents of judicial activism is the retired Justice of the High Court of 
Australia, Hon Justice Michael Kirby.
51
  He argues that judges do make law and have the 
right to be judicial activists.
52
  Although there has been a tendency to equate judicial activism 
with political ideology, linking ‘activism’ with liberal ideology and ‘restraintism’ with 
conservative ideology, research by Cass Sunstein and others has demonstrated that there is no 
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such direct connection in the US Supreme Court.
53
  Although there is no direct connection, 
there is a significant interaction between role orientation and political ideology on the 
decision making process with liberal activists more likely to reverse an appeal than 
conservative activists.
 54
  
 
Judicial activism is not confined to the realms of the US Supreme Court.  In his seminal book 
‘The Politics of the Judiciary’ JAG Griffiths identified judicial activism within the UK legal 
system.
55
  In 2005 Michael Howard openly criticised what he identified to be judicial 
activism in the House of Lords.
 56
   The activism that worried the government had a broader 
definition, which extended beyond the exercise of discretion.
 57
  The critical work in this area 
is by Brice Dickson who identifies judicial activism as 
an approach to adjudication which seeks to locate the particular decision 
in the context of a wider legal framework, pointing out what the 
consequences of the decision are likely to be for fact situations which are 
different from those currently before the court and explaining how the 
reasoning underlying the decision fits with the reasoning underlying other 
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related rules and principles already set down by Parliament or by previous 
judges.
58
 
Using this definition, Dickson suggested that judges in the House of Lords could be 
differentiated based on their propensity to activism and their preparedness to justify their 
personal view of the law.   However, he does not empirically assess the influence on the 
decisions they reach.  Judicial activism is not limited to final courts of appeal, Cowan 
identified activism within the District Court system, and although he hypothesised that this 
may impact on the outcome of cases, he could not substantiate this argument in the small 
scale study.
 59
 
 
1.1.2 Attitudes and ideology 
An ideology is a shared (not unanimously) system of beliefs, opinions, and values of an 
identifiable group or society.
60
  Political ideology locates the system of beliefs in “the proper 
order of society and how it can be achieved.
61
   In contrast, a political attitude is an 
expression of favour or disfavour to a specific object.   In the context of legal discourse, both 
terms are used to convey a political position, either generally or related to a specific issue.  
Extensive work has been carried out in the USA examining the relationship between political 
attitudes and judicial decisions.  The work stems from seminal work by Glendon Schubert 
who applied psychometric scaling techniques to identify political attitudinal influences at 
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work in the US Supreme Court.
62
  The most commonly studied political influence is the 
conflict between liberalism and conservatism and Schubert was one of the first to empirically 
demonstrate the association between these political ideological positions and legal decisions 
in the US Supreme Court.
63
  These associations have subsequently been identified throughout 
the world.
64
    
 
Segal and Speath have conducted several studies either independently or together examining 
the influence of judicial political attitudes, defined as instrumental (change orientated) policy 
preferences, on the way the Justices’ vote in the US Supreme Court. 65   The authors 
identified that Justices who espouse liberal policy positions are more likely to favour the 
criminally accused and the civil liberties/rights claimant and oppose the government in due 
process and privacy litigations.
66
  Furthermore, Segal and Cover could effectively predict an 
individual’s decisions on civil liberty and economic cases based on the Supreme Court 
Justices’ ideological positions.67  Segal and Speath proposed that attitudes explained the 
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decisions of the Supreme Court and created what they called the ‘attitudinal model’ of legal 
theory.  This model held ‘that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the 
case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the Justices.’ 68  
 
Indeed, the authors argue that Supreme Court Justices in the USA exercise judicial discretion 
to give effect to an individual Justice’s policy preference.  This discretion extends through the 
process from case selection to the ultimate decision.  Smyth demonstrated that judicial 
political attitudes also influence judicial decisions in the Australian Supreme Court.
 69
 A 
recent empirical study identified the attitudinal model of decision making at work in the 
Supreme Court of Israel.
70
 
 
Lord Hope describes the UK Supreme Court Justices as ‘strong-minded people, ….with 
views ranging from most conservative to most liberal’. 71   Although Lord Hope recognised 
that different Justices have different ideology, he did not attempt to link this ideology with 
the exercise of judicial discretion and decision making.  Indeed, unlike the US Supreme Court 
Justices, the individual political ideology of the UK Supreme Court Justices is largely 
unknown.  Although not centred on individual ideology, the work of Alan Paterson provides 
some insight into the decision making and judicial personalities in the House of Lords and the 
Supreme Court.
72
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 Robertson applied modified jurimetrics to decision making in the House of Lords.
73
  He 
classified judicial decisions based on ‘egalitarianism’ which he defined as ‘the view that the 
courts do justice by acting as a counterbalance to social imbalance’ or whether they supported 
a weak claimant or the strong litigant.  For example in constitutional cases, the strong litigant 
would be the State, the weak claimant the individual.  Robertson demonstrated, using this 
classification, that judicial decisions could be predicted based on which judges were on the 
panel.  His work highlights the influence of judicial discretion on legal decisions in the final 
court of appeal, in a limited subset of cases. 
 
1.1.3 Morals  
‘[We are] ….concerned with hard facts not moral judgements’74  
‘ The law of the land effectively constitutes the collective moral code.’75 
 
These conflicting quotes reflect the extensive debate surrounding the influence of judicial 
morals on legal decisions.   Moral judgements are typically not a conscious process, but a 
product of the innate moral faculty whose optional parameters and exceptions are determined 
by our culture.
76
  As such a moral judgement, on the rightness or wrongness of a specific 
behaviour, reflects both the innate characteristics of an individual and the norms of the 
society in which they are situated.   The philosophical arguments surrounding the role and 
validity of moral judgements in judicial decision making is the crux of Hart and Dworkin 
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debate.
77
  The central tenet of Dworkin’s thesis is that legal judgments in hard cases have a 
moral core and that the gaps in the law evident in hard cases are filled with moral decisions.
78
  
This is in contrast with the positivist approach in which it is argued that legality is not 
determined by morality but by legal social practice.
79
  Although, Hart and others recognise 
that moral theory is a force in ordinary life, they argue that judges should ignore it, because 
they have better ‘devices’ available to inform their decision making.80  This is disputed by 
Dworkin and others who argue that moral judgement underpins legal reasoning and judicial 
difference in hard cases and that division reflects divergence of views on the moral rights of 
the parties.
81
   Dworkin argues that the moral component is not a reflection of the morality of 
the community as a whole, although that may influence judicial decisions, but a reflection of 
the personal moral convictions of the judge.
82   
Therefore, in cases where moral judgements 
prevail, judges are exercising discretion to give effect to an intrinsic personal characteristic, 
their moral convictions.   
 
1.1.4 Demographics 
If judicial personal traits have an impact on Supreme Court legal judgments, then individual 
judges become critical to the decision and this raises arguments about judicial demographic 
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diversity.  Debates rage around the importance of diversity on the bench.
83
  The debates have 
fuelled the reform of the judicial appointments process which has served to encourage a 
wider range of applicants.
84
  Despite this the Supreme Court bench remains the domain of 
public school educated white males who have graduated from Oxbridge.  
 
It has been argued that enhanced diversity of the judicial bench will influence judicial 
decision making and that diversity would lead to better decision making because women and 
minorities bring something different to the decision making process.
85
  The majority of this 
work has focused on the female judge and suggests that females, as a result of biological and 
social differences will judge differently from males.
86
  Indeed, this view was shared by many 
female judges in the US and New Zealand and suggested by Lady Hale when discussing her 
decision in Radmacher v Granatino [2010].
87
  Empirical evidence is varied in its support of 
the ‘different voice’ theory.  There is some evidence of an association between gender and 
decision making in cases which have a gendered element including sexual discrimination 
cases.
88
  There is little empirical work examining the influence of gender on judicial 
decisions in the UK.  A survey of a small subset of female judges in the UK revealed that 
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almost 38% of judges thought that female judges had a different approach to judging.
89
  The 
study did not investigate whether this difference influenced the judgments reached. 
 
The influence of other demographic variables on judicial decision making has been assessed 
but to a lesser degree.  Welch et al suggested that ethnicity influences judicial decision 
making with the black judge more even-handed with white and black defendants than the 
white judge who tended to treat the white defendant more leniently in criminal cases.
 90
 
 
Leslie Moran undertook a series of interviews with lesbian and gay members of the judiciary 
and legal professionals in Australia, England, Wales and South Africa.   The interviews 
revealed that judges did not feel that their sexuality had any impact on judicial decisions.
91
 
One small study, carried out in the USA, did identify that religion played a role in judicial 
perception of role orientation.  In a survey of 22 judges, Wold identified that Protestant 
judges tended to adopt a more restraintist position than Catholic or Jewish judges.
 92
   
 
1.2 Judicial discretion and subconscious influences. 
The exercise of judicial discretion is not wrong.  Indeed the Honorable Rosemary Barkett, a 
United States Circuit Judge, argues that judicial discretion serves to lead to greater fairness 
and equality in legal decision making.
93
  Many others agree, indeed, some would argue that 
judicial discretion it is inevitable in the Supreme Court, however, despite the importance of 
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discretion, it is rarely articulated.
94
  The use of neutral technical language in judgments serves 
to mask the other influences; as suggested by Dickson: 
Contrary to public belief, … judges have considerable discretion to decide 
disputes in accordance with personal predilection.  It is just that most of 
them are adept at clothing their conclusion in legal language which 
disguises their personal preferences.
95
 
Indeed, Lord Justice Balcombe went further and suggested that ‘English judges in their 
judgments rarely seek to explain the particular thought processes which have led them to 
reach their decisions.’96  Various reasons have been promulgated for the notable absence. 
Segal and Speath, discussing the US Supreme Court, argue that the mythology of judging is 
fuelled by the finality and importance of the Supreme Court decision.
97
  They argued that 
public confidence requires that the outcome be dictated by the law or constitution.  The 
authors suggested that judges ‘to ensure that facts do not becloud the myth,… adopt the 
ostrich posture.’98  Indeed Gold suggested that ‘judges may act under a delusion, deciding 
cases on the basis of different reasons from the reasons they themselves perceive.’99  
 
These authors suggest an intentional hiding or masking of decisional influences, however,   
Smith argued that the masking of the factors that influence legal judgments is not intentional.  
He suggested that judicial decisions take place within the context of the ‘deep structure’ of 
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external debates which are on-going.  In reaching their decisions, judges tap into this system 
of knowledge at various levels of analysis and cognition ranging from automatic and intuitive 
mental processes to full conscious awareness.
100
 Indeed, Smith argued that many of the 
judicial external and internal influences are not reflected in judgments, as the influence is 
acting at a subconscious level.  In recent years there has been extensive research into the 
influence of psychological processes on human behaviour and decision making. This research 
has served to undermine the assumption that decision making is intentional and under 
complete conscious control.  Although an element of conscious control remains in some 
decisions, psychologists have identified the limits of this control and have highlighted the 
importance of subconscious mental processes in decision making.  The internal processes and 
influences that drive decision making in a choice situation, where the outcome is not clearly 
dictated  provides important insight into the potential role of subconscious factors judicial 
decision making. 
 
1.3 The psychology of decision making 
The prevailing understanding of decision making within the domain of psychology focusses 
on dual process accounts of reasoning and decision making (system 1 and system 2).  Both 
dual process systems are identified and characterised by three different areas of psychology, 
a) reasoning, b) decision and judgement and c) social cognition.  All three are important in 
the understanding of judicial decision making.  The paradigm case for a dual process account 
in deductive reasoning is the belief-bias effect. 
101
  In examining the influence of prior belief 
on conclusions, the belief-bias experiments sought to create a conflict between responses 
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based on the process of logical reasoning and those derived from prior belief.
102
  The 
experimental data revealed that in reaching decisions, intelligent populations were 
consistently influenced by both the prior believability of the conclusion (belief based 
reasoning) as well as logic based arguments.
103
  The influence of belief based reasoning was 
enhanced in conditions which exert severe time pressure and significant concurrent memory 
load (highly complex reasoning).
104
  The presence of two processes of reasoning (belief and 
logic) and the shift towards belief based reasoning in specific conditions is supported by 
evidence from neuropsychological studies of brain activity.  Using fluorescent magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI), a technique which can distinguish regions of brain activity, it has 
been shown that resolution of such conflict problems (reasoning) in favour of either logic or 
belief was associated with neurological activity in different areas of the prefrontal cortex.
105
  
This scientific evidence supports two distinct processes of reasoning (belief and logic). 
 
This dual process systems account was extended to judgement and decision making by 
Daniel Kahenman and Amos Tversky.
106
  Of note, judgement within the context of the 
psychology of decision making reflects the act or process of balancing evidence to form an 
opinion and the final decision.  The publication of the Nobel prize winning speech as the 
book ‘Thinking Fast and Slow’ by Daniel Kahenman brought the dual process or two stage 
theory of decision making to public attention.  Both stages are systems, or a collection of 
processes which are distinguished by their speed and controllability.  The first stage, system 
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1, is intuitive, occurs spontaneously and does not require a high level of cognition.
 107
  It is in 
this stage of the process, that prior beliefs, heuristics (mental short cuts) and emotions are 
generally thought to have the most influence.
108
  The second stage, system 2, is more 
deliberative and involves mental operations which require effort, motivation, concentration 
and the execution of learned rules.  System 2 decision making is a deliberate, effortful and 
slow process.  It is rule based and relies on well-articulated reasons and more fully developed 
evidence.   This is the form of reasoning described as ‘logic’.  System 1 and system 2 
reasoning function together and both are involved when the stakes are high and the issue 
uncertain.  System 2 conscious reasoning is supported by subconscious processes in system 1 
which deliver other cognitions including perceptions, memories and associations.
109
  The key 
characteristics of the two stage decision making process are highlighted below.   
 
Kahneman and Frederick posit that judges initially make intuitive judgements (system 1) 
which they might or might not over-ride with deliberation (system 2).  Indeed, the authors 
suggest that the intuitive judgement is expressed overtly only if it is endorsed by system 2 as 
‘system 1 quickly proposes intuitive answers to judgement problems as they arise, and system 
2 monitors the quality of these proposals which it may endorse, correct or override.’110 
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Table 1:  Characteristics of system 1 and system 2 decision making processes.  
Adapted from Guthrie et al (2007)111 and Kahneman and Frederick (2008)112 
Characteristic System 1 
Intuitive 
System 2 
Reflexive 
Cognitive style Automatic Systematic - 
controlled 
Cognitive awareness Effortless Effortful 
Conscious control Low  - associative, opaque High – deductive, 
self-aware 
Automaticity High – rapid, parallel Low – slow, serial 
Effort Low High 
Emotional Valence
113
 High Low 
 
 
Indeed, Haidt argues that decisions are neither wholly system 1 nor system 2, he argues that 
decision making is a combination of both systems and neither exists independently of the 
other.
114
  System 1 and system 2 processes can be active concurrently, the automatic and 
controlled cognitive operations compete for the control of the explicit or overt response but 
deliberate judgements are likely to remain anchored in the initial impression or intuitive 
judgement developed though system 1.
115
    Although, the higher the intellect the better the 
ability to resist the contextualisation of problems within prior knowledge and belief, in 
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uncertain decisions the final judgement is likely to remain anchored in the intuitive response 
driven by system 1, a system that is influenced by heuristics and prior beliefs.
116
   
 
1.3.1 System 1 - Heuristics and subconscious or implicit bias 
Cognitive heuristics are short-cuts, rules of thumb which serve as anchors for decision 
making. The most common example of a heuristic is the availability heuristic where 
individuals estimate the frequency of an event or the likelihood of its occurrence by the ease 
with which instances or associations come to mind.
117
  Heuristic judgements are intuitive and 
unintentional and typically associated with system 1 thinking.  However, heuristics influence 
both system 1 and system 2 thinking.  Heuristics can be initiated spontaneously by system 1 
but system 2 can deliberately adopt a heuristic.
118
  This means that a system 1 spontaneous 
reaction to a problem can influence the logical reasoning (system 2) and a decision may be 
reached which reflects the initial system 1 response.  This is more likely to occur if 
systematic reasoning fails to yield a clear result and the decision remains uncertain.   
 
There is a wide range of heuristics which do not work in isolation and any one decision may 
draw on a variety of heuristics.  However, a key heuristic in decision making, which may 
play role in judicial decision making, is the affect heuristic. The affect heuristic operates 
when you have an immediate positive or a negative reaction to some idea, proposal, person, 
object or argument and occurs outside awareness or subconsciously.
119
  In social cognition 
theory this is commonly known as the ‘gut reaction’, and sets up an initial orientation in the 
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decision maker, positive or negative, toward the object.   The response occurs rapidly and 
automatically, typically without conscious thought.
120
  This ‘gut reaction’ provides an anchor 
for system 2 reasoning and serves to orientate mechanisms of decision making and 
subsequently guide information processing and judgement.
121
  Indeed, the affect heuristic or 
gut reaction is an important element in rational decision making when the decision is 
complex or uncertain.
122
   
 
It takes substantial system 2 reasoning to overcome a powerful affective response to an idea.  
This process between reasoning and the affect heuristic was characterised aptly by Finucane 
and others who use the metaphor of ‘the dance between affect and reason’.123  The strength of 
the affect heuristic is such that the majority of judgements are likely to remain anchored in 
the initial impression or ‘gut reaction’ and this influence will be enhanced where the system 2 
reasoning can lead to two competing but equally plausible possible outcomes, such as hard 
cases.
124
  It is important to note that in uncertain judgements, information which could serve 
to supplement or correct the heuristic is not neglected or underweighted, but simply not 
available.
125
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1.4 How do psychological models of decision making relate to judicial decision 
making? 
Judicial decision making has traditionally been divided into two broad models, the formalist 
and realist models.  The basic premises underpinning these contrasting models can be in part 
related to the psychological models of decision making.  Legal formalists suggest that judges 
apply the law in a mechanical, deliberate logical fashion.  In this context, it is argued that 
judicial decision making is system 2 thinking and the subconscious intrinsic elements of the 
decision making, characterised by system 1 thinking have no role to play.  The overarching 
theme of legal realism is that the judges follow more intuitive process of cognition, reaching 
an intuitive decision and rationalising the decision later.  Although, the two categories remain 
in textbooks, for many jurisprudential thinking has moved on, and more recent theorists argue 
that the clear divide between realism and formalism no longer exist, if indeed they ever 
did.
126
    
 
The importance of judicial discretion, in cases where the decision is neither prescribed nor 
prohibited, is increasingly recognised by legal theorists.  Discretion creates ‘a sphere of 
judicial freedom’, albeit constrained by the context, which leaves open a choice between two 
possibilities that often reflect competing and conflicting interests.
127
  Although, legal theorists 
focus on the justification of judicial discretion, they recognise epistemic discretion, discretion 
which centres on intuition, as an essential element of decision making particularly in the 
higher courts.
128
  In recognising the role of intuition, legal theorists recognise the role of 
system 1 psychological processes.  Indeed, modern theories of judicial decision making 
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suggest that judges rely both on intuition and reasoning to reaching a decision.  Judges 
initially have a gut reaction, a system 1 response, as to what is ‘right’ or ‘fair’ in response to 
the stimulus of the facts of the case and the legal arguments.
129
  The instinct can be affirmed, 
over-ruled or adjusted by system 2 reasoning.  
 
Guthrie, Rachlinksi and Wistrich, in their paper ‘Blinking on the Bench’¸ demonstrated both 
processes at work in trial judge decision making.
130
  In several experimental empirical studies 
of judicial decision making, the authors examined the role of system 1 responses which 
propose an intuitive answer and the role of system 2 reasoning to monitor the quality of the 
system 1 answer and either endorse, correct or override it.  Using psychometric instruments, 
the authors demonstrated that the pattern of decision making of trial judges was subject to the 
same cognitive processes.  It is recognised that judges exercise greater care when ruling in 
court than responding to a psychometric test at an educational day, and that trial judges have 
different external pressures, particularly time pressures, than Supreme Court Justices, 
however the studies revealed system 1 responses at work in judicial decision making.  Indeed 
although judges are ‘experienced, well trained and highly motivated decision makers’, the 
legal decision making cognitive process is not unique and follows the pattern of highly 
educated adults.
131
  Judges are not as susceptible to framing effects (how a question is stated) 
and representative heuristics (ignoring important statistical information in favour of 
individuating information) as unsophisticated decision makers, however the evidence 
suggests that judges are as susceptible as any decision maker to other cognitive processes.
132
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Judicial decision making takes place within a framework of uncertainty, which may serve to 
enhance the influence of certain heuristics and although experience reduces the effect it does 
not eliminate it.
133
  Bainbridge and Gulati examined highly complex security fraud class 
actions and argued that in such cases, federal judges relied on heuristics to determine the 
outcome.
134
  The authors argued that reliance on heuristics is due to institutional and 
intellectual constraints which require judges who are not experts in the area to reach a 
decision.
135
  Indeed, these influences may be enhanced within the Supreme Court where by 
definition the cases heard are difficult and uncertain.   Although the data by Guthrie et al was 
experimental there is a suggestion from UK Supreme Court Justices that the affect heuristic, 
‘gut reaction’ which is evoked through the system 1 process, serves to anchor the decision 
making.
136
   This was articulated by Lord Neuberger who recognised the impact of ‘gut 
instinct’ on his decision making and how this instinct formed the lens through which the 
decision is viewed.   
I almost always have an idea of what I want to find either because it 
instinctively feels right or it seems to go with the merits or my feeling is 
that it is line with the principles as I think they are.
137
 
Psychological studies would suggest that it takes significant system 2 reasoning to shift a 
decision from that the initial ‘gut reaction’.  This is evident in a quote by Lord Sumption in 
discussion of the outcome of cases:  
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Yes, I do have an instinctive feeling.  I think everybody does.  How hard it 
is to shift me on it, depends entirely on what sort of case it is and how 
much I know about the subject matter... How often I am persuaded by my 
initial instinct is just completely wrong in principle, well probably not 
very often.  When it happens it tends to be in cases on subject areas which 
I am not so familiar with as some of my colleagues.
138
 
Paterson’s book provides significant evidence of the ‘intuition-override model’ in operation 
in the Supreme Court with extensive discussion of ‘changes of mind.’   Lord Clarke suggests 
that the ‘override’ or system 2 reasoning serves to change the decision ‘more often that 
people may think’ even in cases which divide judicial opinion, specifically ‘close call’ cases.  
Indeed in R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions Appeal 
Panel of JFS, Lord Phillips indicates that he changed his mind in reaching his final 
conclusion:  
Initially I found Lord Pannick's argument persuasive, but on reflection I 
have concluded that it is fallacious. The fallacy lies in treating current 
membership of a Mandla ethnic group as the exclusive ground of racial 
discrimination.
139
 
Similarly, Lord Hope suggests that a change of mind can occur at any point in the judicial 
process: 
                                                 
138
 Quote from an interview with Paterson, ibid at page197. 
139
 R (on the application of E) (Respondent) v Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS 
(Appellants) and others [2009] UKSC 15, [33];  S Mancini, 'To Be or Not to Be Jewish:  The UK Supreme 
Court Answers the Question; Judgment of 16 December 2009; R v The Governing Body of JFS, UKSC 15 (Case 
Comment)' (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 481; M Connolly, 'Racial Groups, Sub-groups, the 
Demise of the But For Test and the Death of the Benign Motive Defence' (2010) 39 Industrial Law Journal 183  
53 
 
What, you might well ask, would have happened if Lord Rodger and I had 
disagreed in Grainger – which, as it happened, seemed both during the 
hearing (to the obvious alarm of Professor Reid, who was listening to the 
argument) and in our discussion afterwards to be a very real possibility? 
The judgment would then have lain in the hands of the other judges.
140
 
Although, the psychological theory of decision making centres on individual decisions, these 
decisions take place within the context of the court.  As such, these decisions are subject to 
contextual constraints and influences.  It is accepted that even decisions in hard cases are 
constrained by the facts, the applicable law, institutional norms and customs.
 141
  The exercise 
of discretion is therefore constrained by these external boundaries.     However, even within 
these constraints, personal intrinsic factors, central to self, may play a role in individual 
decision making.   
 
1.4.1  Instinct-override and judicial values 
Despite evidence of override in some cases, there remains a significant role for system 1 and 
heuristics and particularly the ‘affect’ heuristic in judicial decision making.  Judicial decision 
making is subject to the same psychological influences as other decision making processes 
including heuristics and ‘gut instinct’ which serve to anchor judicial decisions.  This aligns 
with Bartel’s ‘top-down’ model of judicial decision making.  Bartel argues that judicial 
decisions are ‘theory’ driven, in as such that judicial decisions are made through the lens of  
‘a set of beliefs, based on a directional predisposition that becomes the individual story of 
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how the world works or ought to work’ or system 1 reasoning.142  He argues that this ‘theory’ 
is automatically triggered and serves to influence the decision making process and the 
perception of subsequent information.  Bartels set of directional beliefs are values which 
serve to provide the lens through which decision making is framed.  The role of values is not 
limited to system 1 responses, indeed values operate at three different levels from a systems 
largely subconscious level to the conscious level of making choices that align with values.
143
 
The initial affect response and the values that underpin that response may be affirmed or 
rejected by the more conscious system 2 response and a conscious affirmation or rejection of 
the values position.  However, in all decisions the initial value response is at the systems 
level, which may be mediated through the ‘affect’ heuristic, the ‘gut reaction’ which anchors 
decision making and drives a positive or a negative reaction to an argument.    
 
1.5 Values and judicial decisions 
The psychological systems theory of decision making suggests that personal factors influence 
decision making.  As highlighted by the opening letter from the Master of the Rolls, Lord 
Dyson, there is significant resistance to the view that individual characteristics influence 
judicial decisions.
144
  Indeed, this concept was firmly rejected by Lord Phillips who suggests 
that the Justices of the UK Supreme Court are immune to this influence stating ‘judges are 
doing their best to apply the law and do not decide cases according to personal 
predilections.’145 
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However, other judges from the highest courts suggest that personal characteristics may have 
an influence on judicial reasoning.  For example, Lady Hale suggests that facets of the 
individual may occasionally influence the perceptions of the facts: 
[F]rom time to time one’s own particular approach to concepts of justice 
and fairness, comes in as does one’s own particular background and 
experiences may lead one to look at a particular factual situation in a 
different way… 146 
A Justice of the High Court of Australia, Hon Michael Kirby goes further and suggests that 
values may influence decisions stating that ‘appointees to a final national court necessarily 
bring with them values that influence their judicial decisions.’147  In a candid series of 
lectures Lord McCluskey, a retired judge in the Scottish Court of Session and High Court of 
Justiciary, articulated a series of inherent factors which may influence judicial decisions: 
It is difficult to escape from the conclusion that the choices, which the 
system leaves the judge free to make, are influenced by the judge’s 
personality, his instincts and preferences, his accumulated social and 
philosophical make-up…148 
Lord McCluskey associated the influence of these intrinsic personal factors and system 1 
responses with judicial decisions, where the law does not provide a clear answer, where the 
judge has a choice and judicial discretion is exercised.  Indeed, the psychology of decision 
making supports this position as stated by Guthrie et al in the conclusion of their paper: 
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[J]udges attempt to reach their decisions utilising facts, evidence and 
highly constrained legal criteria, while putting aside their personal biases, 
attitudes, emotions, and other individuating factors.  Despite their best 
efforts, however, judges like everyone else, have two cognitive systems 
for making judgments – the intuitive and the deliberative and the intuitive 
system appears to have a powerful effect on judicial decision making.
149
 
Where legal rules and principles do not provide a clear answer and the decision requires the 
exercise of judicial discretion, it is argued in this thesis that personal values serve as a lens 
through which judicial decisions are made by individual judges. 
 
1.5.1 What are personal values? 
It is clear that values and value judgments are used in legal literature to cover a variety of 
concepts.  Indeed, the term has been used to refer to interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, 
duties, desires, wants, goals, needs, attractions and other kinds of selective orientations.
150
 
Within the context of legal judgments, the term ‘values’ has been used to cover a range of 
concepts and has been used synonymously with moral obligations.  Although morals are 
derived from values, the two are not the same. Morals are concerned with the “rightness or 
wrongness” of a specific action.  In contrast, values are ‘enduring beliefs that a specific mode 
of conduct is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or 
end state of existence.’151    
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This definition was further refined by Schwartz and Bilsky who identified five formal 
features which are common to most psychological definitions of values.  Values are (1) 
concepts or beliefs which (2) pertain to desirable end states or behaviours, (3) transcend 
specific situations, (4) guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events and (5) are 
ordered by relative importance.
152
   
 
Values act as guides for the evaluation of the social world and influence decisions and 
behaviour.  Feather argues that we appraise objects, actions, situations and people in relation 
to our values, but do so with very little cognitive effort.
153
  This suggests that although we 
can be conscious of our values, in decision making values can be engaged without conscious 
effort. As such, values frame our decision making and Tetlock suggests that this influence is 
universal and our personal values are engaged in every judgement.
154
    
 
1.5.2 The influence of values on decision making 
We judge objects and situations according to our value standards through an intuitive process 
with little cognitive effort.
155
  Values, mediated through this process, function quickly and 
often subconsciously.  Therefore although an individual when directly questioned can 
generally identify some of the key values important to them, they may have very little insight 
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into their value hierarchy and the influence of those values on their decision making.
156
  
Decision making, within psychology, is framed in the context of a choice and Feather argues 
that all choices between alternatives, whether personal, policy or political, involve a decision 
between two or more competing values.
157
  Indeed, empirical studies have confirmed this 
belief and competing personal values have been shown to influence decisions in a variety of 
realistic situations.
158
  A decision between competing values frequently results in the 
affirmation of one value set above another.  For example, political policies, which Dickson 
refers to as ‘values backed up with plans’, often satisfy one value while sacrificing another.159  
In the debate regarding detainment without trial, the competing values might be those of 
security and self-direction which encompasses liberty.
160
   In supporting detainment, the 
decision maker is elevating the values encompassed in security over those encompassed in 
self-direction. However, the role of values in decision making is more complex than a simple 
decision between two alternatives.  It requires a more nuanced balancing and prioritising of 
sets of competing values,  this occurs at a systems level of decision making.  These responses 
may be affirmed or rejected by more conscious processes not least the conscious evaluation 
of particular value positions. Indeed, value based decisions are subject to several other 
psychological influences which may constrain the influence of personal values and may play 
a particularly important role in judicial decision making and the exercise of judicial 
discretion.
161
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The first is the psychological concept of trade-off, where a decision maker will reach a 
decision which is in conflict with their personal values but achieves an alternative agenda.  
With the setting of judicial decisions, a value-based decision may be traded for collegiality, 
consensus, support in another decision or future benefits.  Although theoretically trading can 
happen with any value, Baron and Spranca have identified that some individuals have 
specific values that resist trade-off with other values.
162
  The authors named these values 
‘protected values’.163  The authors identified that resistance to trade-off existed even when the 
subjects could not tell experimenters which values they were responding to.
164
  Typically, 
people want protected values to trump any decision involving a conflict between a protected 
value and a compensatory value.
165
  These are ‘core values’ the values that are so central to 
self that they are resistant to trade-off. 
 
Other factors can also influence the competing value decision making process.  Feather 
argues that value choices are also influenced by valence or the subjective attractiveness of 
specific objects or events within the immediate situation.  Valence unlike values is specific to 
a time and context.  It centres on the attractiveness of a specific outcome of the choice, at a 
specific time, in a specific context.  For example, in a legal context it may be that a judge will 
forsake a cherished value to avoid destabilising the current law at that time.
166
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Maio et al have also demonstrated that situational forces can overwhelm values.
167
   For 
example a series of studies have shown that the presence of bystanders may prevent people 
helping in an emergency even when they consider helpfulness important.
168
 Similarly, in a 
judicial setting, it is foreseeable that a judge sitting on a panel could forsake a highly rated 
value under the pressure for consensus.  
 
Values act as an influence on the decision making process, and although this influence can be 
modified by psychological responses to external and internal factors, there is a strong 
theoretical argument that values may play a role in judicial decision making and the exercise 
of judicial discretion in cases where the law is uncertain.  Indeed, personal values have been 
demonstrated to influence or be influenced by many of the personal characteristics associated 
with the exercise of judicial discretion. 
 
1.6 Values and the exercise of judicial discretion. 
As discussed, legal and political academics have identified several characteristics of the 
judicial personality which are associated with the exercise of judicial discretion. 
Psychological research suggests that personal values underpin each of the intrinsic judicial 
factors identified.   
 
Personal values are informed and formed by life experiences and values reflect demographic 
difference.  For example, the values of a population of men and women differ.  Empirical 
population studies by Schwartz revealed that men more than women attribute particular 
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importance to power values.  They also rate values encompassed within achievement, 
hedonism, stimulation and self-direction highly.  In contrast, women, at a population level, 
attribute more importance than men to benevolence, universalism, conformity and security 
values.
169
    Personal values are developed through human experience.  They influence 
conceptions of justice and fairness, indeed, an individuals’ morals, attitudes, ideology and 
role orientation are underpinned by the values that an individual holds to be important.     
 
Values are by definition abstract, but are applied by people to concrete situations.  The 
psychological functioning of values operates at three different levels, a systems level, an 
“abstract” level and an instantiation level.170  The most subconscious level is the systems 
level which reflects the internal hierarchy of values, the motivational tensions in decision 
making and the activation of values by a choice situation.  This systems level of values 
underpins the “abstract” level, where values are related to the feelings and the emotion the 
values and choice elicit. The form of emotion depends on the values’ roles as ideal versus 
ought self-guides.
171
  The instantiation level is the outcome level, the consequence that results 
from value choices, typical value instantiations increase value-affirming behaviour.   The 
influence of personal values is processed through a pathway from the systems level to 
behaviour through the abstract level and instantiation level.   
 
Judicial discretion is influenced by moral reasoning, a mental process which culminates in a 
judgement of the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of a decision.  Values and moral reasoning are 
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intimately linked.
172
  Moral reasoning forms the bridge between personal values and 
behaviour, at the abstract value level, which links values with the emotions and perceptions 
of rightness or wrongness they engender.
173
  Values therefore underpin moral reasoning and 
serve to anchor the moral position.  Skitka and Mullen argue that self-expressive moral 
positions, at the instantiation level, are a selective expression of a core value or values.
 174
    
 
Values are also reflected, at the instantiation level, in the more conscious influences on 
judicial decision making including political ideology and role orientation.  Psychological 
studies have demonstrated that values underpin political ideologies and attitudes and the 
resultant value affirming behaviours.
175
  Feather demonstrated an association between 
political ideology and personal values at a systems level, with respondents high conservatism 
scores affirming values encompassed in security and obedience and rating values such as 
equality, freedom and independence of relatively lower importance.
176
  Barnea and Schwartz 
confirmed these findings, demonstrating that individuals who espousing conservative 
ideology hold security and tradition in higher regard than those who support liberal 
ideologies.
177
 In contrast to many political scientists and legal academics, psychological 
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studies would suggest that liberalism and conservatism is a value disposition rather than an 
aggregate of responses to contemporary political issues.
178
   
 
Judicial discretion is also influenced by role orientation which reflects values.  Indeed, 
Gibson argues that although ‘role orientation’ may stem from role expectations, it is more 
likely that it represents a synthesis of perceptions of expectations and the occupants own 
values.
179
  Spini and Doise demonstrated an association between role orientation and values 
at a systems level in students.  Students identified as activist prioritised values associated 
with self-direction and universalism while restraintist students prioritised values associated 
with power and tradition.
180
 
 
It is widely accepted that legal rules are rooted in values and that changes in cultural values 
have a key role in changing the law.   In reaching a decision, values are ordered when they 
come into conflict and moral justificatory practices and practical reasons are developed to 
support the value choice.  In society, these justifications and reasons can then be generalised 
into policies to justify the imposition of a value structure.   It is this value based structure that 
is reflected in statute and legal doctrine.  Indeed, the retired President of the UK Supreme 
Court, Lord Phillips recognises the central role of values in Parliamentary law making, 
highlighting that ‘the laws tend to reflect the motives, beliefs, attitudes and prejudices of 
those who make the law.’181 
 
                                                 
178
 V Braithwaite, 'The Value Orientations Underlying Liberalism - Conservatism' (1998) 25 Personality and 
Individual Differences 575  
179
 JL Gibson, 'The Role Concept in Judicial Research' (1981) 3 Law & Policy Quarterly 291  
180
 D Spini and W Doise, 'Organising Principles of Involvement in Human Rights and their Social Anchoring in 
Value Priorities' (1998) 28 European Journal of Social Psychology 603  
181
 Lord Phillips ‘Equality before the law’ (East London Muslim Centre, London, 3 July 2008) 
64 
 
This thesis moves from the general role of values in law and society, to the specific role of 
values in judicial decision making and the exercise of discretion.  The facets of judicial 
personality, identified by legal and political academics, which potentially influence the 
exercise of judicial discretion are underpinned by personal values.   The systems based 
psychology of decision making suggests that in uncertain decisions, where a judge exercises 
discretion, values may play a role.  This is endorsed by legal theorists including MacCormick 
who argues that a judge in reaching a decision between conflicting precedents is exercising 
discretion and expressing a preference and there must be some value or values on which this 
preference is founded.
182
   The psychology of decision making provides a framework to 
assess this potential influence of personal values on judicial decisions, where legal rules do 
not provide a clear answer.   
 
1.7 Hypothesis 
In 1969, Prof. Danelski wrote that ‘the concept of values is central to the explanation of 
judicial decision making.’183  The potential influence of values is enhanced in hard cases, 
where the result is not dictated by statute or precedent.
184
  In these cases, where the law is 
uncertain, the exercise of judicial discretion plays an important role in the final decision and 
it is through the exercise of discretion that the values may have influence.  Although legal 
and political academics have recognised the theoretical importance of facets of personality on 
judicial decision making, to date there have not been any studies which empirically examine 
the role of values in this context.  The psychology of decision making and the role of values 
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within this process provide a framework to start to understand the role of values in judicial 
decision making.  
 
The central hypothesis of this thesis is that in reaching a legal decision, the law provides the 
basis for framing and constraining judicial discretion, but where uncertainty exists, the 
personal values of an individual judge, influences how judicial discretion is exercised and 
that in turn may influence the way in which law develops. This thesis will test this hypothesis 
and address the critical legal question ‘How do judges decide hard cases?’ through a 
psychological lens.   
 
This thesis will adopt an empirical approach to assess the influence of individual Supreme 
Court Justice’s personal values on legal decisions. It will examine the role of personal values 
through qualitative and quantitative content analysis of judicial decision making and 
experimental examination of the role of personal values in legal decisions.  These studies will 
contribute to the debate on the role of judicial discretion in legal decisions and the factors that 
influence it.  The findings will also contribute to debates regarding judicial diversity and 
judicial selection. If personal values influence judicial decisions, then debates surrounding 
judicial selection and judicial diversity need to move beyond demographic diversity.  
 
The thesis is set out as follows; Chapter 2 discusses the psychology of values and will detail 
the novel method developed for the systematic content analysis of legal judgments to identify 
the values contained within them.  Chapter 3 tests the hypothesis that judicial division is 
reflected by differential value expression and will detail an experimental study to confirm the 
association between values and legal decisions.  Chapters 4 and 5 examine the limits of the 
value: decision paradigm in cases heard in the Supreme Court and starts to develop a theory 
66 
 
of association between the judicial perception of uncertainty and the expression of values.  
Chapters 6 and 7 turn the focus from the cases heard in the Supreme Court to the Supreme 
Court Justices as individuals.  Chapter 6 subjects the judgments of four Supreme Court 
Justices to detailed analysis, revealing potential internal and external influences which serve 
to constrain the expression of values in legal judgments.  Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the 
findings of the association of values with judicial decisions in the context of debates 
surrounding judicial diversity.  
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2 Chapter 2 
Content Analysis: A Method for the Empirical Study of Values in Legal 
Judgments 
 
 [A]ny legal philosophy worthy of the name should fast begin to 
concentrate its attention upon the precise analysis of the social, political 
and ideological values existent throughout the syntactic and discursive 
processes of law.
185
 
Extensive research in the USA has shown that factors such as political ideology and attitudes 
may play a heuristic role in the decision making process.    Although there is some evidence 
that inherently personal factors may also influence judicial decision making in the UK, there 
is comparatively little empirical evidence to support this position.   
 
Psychological research demonstrated that personal values underpin decision making in a 
variety of contexts.
186
  There is also significant evidence that personal values influence many 
facets of the judicial personality which have been demonstrated to play a role in judicial 
decision making in the USA.
187
   There is, therefore, a strong theoretical argument that 
personal values may play a role in judicial decision making.  Prior to the empirical analysis of 
the influence of personal values on legal judgments, two critical questions had to be 
answered.  Firstly whether it was possible to identify personal values within the context of a 
written legal judgment and secondly whether the values identified could be codified 
according to a psychological model for empirical analysis. 
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2.1 Psychological models of personal values 
The selection of the psychological model for study of values is an important element of this 
thesis and this chapter will set out the models available for this analysis and the rationale 
behind the selection of the Schwartz model.   
 
2.1.1 Defining values 
As previously discussed, values are latent constructs that refer to the way in which people 
evaluate activities or outcomes and act as ‘standards or criteria to guide not only action but 
also judgement, choice, attitude, evaluation, argument, exhortation, rationalisation and 
attribution of causality’.188  One of the earliest definitions of values is that by Kluckhohn 
(1951) who defined values in relation to actions and highlighted the potentially implicit 
nature of values.
189
   
A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or 
characteristic of a group,…which influences the selection from available 
modes, means and ends of action.
190
 
This definition was refined by Milton Rokeach, in 1973, who identified values as central to 
personhood and firmly placed values within the framework of decision making;   
 [Values are] enduring beliefs that a specific mode of conduct or end-state 
of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse 
mode of conduct or end-state of existence.
191  
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Although Rokeach’s definition remains the most commonly used, Shalom Schwartz, in 1992, 
developed a more rigorous definition of values.  Schwartz defined values as  
[A] belief pertaining to desirable states, objects, goals or behaviours, 
transcending specific situations and applied as normative standards to 
judge and to choose among alternative modes of behaviour.
192
     
In expressing values as goals, Schwartz highlights the motivational goal underpinning a value 
and distinguishes values from attitudes.  Attitudes are defined as beliefs about specific objects 
or situations, in comparison, values are abstract and not centred in specific objects or 
situations.
193
   Indeed, values, unlike attitudes, tend to be shared socially within larger 
communities and serve as trans-situational goals rather than goals focussed on a single object.  
 
Although morals are underpinned by values, values are not morals. Morals are a set of rules 
which differentiate right from wrong based on the belief system of a culture, society or 
religion.  Morals therefore are socially situated influences and centre on the ‘rightness or 
wrongness’ of a specific outcome compared to a standard set by society.  In contrast values 
are personal and universal and provide an internal reference rather than an external reference 
for decision making.  
 
Values are always positive, in favour of something.  Personal values function as internal 
standards for judging and justifying action and judging others’ and one’s own behaviour.’194 
As discussed, values can serve as a motivation underpinning action, giving it direction and 
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emotional intensity. 
195
    Indeed, personal values have been associated with facets of decision 
making across all aspects of life including job choices, political preferences, perceptions of 
well-being and decisions on cooperation. 
196
  Values are acquired both through socialisation 
to dominant group values and through the unique learning experiences of individuals, 
although largely formed prior to adulthood values can change throughout life associated with 
life experiences.
197
   
 
2.1.2 The psychological models of values.  Why Schwartz? 
Values were originally philosophical concepts which were inextricably tied to virtuous living 
and morality.
198
  Contemporary theories of values are more diverse and vary based on their 
conceptual emphasis.
199
   This diversity of value theory has led to a diversity of value models 
each with a different emphasis.
200
  For example behavioural theorists have examined values 
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within the context of work situations and developed the Work Values Questionnaire which 
reflects values related to the work environment such as convenient hours of work, a good 
supervisor who is a fair and a considerate boss.  The Work Values Questionnaire structures 
work related values in relation to work related outcomes such as bonuses.
201
   This model 
studies values within the limited context of work.   
 
The empirical analysis of judicial values within legal judgments requires a model which is 
not situational and identifies universal values, not simply values related to a specific context.  
As discussed, in reaching a decision between competing values, the decision maker will 
elevate one value above another and it is this value hierarchy that is psychologically 
important.
202
  Therefore the model selected for the analysis of judicial values should provide 
a method to identify and empirically analyse values within a structured framework which 
reveals the relationship between values.
203
   
 
Early non-situational value models focussed on values which differentiate between 
cultures.
204
  The most widely used cultural model is that of Kluchohn and Strodbeck which 
was developed to identify the values used by societies to address public issues.
205
  Kluckhohn 
and Strodbeck proposed that there are a limited number of common human problems to 
which society must find a solution and the preferred solution would serve to identify the 
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values endorsed by a society at a specific time.
206
  Although this remains a useful model, the 
categorisation was used to examine values at a societal level not an individual level.
207
 
 
Parsons and Shils linked individual values with societal value patterns examining values as a 
function of the normative agreements that make social order possible.
208
  The authors argued 
that in order to give meaning to any situation actors had to resolve basic existential dilemmas, 
which the authors categorised into five pattern variables.
209
  For example in reaching 
decisions the actor must decide whether the result should benefit the individual or society as a 
whole (self versus collective orientations).
210
  Parson and Shils suggested that 
institutionalisation of values in a social group would achieve the ‘perfect’ effect and if the 
value based rules were followed, all actors in a society would live in perfect harmony. This 
model although important in its time has lacked empirical support. 
211
  
 
The first model which attempted to differentiate values at the individual system level and 
developed a psychometric test to measure such values was that of Allport, Vernon and 
Lindzey.
212
  The model created scales for six different value types, theoretical (discovery of 
truth), economic (what is most useful), aesthetic (form, beauty, and harmony), social (seeking 
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love of people), political (power), and religious (unity).
213
   The model of values does not 
restrict values to cultural origins and starts to identify universal values.  The model also 
provided a psychometric test which facilitated empirical analysis of values.  When it was first 
developed, this model was a very popular method of assessing values but fell out of favour 
due to its archaic language.
214
  
 
One of the most limiting facets of all the early psychological assessments of values was the 
limited range and universality of values identified.  This was resolved by Milton Rokeach in 
1973 when he developed the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS).  Two elements are critical to 
Rokeach’s theory of values. Firstly, that some values are highly conserved between 
populations and transcended specific objects and situations.  Rokeach suggests that there are 
a number of human values which are the same the world over, although abstract ideals, these 
values represent the same concept to each person.  Secondly, as discussed there is a 
relationship between values. It is the relative importance of individual values in comparison 
to other values (value hierarchy) which varies between individuals and it is this that is of 
psychological importance rather than the importance of a single value alone. 
 
The RVS is a psychometric instrument underpinned by the two key elements of Rokeach’s 
theory.  It consists of a list of 36 highly conserved value based words.  These words were 
derived from respondents’ descriptions of their values and examination of value words in the 
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English language.
215
  The value lists were created by reducing the values identified in 
literature and interviews to a set of values that were maximally conceptually different and 
minimally correlated empirically.
216
  This list included values which both centred on the 
individual and society.  These words were divided into two groups of values; terminal values 
which refer to desirable end-states of existence and instrumental values which refer to 
preferable modes of behaviour.  Terminal values include a comfortable life, equality, self-
respect and instrumental values include forgiving, polite, logical and broad-minded.  The 
RVS instrument requires that respondents arrange these words in order of importance to 
them.   It is accepted that the RVS encompasses the majority of highly conserved values and 
that the values are clearly defined and reproducible.
 217
  The RVS continues to be one of the 
most popular methods to assess personal values.
218
   
 
Although the RVS is a suitable method for empirical analysis and it has been widely used and 
has been independently validated, the RVS has two key limitations.
219
  Firstly, the RVS 
represents a series of unconnected value words with no underlying value system structure.   It 
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is widely accepted that alteration of one value priority may influence other related value 
priorities, however in the absence of an underlying structure it is difficult to understand such 
response patterns.  Secondly, the RVS is an ipsative or ‘forced choice’ model which requires 
that the participant order the values, thus requiring that no value word has the same 
priority.
220
   In doing so, the subjects are required to make a false choice between values they 
may hold in equal regard.  Work by Maio et al suggests that ranking values can force 
illegitimate distinctions which will distort the empirical analysis.
221
   
 
The limitations of the RVS are largely overcome by the model created by Shalom Schwartz 
in 1992.
222
   In developing the model, Schwartz analysed a total 25,863 value questionnaires 
completed by students and teachers in 20 countries.
223
  Schwartz mapped 56 values, including 
those identified by Rokeach, using smallest space analysis.
224
  Based on this analysis, 
Schwartz argued that there was no evidence to support the distinction between terminal and 
instrumental values.  In contrast, he demonstrated that all values fit into ten different 
groupings and these groupings can be related to overarching motivations.  The motivations 
are driven by three universal requirements, firstly the needs of individuals as biological 
organisms, secondly the requirements of co-ordinated social interaction and finally the 
requirements for the smooth functioning and survival of groups.
225
  One of the key 
advantages of the Schwartz model, over the RVS, is that it demonstrates not only how an 
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individual’s values relate to each other but also presents a higher order of motivational goals 
which identifies how these values relate to the basic motivations that arise from our needs as 
individuals and as members of a larger society.  Schwartz proposed that there were ten key 
motivational values which can be organised into dimensions, in a circular model, based on 
relative motivations.
226
  This theoretical circular model of values has subsequently been 
subjected to statistical testing, using modified confirmatory factor analysis and analysis of 
two independent sets of 23 samples from 27 countries encompassing 10,857 questionnaires, 
which supported the proposed circular model and the motivational continuum of values.
227
 
 
2.2 Schwartz model of values228 
The ten key motivational goals, which encompass the universal values, are self-direction, 
stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence and 
universalism.
229
  Schwartz identified and defined each of these ten primary motivational 
goals and used examples of the individual values that the goal encompasses.
230
  
 
1. Self Direction:  The motivational objective of self-direction is independent thought 
and action.  The values contained within this motivational type include freedom, 
creativity, independence, curiosity and self-respect.  Those who seek self-direction 
enjoy being independent and outside the control of others. 
 
                                                 
226
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2. Stimulation:   The motivational objective is excitement, novelty and challenge in life.  
The values contained within this motivational goal include an exciting life, a varied 
life and daring. 
 
3. Hedonism:  The defining motivational goal is pleasure or sensuous gratification for 
oneself and includes the values of pleasure and enjoying life. 
 
4. Achievement:  The motivational objective is personal success through demonstrating 
competence according to social standards.  Achievement values emphasise 
competence in terms of the prevailing social standards, thereby obtaining social 
approval.  The values encompassed by this motivational goal include ambition, 
success, capability, influence, intelligence and self-respect.
 
 
 
5. Power:  The motivational objective is the attainment of social status and prestige and 
control or dominance over people and resources.  The values contained within this 
motivational goal include social power, wealth, authority, public image and social 
recognition. Those who value power highly will seek to control others and 
resources.
231
 
 
6. Security:  The motivational goal is safety, harmony and stability of society, 
relationships and oneself.  The values contained within the motivational goal reflect 
security of both individual and society and include social order, family security, 
national security, reciprocity of favours, cleanliness, sense of belonging and health. 
 
7. Conformity: The motivational objective is the restraint of actions, inclinations and 
impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms and to 
inhibit actions which upset the smooth running of social groups.  The values 
contained within this motivational goal include obedience, self-discipline, politeness, 
honouring parents and elders. 
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preservation of a dominant position within the social structure.   
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8. Tradition: The motivational goal is respect, commitment and acceptance of the 
customs and ideas that one’s culture or religion impose on an individual.  This goal 
encompasses the values of respect for tradition, humility, devotion, acceptance of life 
and moderation.
 232
  Those who value tradition will place cultural customs and ideals 
above personal interests. 
 
9. Benevolence:  The motivational goal of benevolence is the preservation and 
enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact.  
This goal encompasses values such as helpfulness, loyalty, forgiveness, honesty, 
responsibility, true friendship and mature love. 
 
10. Universalism:  The motivational goal is understanding, appreciation, tolerance and 
protection of the welfare of all people and nature.  This includes respect for human 
rights. The values encompassed by this motivational goal are equality, unity with 
nature, wisdom, a world of beauty, social justice, broad-minded, protecting the 
vulnerable and the environment and a world at peace.
 233  An individual who values 
universalism above other values will place the needs of society as whole above those 
of the individual.234 
 
Although, Schwartz acknowledges that spirituality may be a motivational goal for many, he 
argues that is not highly conserved as it represents different values for different individuals.  
The lack of uniformity and consistency with the concept of spirituality prevents its use in the 
model of values.  Although the motivation of spirituality is not directly assessed, several 
studies have demonstrated a relationship between religiosity (the quality of being religious) 
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and personal values.
235
  Religious people tend to favour values that promote conservation of 
social and individual order (tradition, conformity and to a lesser extent security) and values 
that allow for limited self-transcendence (benevolence but not universalism).  In contrast, 
there is a negative association between religiosity and hedonism and to a lesser extent 
achievement and power.
236
  Of note, many of these effects are constant across religious 
denominations (Christians, Jews, and Muslims).  Therefore, although religion and spirituality 
are not represented as individual values, it is clear that values are influenced by these factors. 
 
The most important feature of Schwartz’s model of values is that Schwartz identified a 
relationship between personal values.   He created a circular schematic representation of this 
theoretical relationship.   It is acknowledged by Schwartz that the theorised structure is not a 
perfect representation, but it is ‘a reasonable approximation of the structure of relations 
among the ten value types in the vast majority of samples.’237  This schema facilitates the 
study of how values relate to each other and has found a great deal of empirical and cross-
cultural support.
238
   The model is presented in Figure 2.2-1. 
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The central black circle identifies the relationship between the 10 key values and each 
other.
239
  Values that are closely related are adjacent (separated by a dotted line) for example 
universalism and benevolence and those which are opposed on the circle are less likely to be 
held in equal regard.  The external circles clusters values based on broader concerns. 
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Figure 2.2.-1 The circular model of values adapted from Schwartz 2012 
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2.2.1 The relationship between values 
Schwartz identified that adjacent values on the circular model share the same motivational 
emphasis for example power and achievement emphasise social superiority and esteem.
 240
  
Similarly achievement and hedonism both focus on self-centred satisfaction and self-direction 
and universalism both promote reliance on one’s own judgement and derive comfort from 
diversity of existence.  Other positive relationships include stimulation and self-direction 
which both involve intrinsic motivation for mastery and openness to change and universalism 
and benevolence are both concerned with enhancement of others and transcendence of selfish 
interests.
241
  Tradition and conformity both stress self-restraint and submission,
242
conformity 
and security both emphasise protection of order and harmony in relations, and  security and 
power both stress avoiding or overcoming the threat of uncertainty by controlling 
relationships and resources. 
 
Schwartz also identified that values on opposing sides of the circle are negatively related.   
For example a  person who has a high regard for hedonism, is also likely to perceive 
achievement and self-direction as important values but is unlikely to regard as highly values 
with an emphasis on collective interests, such as conformity.   Indeed Schwartz identified 
clear conflicts between specific values for example values encompassed within universalism 
and benevolence conflict with those of achievement and power.  Universalism and 
benevolence focus on acceptance of others as equals and concern for their welfare which 
interferes with the pursuit of one’s own relative success and dominance over others, values 
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which are encompassed in achievement and power.  Conflicts were also identified between 
self-direction and stimulation which conflict with conformity, tradition and security and 
hedonism versus conformity and tradition 
 
Schwartz also suggested a higher order of motivational value types.  These are represented 
outside the circle and are composed bipolar dimensions.  One dimension opposes motives to 
promote self (self-enhancement) against motives that transcend personal interests to consider 
the welfare of others (self-transcendence).  Self-enhancement includes the values that 
promote achievement and power and self-transcendence includes the values that promote 
benevolence and universalism.  The second dimension opposes tradition and the need to 
follow the status quo (conservation) with pursuit of personal needs (openness).   Conservation 
includes values that promote tradition, conformity and security and openness includes values 
that promote self-direction and stimulation.  Of note, Schwartz suggests that hedonism can 
promote either self-enhancement or openness.   He argues that universalism and security 
serve both types of interests and therefore should be located at the boundaries of these 
regions.    
 
In a later paper, Schwartz added a second layer of higher motivations representing alternate 
conceptual frame and highlighting the continuum of values.
243
  Schwartz categorised the 
values encompassed in openness and self-enhancement as having a personal focus (outcomes 
which concern self).  In contrast, those values encompassed in conservation and self-
transcendence have a social focus and concern outcomes for others or for established 
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institutions.  Security has both a personal and social focus.
244
  Schwartz proposed that values 
encompassed in self-transcendence, openness to change and achievement, express growth and 
self-expansion and more likely to motivate people when they are free from anxiety.  In 
contrast, values encompassed in self-enhancement and conservation is directed towards 
protecting oneself from anxiety and threat.
245
 
 
The psychological assessment instrument created to identify values by Schwartz is the 
Schwartz Values Survey (SVS).  Unlike the RVS, the SVS provides subjects with a list of 
values which they must rate on a scale.  This method of assessing values allows subjects to 
rate values equally and removes the force choice bias.  The SVS employs a nine point scale 
with labels of -1 (opposed to my values), 0 (not important at all), 3 (important), 6 (very 
important) and 7 (extremely important).  The nine point scale has been demonstrated to 
facilitate more refined differentiation in the ratings and helps to improve prediction.
246
  The 
rating of the SVS was further refined by requiring that subjects rate their most and least 
important values first and then the other values in between.  This form of rating has been 
demonstrated to result in more robust relations between the value ratings.
247
  Researchers 
have designed and successfully used four different variations of the psychometric instrument 
to measure the ten values.
248
  The most commonly used are the SVS and the Portrait Value 
Questionnaire (PVQ) a more limited but more accessible psychometric instrument.
249
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Since publication, the SVS has been used to analyse the relationship between values in over 
70 countries including data from 14,000 school teachers and 19,000 pupils and the data has 
supported the dynamic circular model of values proposed by Schwartz.
 250
  Indeed, the model 
has been used in many psychological studies
251
 including studies of personality
252
 and well-
being
253
 and population studies
254
 such the relationship between values and communist 
rule
255
, emigration
256
 and environmental attitudes
257
  The model has also been used in a wide 
range of behavioural studies
258
  many which centre on individual work and organisational 
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values
259
 but also wide ranging behaviours such as political choice
260
, parenting
261
 and pro-
social behaviour.
262
 
 
Indeed, the more limited value survey the Portrait Value Questionnaire has been used as part 
of the European Social Survey, a bi-annual survey of the ‘interaction between Europe's 
changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of its diverse 
populations’. 263  This survey has been completed by 150,000 individuals over the first four 
rounds and provides a significant source of population values.   As stated earlier, the 
empirical analysis of judicial values requires a model which is not situational, identifies 
universal values and provides a method to identify and empirically analyse individual’s 
values within a structured framework.  The Schwartz model and the SVS fulfil all of these 
criteria and overcomes many of the limitations of the RVS.   
 
2.2.2 The limitations of the Schwartz model of values. 
All models of values have limitations and one of the key limitations is abstraction.  The 
central issue with abstraction is clearly articulated by Greg Maio; 
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 The abstract nature of values is vital for their conceptualisation, but 
complicates their assessment.  For example, equality can entail equality of 
outcomes or opportunities and it could involve equality between races, 
genders, religions or more typical social categories (for example left-
handers versus right-handers).  Which instantiations do people have in 
mind when they speak about a value, think about acting on it or rate its 
importance in a survey?
264
 
In an attempt to limit the problem of abstraction, the SVS offers synonyms to refine the 
meaning of the values, for example equality is equality of opportunity.  Although this does 
reduce the impact of abstraction Maio suggests that this may be insufficient to prevent 
substantial differences in conceptualisation.  This influence is more significant when 
evaluating values across cultures.  However, the author agrees that despite this limitation ‘the 
Schwartz model provides a reasonable ‘prototype’ for modelling value relations’.265 
 
All value instruments are also influenced by the respondent’s conscious theories of 
compatibility.   In identifying the instrument as a ‘value’ survey, the respondents are 
influenced by their perceptions of what ‘ought’ to be their values as compared to what their 
values ‘are’.  This response bias is a recognised problem with many surveys, especially those 
which centre on controversial issues.
266
  Although this cannot be entirely eliminated, the 
impact is minimised in the SVS, as the SVS presents respondents with 40 individual values 
and the final value analysis in SVS unlike other value instruments reflects the rating of the 
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several values encompassed in each overarching motivation value.
267
  Despite these 
limitations, the SVS and the Schwartz model has been used extensively by both empirical and 
cross-cultural studies.
268
  The model provides a ‘structure of relations among the ten value 
types in the vast majority of samples.’269  
 
The SVS provides a psychological tool to identify personal values and the relationship 
between these values which facilitates the empirical analysis of the influence of values on 
other factors.  The Schwartz model and SVS therefore fulfil the criteria for selection as the 
model for assessment of personal values in legal judgments.   
 
2.3  The identification of values in legal judgments 
The Schwartz model provided this research with a structure for the analysis of values within 
legal judgments.  This model related values to overarching motivations and provides a 
framework for analysis.  To employ this framework to the empirical content analysis of the 
role of personal values in judicial decisions, one first needs to determine whether values can 
be identified in written legal judgments.  The following sections detail the identification of 
values within legal judgments and the creation of a coding frame that relates values expressed 
in legal judgments to the Schwartz model. 
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2.3.1 The identification of values in legal text:  The theory 
There is a long tradition of identifying values within written text which stems from the early 
studies by Lowenthal and Albrecht who examined mass-periodical fiction for evidence of 
values.
270
  The legal tradition is also a written tradition and this thesis sets out to develop a 
value based content analysis method to identify values within written text.   To achieve this 
aim it is necessary to interpret the textual meanings of legal judgments. Although, it is not 
unusual to interpret legal text to identify the nuances of a legal decision, how these textual 
meanings are interpreted is the subject of debate.   
 
Hart has long argued that legal language has a distinctive character and cannot be interpreted 
‘in terms of ordinary factual counterparts.’ 271  It is true that legal judgments contain the 
language of law which seeks to adopt a uniquely objective stance.  However, Goodrich and 
others argue that Hart’s formalist approach to legal language is not compatible with 
semantics as a science.
272
  Goodrich supports the approach of Fowler et al who argues that all 
language use inevitably bears the impress of social meaning: 
‘[T]here are social meanings in a natural language ….which are 
articulated when we write or speak.  There is no discourse that does not 
embody such meanings.’273 
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Indeed, the authors argue that legal language can be read with ordinary social meaning, 
therefore it should be possible using ordinary meaning to identify values within legal 
judgments.   
 
Interpretation of text is not limited to semantics, context may also play an important role.  
Indeed, philosophers of language would argue that the content of linguistic communication is 
not always determined by the meaning of the words and the sentences uttered, and that the 
content is pragmatically enriched by other factors such as context and what is implied or 
implicated.
274
  This is certainly true of the spoken word, but less true of the written text.  In a 
legal context, Marmor argues the contextual background does not typically play a major role 
in the interpretation of the meaning of legal documents.
275
 The arguments of both Goodrich 
and Marmor support the position that within the context of a legal judgment, the words used 
can reveal social meanings which are not dependant on contextual background.   Therefore it 
is possible that legal judgments could reveal values. 
 
 
It is accepted that written legal judgments reflect ‘post hoc justifications of those writing a 
decision in a particular case and does not fully capture the judicial decision-making 
process.’276  As such the written judgment may not reveal all of the values that influence the 
decision making process or the values revealed may be modified to reflect the function, and 
audience to whom the judge is speaking.  The main function of any judgment is to convey the 
decision and a justification of the decision reached but James Lee highlighted the variety of 
more nuanced functions including judgments that are written to support the lead judgment, or 
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to highlight differences or aimed at enhancing accessibility.
277
 Alan Paterson highlights 
another more subtle function, judgments written to “provide a way for the writer to seek to 
influence his or her colleagues without having the judgment dismissed as a dissent.”278 This 
more subtle function relates to the audience that the judge has in mind when writing the 
judgment.  In 1960, Professor Walker Gibson asked 25 US Appellate Judges “To whom (or 
for whom) do you write your opinions?”  He received a wide range of responses, including 
the legislature, for the writing judge to satisfy themselves that the decision is right, and to 
persuade other judges.
279
 Although dated, and situated in the US Appellate courts, there is 
little to suggest that the Supreme Court in the UK has different audiences in mind.  Indeed, in 
the majority of cases which divide judicial opinion, persuasion may be central.   It is accepted 
that the content analysis of judgments provide an indirect assessment of judicial decision 
making research and that the form, function and audience the judge has in mind may have a 
significant impact on the values expressed in the judgment. However as this study will 
demonstrate there is a consistency of value expression across a range of judgments which 
suggests that this form of analysis despite the inherent limitations provides an insight into the 
influence of values on legal judgments.   
 
2.3.2 The identification of values in legal text:  In practice 
To assess whether values are evident in legal judgments, the judgments of eighteen sequential 
cases which divided the Supreme Court, were reviewed.  Although, the majority of any legal 
judgment consists of facts and the law, with citations of excerpts of relevant cases, there were 
statements made by judges about their opinions which appeared to include value statements 
and the following is a sample of some of the value statements identified within legal 
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judgments of the Supreme Court and how they relate to the value motivations identified by 
Schwartz.   
 
One of the broadest value motivations identified by Schwartz is that of universalism, which 
has the overarching motivation of understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection of the 
welfare of all people and nature and includes respect for human rights and environment. 
Some of the values encompassed by this motivational goal include equality and social justice. 
Universalism encompasses values which promote the benefit to society as a whole above that 
of the individual.  In this excerpt from R (on the application of Sainsbury Supermarkets Ltd) 
v Wolverhampton City Council Lord Phillips supporting the majority decision positively 
espoused the benefit to society of ‘competitive planning’: 
The fact that this may, in effect, involve an auction between the two 
developers for the benefit of the community does not seem to me to be 
inherently objectionable.
280
 
In positively placing the benefit to the community above the planning issues, Lord Philips is 
espousing values contained within the overarching value motivation of universalism.   
 
Universalism also encompasses the protection of vulnerable of society, a theme identified the 
dissenting opinion of Lady Hale in A v Essex County Council:  
This is where the fact that, unlike the pupil in Lord Grey, the appellant has 
such very special educational needs comes into play. The effect of 
exclusion for ‘such pupils’ can be so much more serious than for other 
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children. A denial of access which would have no long term impact upon 
an ordinary pupil may be catastrophic for a pupil with special needs.
281
 
In emphasising the protection of the vulnerable in society, it can be argued that Lady Hale 
appears to have positively espoused the value of universalism.   
 
Tradition is also a broad ranging value motivation which encompasses both legal and 
religious tradition. In this excerpt from in R(on the application of E) v JFS Governing Body 
Lord Brown appeared to be espousing the value tradition in his support of the Jewish 
religious tradition: 
That, however, is not an issue which is, or ever could be, before the Court. 
No court would ever intervene on such a question or dictate who, as a 
matter of orthodox religious law, is to be regarded as Jewish.282 
Tradition and conformity share the same motivational goal of ‘subordination of self in favour 
of socially imposed expectations’.  This excerpt from R (on the application of Morge) v 
Hampshire County Council positively promoted the values encompassed in conformity and 
compliance with the rules: 
It is, of course, always important that the legal requirements are properly 
complied with, perhaps the more so in cases such as this, where the 
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County Council is both the applicant for planning permission and the 
planning authority deciding whether it should be granted.283 
These excerpts demonstrate that it is possible to identify values within the context of legal 
judgments and these values may be related to the value motivations identified by Schwartz.   
 
2.4  Textual content analysis of values in legal judgments: Method 
To systematically analyse the expression of values in legal judgments this study employs 
computer-aided content analysis of the text of judgments.  The standard social science 
technique of content analysis requires the systematic, rule-guided reading of documents for 
consistent features and drawing inferences about their use and meaning.
284
  Content analysis 
is only one of the several forms of textual analysis used in social science research, but this 
method was selected as it is a key method for the identification within text of ‘indicators 
which point to the state of beliefs, values, ideologies’. 285  This method enables quantitative 
analysis of concepts implied in text based on how often a concept occurs within a text. 
Concepts are defined as ‘a single idea, or ideational kernel regardless of whether it is 
represented by a single word of a phrase’.286  The difference in the frequency of expression of 
a concept provides insights into the similarity or difference of the content.
287
  The 
epistemological roots of content analysis lie in legal realism, providing a mechanism by 
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which the jurisprudential claims can be empirically assessed.
288
  Although similar to the 
doctrinal approach of legal scholarship, this method brings the rigour associated with social 
science and analysis of judgments creating a ‘distinctively legal form of empiricism.’289  Hall 
and Wright argue that content analysis works best, in a legal context, where patterns across 
cases matter more than a deeply reflective analysis of a single case and it is therefore suited 
to the analysis of values in legal judgments.
290
  
 
Employment of this method in a legal context is not unique to this study.  Indeed, content 
analysis of written judgments of the US Supreme Court was employed by Kort, Nagel and 
Ulmer from the late 1950’s.291  In 1965, Glendon Schubert started to move away from a focus 
on prediction of outcome and used content analysis of judgments to start to reveal the 
attitudes that underpin legal judgments of the US Supreme Court.
292
  Many of the techniques 
employed in content analysis are also present in the work of Robertson and Paterson and the 
work of many others in judicial studies.
293
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2.4.1 Creation of a coding scheme for content analysis of legal judgments 
Central to content analysis is the creation of a systematic, rule-based coding system.  As 
Professor Charles Haar suggests that ‘the disciplined reading and analysis of cases required to 
code them for computer analysis eliminates casual meandering through factors on a case-by-
case basis.’294  The defined coding system focusses attention more methodically on elements 
of the case and serves to limit against the conscious or unconscious search for predetermined 
positions.
295
  As such, content analysis requires a large number of choices which have to be 
made by a researcher.
 296
  With all content analysis the choices made influence the results 
achieved and the interpretation of these results.  The following sections detail and justify the 
choices made to facilitate content analysis of legal judgments.     
 
2.4.1.1 Words or Concepts:  Content analysis of text can be based on either the analysis of 
single words or phrases.   Single word analysis is appropriate when a single word can be used 
to define the concept, for example a political party name.  In contrast, phrases are more useful 
when the researcher wants to capture broad based concepts.   Value motivations are broad 
based concepts and therefore this study relied on the coding of phrases rather than single 
words.  Although values can be expressed in a text in more dimensions than simple 
acceptance and rejection, psychologists only categorise values based on positive espousal.  
Therefore for this study, it was only the positive espousal of values that was coded to 
facilitate analysis within the psychological model of values.     
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Only text that reflects a judicial view was coded, therefore text which simply sets out the 
facts of the case, excerpts of other judgments, books or statutes was excluded.  This facilitates 
analysis which focuses solely on the individual Supreme Court Justice’s values.297   
 
2.4.1.2. Generation of codes:  Coding schemes for textual analysis can be identified in two 
frameworks based on how the codes are derived.  Firstly, the codes can be either deductive, 
where codes are derived from the theory which underpins the analysis, or inductive where 
codes are based on the data.  Content analysis often combines both deductive and inductive 
coding, using deductive codes as a way of ‘getting into’ the data and an inductive approach to 
identify new codes and to refine or even eliminate deductive codes.
298
   The second 
framework of coding is pre-defined or emergent.  Although pre-defined coding is essential to 
refine the coding process, strictly pre-defined coding limits the flexibility and depth of coding 
which can be achieved.  This study combined both pre-defined and emergent coding which 
was rationalised to achieve a coherent coding system. 
 
The highest order codes were based on the ten value motivations identified in the Schwartz 
value model.
 299
  Inductive codes were derived based on legal concepts and principles which 
were underpinned by these value motivations.  For example, legal traditions including 
adherence to precedent and respect for Parliamentary sovereignty were coded within the 
value tradition.    Although many of the codes were pre-determined, emergent coding was 
also used to facilitate the addition of value based legal concepts which had not been foreseen 
prior to analysis.  For example, during the course of the analysis a theme emerged which 
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reflected the judicial desire to prevent uncertainty in the law.    This theme was often 
articulated by Lord Dyson.  For example: 
But this uncertainty, generated by the difficulty of knowing where to draw 
the line in any given case, is inherently unsatisfactory, since the difficulty 
itself contains the seeds of potential litigation.
300
 
The implications of awarding vindicatory damages in the present case 
would be far reaching. Undesirable uncertainty would result.
301
 
This theme was not limited to Lord Dyson, Lord Hope in Millar (Craig Martin) v HM 
Advocate, a case which centred on the limits of devolved powers, also espoused the 
importance of preventing uncertainty in the law:  
To draw a line between statutory offences relating to reserved matters and 
those relating to matters that were not reserved would have been even 
more confusing.’302 
Indeed, this theme of prevention of uncertainty went beyond the confines of uncertainty in 
the law, to the prevention of the uncertainty created by the court delivering a divided opinion 
as articulated by Lord Brown: 
 A court which speaks with two voices risks bringing the law into disrepute.
303
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The value underlying the prevention of uncertainty in the law is conformity.  The underlying 
motivation of conformity is the requirement that individuals inhibit inclinations that might 
disrupt and undermine smooth interaction and group functioning.   The emergent theme was 
therefore coded as conformity.  Once the initial coding was completed, the coding system was 
reviewed and rationalised to create a defined coding framework for analysis.   
 
2.5  The coding scheme for content analysis of legal judgments 
A coding scheme was developed which facilitated several layers of analysis relating personal 
values to legal concepts and legal theories of judicial decision making.  The final coding 
scheme is set out in Table 2.   
 
2.5.1 Personal Values 
The coding scheme reflected the ten value motivations identified by Schwartz.  These values 
were hedonism, self-direction, stimulation, benevolence, universalism, conformity, security, 
tradition, achievement and power.   
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Table 2 Final coding scheme for the identification of values in legal judgments 
Schwartz’s 
Values 
 
Legal Representation of 
Values 
 
Schwartz’s Values 
 
Legal Representation of 
Values 
 
Hedonism 
 
Enjoy life Conformity 1. Conforming with rule 
and obligations 
 
2. Preventing uncertainty in 
the law 
Self-Direction 1. Freedom 
             -autonomy 
             - liberty 
 
2.  Independence 
- judicial 
independence 
 
3.  Limits on power 
 
Security 1.  Family security  
 
2. National security 
 
3.Social order 
- limits on 
obligations 
- limited resources 
Universalism 1. Benefit to society (public 
interest) 
 
2. Broadminded (tolerant of 
other ideas and beliefs) 
 
3. Corporate responsibility 
 
4. Individual responsibility 
 
5. State responsibility 
 
6.Environmental 
responsibility 
 
7. Equality 
 
8. Protection of the 
vulnerable 
 
9. Social Justice (includes 
fairness) 
 
10. Flexibility in law 
 
11. Transparency in law 
 
Tradition 1.Respect for traditions of 
society (including 
religious)  
 
2. Positivist application of 
law 
 
3.Adherence to precedent 
 
4. Adherence to statute 
 
5. Adherence to the 
intentions of Parliament 
 
6. Respect for 
parliamentary role in law 
making 
 
 
7. Adherence to the 
hierarchy of the courts 
 
 
Benevolence 1. Helpfulness 
 
2. Honesty 
 
Achievement 1. Success 
 
Stimulation Varied life (no coding) Power 1. Power  
 
2. Authority 
 
  
100 
 
2.5.1 Legal representations of personal values. 
The codes were both pre-determined and emergent.  Pre-determined codes were based on 
values which were used by Schwartz to generate his model for example universalism includes 
values such as equality and social justice and tradition included religious tradition.  Codes 
based on legal concepts which could be linked to value motivations were also used these 
were either pre-determined or emergent.  For example, pre-determined codes encompassed 
within tradition included respect for legal traditions including adherence to precedent, 
adherence to statute, adherence to the intentions of Parliament and adherence to the hierarchy 
of the courts.    
 
Emergent codes were created based on themes which were identified during the initial 
coding.   For example, a code was generated which reflected a recurrent theme of the 
‘limitation of power of governing bodies’.  This code identified concepts which recognised 
the importance of limiting the power of State and regulatory bodies to encroach on individual 
and corporate autonomy.  This was coded as the positive espousal of self-direction which 
includes independence and freedom.  As the definitions by Schwartz of these values formed 
the basis of the ‘a priori’ coding these will be reiterated in this section.    
 
2.5.1.1  Self Direction   
Schwartz defined the overarching motivation of self-direction as the approbation of 
independent thought and action.  The values contained within this motivational type include 
freedom, creativity, independence, curiosity and self-respect.  Expressions of this value 
within legal judgments include the affirmation of individual liberty for example in this extract 
from Walumba Lumba (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Lord Dyson 
espouses the value of liberty: 
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I acknowledge that the principle that statutory powers should be 
interpreted in a way which is least restrictive of liberty ….304 
and autonomy 
The reason why the court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is that 
there should be respect for individual autonomy…..305 
The exercise of judicial freedom to disagree and reach an independent decision also reflects 
the values encompassed within self-direction.  Evidence of judicial freedom from other 
judges include phrases which highlight disagreement such as, 
The Court of Appeal was not accurate….306 
 I cannot agree
…..’307  
As discussed, the limitation of power and authority, affirms values encompassed within self-
direction, promoting freedom and independence.  This code encompassed the limits on the 
power of the state, the courts, corporations and individuals.  It is contrasted with the opposing 
values encompassed by self-enhancement, power and authority: 
 In conclusion on this issue, while there is considerable practical attraction 
in the notion that the court should be able to make the wide type of 
possession order which the Court of Appeal made in this case, following 
Drury [2004], I do not consider that the court has such power. It is 
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inconsistent with the nature of a possession order, and with the relevant 
provisions governing the powers of the court. The reasoning in the case on 
which it is primarily based, Djemal [1980], cannot sensibly be extended to 
justify the making of a wider possession order, and there are aspects of 
such an order which would be unsatisfactory.
308
 
2.5.1.2 Benevolence  
Benevolence was defined by Schwartz as the preservation and enhancement of the welfare of 
people with whom one is in frequent personal contact.  This goal encompasses values such as 
helpfulness, loyalty, forgiveness, honesty, responsibility, true friendship and mature love.  
This value was coded infrequently and this may be due to the close personal contact nature of 
this value. 
 
2.5.1.3 Universalism  
The overarching motivation for the value of universalism is the understanding, appreciation, 
tolerance and protection of the welfare of all people and of nature.  This is the broadest 
category of values and encompasses a wide range of values including those that respect 
human rights such as equality, social justice and those that respect the environment.  This 
motivation also encompasses other values including broad-mindedness, tolerance and 
wisdom.  Values identified by Schwartz as included in universalism such as equality and 
social justice can be identified in legal judgments.  Equality was frequently coded in 
judgments.  For example Lady Hale espoused the importance of equality in R(on the 
application of E) v JFS Governing Body: 
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It [Parliament] …adopted a model of formal equality, which allows only 
carefully defined distinctions and otherwise expects symmetry. A man 
must be treated as favourably as a woman, an Anglo-Saxon as favourably 
as an African Caribbean, a non-Jew as favourably as a Jew.
309
  
and Lord Rodger in HJ (Iran) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; 
No-one would proceed on the basis that a straight man or woman could 
find it reasonably tolerable to conceal his or her sexual identity 
indefinitely to avoid suffering persecution. Nor would anyone proceed on 
the basis that a man or woman could find it reasonably tolerable to 
conceal his or her race indefinitely to avoid suffering persecution. Such an 
assumption about gay men and lesbian women is equally unacceptable.
310
 
Protection of the vulnerable in society was also encompassed within universalism.  For the 
purposes of this study protection of the vulnerable in society was distinguished from equality. 
Equality reflects equal rights under the law, racial equality, gender equality and the protection 
of the vulnerable in society reflects the duty of society to protect a party which is identified as 
vulnerable or weaker.  For example in A v Essex County Council, which deals with the duty 
of a council to provide education for a severely disabled boy Lady Hale expressed the 
importance of protecting the most vulnerable in society.
311
  Schwartz also identified social 
justice as a value encompassed within universalism. For the purposes of this study social 
justice encompassed the principles of a society which is based on fairness.  It included the 
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concepts of equal rights and opportunities, fairness and moral rightness.  Coding included key 
words such as ‘fair’, ‘justice’ ‘fairness’ ‘reasonableness’ and ‘balance.’  
 
The expression of values encompassed in universalism in a legal context also includes 
expression of the importance of  tolerance of others beliefs which is defined as a fair, 
objective and permissive attitude towards those whose opinions, beliefs, practices, race or 
religion differ from one's own.  This value can be expressed either as espousal of the 
importance of religious tolerance in general or expressions of such tolerance for example in 
R(on the application of E) v JFS Governing Body, Lord Kerr espoused tolerance of religious 
customs: 
In the present case, the reason why the school refused M admission was, if 
not benign, at least perfectly understandable in the religious context.
312
 
One of the core themes of the values encompassed in universalism is the duty to act for the 
greater good of society as a whole.  This was evident in legal judgments as promoting the 
benefits to society or the public interest for example;  
The fact that this may, in effect, involve an auction between the two 
developers for the benefit of the community does not seem to me to be 
inherently objectionable.
313
 
Within the notion of promoting the interests of society, was the concept of social 
responsibility which is defined as the obligation any individual or organisation has to act to 
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benefit society at large.  This was coded under three different codes, corporate, individual and 
state responsibility. For example the duty of the State to care for those in military service was 
highlighted by Lord Hope in R (on the application of Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence: 
But one must not overlook the fact that there have been many cases where 
the death of service personnel indicates a systemic or operational failing 
on the part of the State.
314
 
2.5.1.4 Conformity:  
Schwartz defined conformity as the restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses 
likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms and to 
inhibit actions which upset the smooth running of social groups.  The values 
contained within this motivational goal include obedience, self-discipline, 
politeness, honouring parents and elders.  Legal representations of this value 
included the duty to conform to rules which is defined as an obligation of the 
individual or group to conform to the rules/regulations/laws governing society.  
For example;  
It is, of course, always important that the legal requirements are properly 
complied with, perhaps the more so in cases such as this, where the 
County Council is both the applicant for planning permission and the 
planning authority deciding whether it should be granted.
315
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Conformity requires clear and certain laws and conformity was also expressed in the theme 
evident in many cases, that the court had a duty to prevent uncertainty in the law.  For 
example, Lord Dyson in highlighted the importance of certainty in the law in Walumba 
Lumba (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: 
The implications of awarding vindicatory damages in the present case 
would be far reaching. Undesirable uncertainty would result.
316
 
2.5.1.5 Security:   
Security is defined by Schwartz as the safety, harmony and stability of society, relationships 
and oneself.  The values contained within the motivational goal reflect security of both the 
individual and society and include social order, family security, national security, reciprocity 
of favours, cleanliness, sense of belonging and health.  Values such as the importance of 
national security are evident in legal judgments.  For example in HM Treasury v Al-Ghabra 
Lord Hope espoused the importance of national security: 
The risk of serious and perhaps irreversible damage to efforts to defeat 
international terrorism in our case too must weigh heavily with this Court 
in deciding what it should do to meet the concerns that have been 
expressed by the Treasury. This is not simply a matter of meeting 
international obligations. The national interest in resisting threats to our 
own security is just as important.317  
The values encompassed in security also include social order and the importance of a stable 
society.  Intrinsic to a stable society and social order is the concept that there must be a limit 
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of the obligations (both financial and societal) of the State which recognises that although the 
State has a duty to individuals, the duty must have defined boundaries.  The State cannot 
accommodate limitless obligations.   This includes reducing the cost to society as a whole 
induced by an event or policy. Costs include financial (time, money, resources) and societal 
(harmony, stability, etc.).  For example, Lady Hale in R (on the application of BA) (Nigeria) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department identifies the importance in limiting the number 
of claims an asylum seeker can make to the courts, 
This country is not bound to allow people to make essentially the same 
claim time and time again as a way of staving off their departure.318 
Similarly, Lord Hope identifies the importance of limiting the wasting of public 
resources in HM Treasury v Al-Ghabra:  
I agree that to prosecute would plainly be a waste of time and public 
money.
319
 
2.5.1.6 Tradition:  
Schwartz defines tradition as respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas 
that one’s culture or religion impose on an individual.  This goal encompasses the values of 
respect for tradition, humility, devotion, acceptance of life and moderation.  This value was 
coded in legal judgments as respect for traditions of society including the deferential regard 
for religious, social or legal traditions.
320
  Respect for legal tradition included the adherence 
to precedent, adherence to statute, adherence to the intentions of Parliament, strictly positivist 
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application of the law and adherence to the hierarchy of the courts.  Finally, a separate code 
was created for respect for Parliament’s role in law making and the acknowledgement of the 
separation of powers central to legal tradition.   Examples included, 
If Parliament had intended that the power to detain could be used for a 
purpose other than the making or effecting of a deportation order, it would 
have had to have said this expressly and it has not done so.
321
 
If there is a need to reform the law in this area, it would be better to leave 
it to be dealt with by Parliament following a further report by the Law 
Commission.
322
 
2.5.1.7 Achievement   
Schwartz defines achievement as personal success through demonstrating competence 
according to social standards.  Achievement values emphasise competence in terms of the 
prevailing social standards, thereby obtaining social approval.  The values encompassed by 
this motivational goal include ambition, success, capability, influence, intelligence and self-
respect.
 
 This value was rarely coded in legal judgments.  
 
2.5.1.8 Power 
The defining goal here is the attainment of social status and prestige and control or 
dominance over people and resources.  The values contained within this motivational goal 
include social power, wealth, authority, public image and social recognition.  Legal 
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representations of this value included the positive espousal of the authority of the State and 
other governing bodies. 
2.5.1.9 Hedonism and Stimulation. 
There was no evidence of expression of these values within the cases analysed. 
 
2.5.2 Limits of the coding scheme 
This coding scheme, as with any qualitative research, is subject to interpretation.   Albeit a 
structured scheme, it is acknowledged that the Schwartz model of values represents 
overarching motivations and the legal text may require interpretation to assign judicial 
statements to the value motivations.  In many cases, the values underpinning the statements 
were clear, however situations did arise where the statements required interpretation.  This 
was particularly true for the foundational tools of judicial argumentation which provide a 
framework for the balancing of competing positions in indeterminate cases, reasonableness 
and proportionality.
323
  Although it has been recognised that the exercise of discretion and the 
balancing required by the use of these tools is not “valueless”, the identification of the values 
requires interpretation.
324
 
 
Reasonableness is recognised as a tool for balancing the ‘plurality of values’ which are 
evident in decisions where there are at least two competing reasons.  This balancing 
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apportions relative weight to these competing interests in a context dependent way.
325
 
Reasonableness tends to be a doctrine of deference and in the judgments analysed it was used 
as a conservative tool, to limit obligations or duties.
326
 
The standard of reasonableness expressed in the qualification ‘so far as is 
reasonably practicable’ ….makes it more, rather than less, likely in my 
view that the concept of safety is itself to be judged, ….by reference to 
what would, according to the knowledge and standards of the relevant 
time, have been regarded as safe ….327 
Similarly  
In summary, safety must, in my view, be judged according to the general 
knowledge and standards of the times. The onus is on the employee to 
show that the workplace was unsafe in this basic sense.
328
  
Proportionality, in contrast, was not a device of deference and conservation, indeed in the 
judgments analysed, proportionality was used to mitigate harshness and to achieve fairness, 
reflecting the values encompassed within universalism.  For example, 
Parliament plainly made the power to forfeit discretionary with the 
intention that the magistrates' court should discriminate between cases 
where forfeiture was warranted and cases where it was not. It seems to me 
natural to assume that Parliament intended the court to consider whether 
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forfeiture was a proportionate response to the facts of the particular 
case.
329
 
or 
The issue on this branch of the case, therefore, is whether JFS can show 
that the policy had a legitimate aim and whether the way it was applied 
was a proportionate way of achieving it. The burden is on JFS to prove 
that this was so.
330
 
In qualitative research, the researcher is not a completely ‘neutral observer’.331  It 
is accepted in this thesis that qualitative research is partial and situated and 
influenced by the positioned researcher.
332
   To this end, it is accepted within the 
context of this research, that decisions on coding are influenced by the researcher. 
It was not possible within the context of a PhD thesis to test the internal 
consistency of coding as this would require training other coders to statistically 
calculate inter-coder variation.   In the absence of a cohort of coders, one other 
trained coder did code at the value level the judgments in two cases.  There was, 
as expected, variation in the selection of statements for coding, but of those 
statements selected by both coders were consistent at the value level, such that the 
statements identified were attributed to the same value position.  The absence of a 
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statistical calculation of concordance does not undermine the findings of this 
thesis and the patterns of value expression identified which are validated by 
triangulation drawing on experimental psychometric testing and quantitative 
analysis.   
The Schwartz value model provides a suitable framework for the analysis of personal values 
in legal judgments. Values can be identified within legal judgments and these values can be 
systematically codified within the value framework.   The method, although detailed and 
time-consuming, provided data which is suitable for empirical analysis. Indeed, analysis of 
the judgments of the first 18 cases, which divided the Supreme Court since opening in 
October 2009, provided 2,932 paragraphs of text which contained 1,065 coded value 
statements.   It is acknowledged that all content analysis is subject to influences of the 
researcher, these influences are minimised by the systematic, structured nature of the coding.   
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3 Chapter 3 
Influence of Personal Values on Legal Judgments: A Case Analysis 
 
[T]he impact of background and perspective on judicial decision making 
is particularly relevant in close cases where the legal principles 
themselves permit more than one acceptable answer- precisely the type of 
case that reaches the Supreme Court.
333
  
This quote by Lady Hale highlights the importance of non-legal factors on the decisions in 
cases which divide legal opinion. The non-legal factors that influence the exercise of judicial 
discretion including ideology, activism, attitudes and demographics are underpinned by 
personal values.  Indeed, it could be suggested that the ‘perspective’ that Lady Hale is 
discussing, in this excerpt, is influenced by personal values.  The psychology of decision 
making suggests that the influence of personal values is heightened in uncertain decisions.   
 
The most legally uncertain cases heard in the Supreme Court, are those cases which divide 
the judicial bench, hard cases where the result is “not clearly dictated by statute or 
precedent”. 334  This chapter sets out to examine whether values can be identified in the 
judgments of one such case and seeks to demonstrate, through content and empirical analysis 
of a single close call case, how values are expressed in a case which divided judicial opinion.   
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This chapter proposes a value : decision paradigm which is validated by a small experimental 
psychometric study which examines the relationship between personal values, assessed using 
a psychometric instrument, and legal decision making by legal academics.  
 
3.1 Hard cases in the UK Supreme Court  
This research is set within the context of the Supreme Court for a variety of reasons.  Firstly, 
cases which reach the Supreme Court are ‘cases of the greatest public and constitutional 
importance.’ 335  The exercise of judicial discretion in such cases may have a significant 
impact on the law.  The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal for both criminal and civil 
cases therefore the results of the analysis will apply to both areas of law.  Finally, the cases 
which reach the Supreme Court cannot be easily decided by strict application of the law. For 
a case to reach the Supreme Court there must be valid arguments supporting both parties.  
Both parties must be able to show that the balance of societal interests rests in their favour 
and both parties have precedent or the intention of Parliament to support their positon.  Such 
cases cannot simply be decided on the routine application of the law and are by definition 
indeterminate hard cases.
336 
 There is legal uncertainty regarding the outcome and this 
indeterminacy opens the door to judicial discretion and it is through the exercise of judicial 
discretion in these uncertain decisions that personal values may play a role.  
 
3.2 Judicial discretion and uncertainty: case selection 
To test the hypothesis that judicial values are reflected in legal judgments a single case was 
selected.    Both academic commentators and the appellate judiciary agree that judges in the 
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Supreme Court have a degree of discretion which is not determined by legal rules and only to 
a certain extent by legal principle.  Although there is no consensus as to how many cases fall 
into this category, analysis of the cases heard between the opening of the Supreme Court in 
October 2009 to August 2014 revealed that the Supreme Court decided 243 cases, of which 57 
(23%) divided judicial opinion.   Using division as a reflection of legal uncertainty and the 
exercise of judicial discretion, it could be argued that in up to 23% of UK Supreme Court 
cases, where judicial interpretation of legitimate legal reasons results in two opposing 
decisions, the exercise of judicial discretion and judicial personal factors may play a role. 
 
Within these data, are a set of cases which are ‘close call’ cases, cases in which a single 
judicial decision decides the case (divisions include 3:2, 4:3 and 5:4).  This subset of cases 
account for 8% of cases heard and 34% of cases which divide judicial opinion. It is in these 
cases that the exercise of judicial discretion has the most overt impact.   The psychology of 
decision making suggests that values influence decisions where there is real uncertainty.  
Although all cases heard in the Supreme Court are hard cases and uncertain, to test this 
hypothesis a case with real uncertainty, a close call case, was selected.    
 
Alexy argues that a judicial decision may reflect a balancing between competing rules or 
principles.
 337
   Alexy defined a rule as an all or nothing “ought”, a legal imperative that has 
to be complied with fully or not at all.  In contrast, a legal principle can be optimised to 
varying degrees. The inherent flexibility in a decision which balances competing principles 
facilitates the exercise of judicial discretion.   This reasoning has been applied to human 
rights legislation with the suggestion that decisions which encompass fundamental human 
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rights can also be framed in the context of balancing of principles.
338
  Indeed, it has been 
argued by several academics such legislation has further enhanced judicial discretion.
339
  It is 
for this reason that a case which centred on fundamental principles of human rights was 
selected. 
 
Finally, it is the practice of the Supreme Court to sit in panels of seven or nine in cases of 
great public importance or where the court is being asked to depart from a previous 
decision.
340
  Such cases have the potential to be more difficult, emotive and uncertain and as 
such a case with a larger panel was selected.
 
 
 
3.3 The case for analysis:  R(on the application of E) v JFS Governing Body 
[2009] 
The case selected to present the value: decision paradigm is R(on the application of E) v JFS 
Governing Body, a case which was heard by nine Supreme Court Justices and closely divided 
judicial opinion.
341
  The facts of the case were relatively simple.  E challenged, through 
judicial review, the decision of the Jewish Free School to refuse admission to his son (M).  
The Jewish Free School is a State funded Jewish faith school with an excellent academic 
record which is consistently over-subscribed.
 342
    The school’s admissions policy gave 
preference to children who were recognised as Orthodox Jewish by the Office of the Chief 
Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregation of the Commonwealth (the OCR).
343
  The OCR 
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defines Orthodox Jewishness through application of the matrilineal test.  This test requires 
that the mother of the child is Jewish by birth or by Orthodox conversion.  In this case, M’s 
mother was not born Jewish and her conversion was not Orthodox but Masorti, a non-
orthodox form of Judaism.    On this basis, Boy M, who was a practicing Orthodox Jew, 
failed to meet the criteria of the matrilineal test and was refused admission. 
 
As a faith school, its admissions policy was exempt from the prohibition against 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief under the Equality Act 2006.  It was not 
exempt from prohibitions of race discrimination under the Race Relations Act 1976.  The Act 
prohibits discrimination based on ‘race or ethnic or national origins’.344  While it was 
accepted that the selection policy did discriminate, the key decision in this case was whether 
the policy was based on ethnic criteria (which would be prohibited under the Race Relations 
Act 1976) or simply a religious criteria (which is exempt under the Equality Act 2006) or 
both.  The Court of Appeal held that the admission policy breached the Race Relations Act 
1976 and discriminated on the grounds of ethnicity.  The majority of the Supreme Court 
upheld the Court of Appeal decision and dismissed the appeal, stating that the policy directly 
discriminated on the basis of ethnicity.   
 
The court was divided in its opinion.  Five Supreme Court Justices (Lord Phillips, Lady Hale, 
and Lords Mance, Kerr and Clarke) supported the majority position.  Four opposed the 
majority decision.  Two (Lords Hope and Walker) found that there was evidence of  indirect 
discrimination which was justifiable on the basis that it was a religious school and two 
Justices (Lords Rodger and Brown) found that there was no evidence of discrimination.  The 
clear division in the court over the case begs the question as to what influenced the Supreme 
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Court Justices to decide the case in the way that they did.    The central hypothesis of this 
thesis is that personal values play a role in judicial decision making and this chapter will 
present data which suggests that personal values may have played a role in the decision in 
this case. 
 
3.3.1 The structure of analysis of the JFS case 
This chapter consists of three elements of analysis of the judgments in the JFS case.  The first 
is the qualitative examination of the judgments for the expression of values.  The second is 
the quantitative analysis of values as espoused in these judgments.  This analysis is facilitated 
by the systematic rule-based content analysis based on the Schwartz classification of 
values.
345
  The final part of this chapter is an experimental examination of the influence of 
values on legal decisions.  This experiment uses a vignette of the JFS case and relates the 
decision in the case to personal values identified using a psychometric assessment of personal 
values.  
 
3.4 Part I:  Can personal values be identified in legal judgments? 
This analysis relied on the underlying assumption that judicial judgments contain value 
statements.  To address this assumption, a qualitative analysis of the JFS case is presented 
revealing values espoused within judgments.   
 
The JFS case centred on the definition of ‘ethnicity’ and whether Orthodox Jews could be 
classified as an ethnic group or simply a religious subset of a larger ethnic group of ‘Jews’.  
In reaching their decision, the majority (Lord Phillips, Lady Hale and Lords Mance, Kerr and 
Clarke) decided that the Jewish Free School discriminated on the basis of genetic descent 
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which was held to be direct racial discrimination prohibited under the Race Relations Act 
1976.   This was eloquently articulated by Lord Phillips at the opening of his judgment: 
[I]t is possible to identify two different cohorts, or groups, with an 
overlapping membership, those who are descended by the maternal line 
from a Jew, and those who are currently members of the Jewish ethnic 
group. Discrimination against a person on the grounds that he or she is, or 
is not, a member of either group is racial discrimination. JFS discriminates 
in its admission requirements on the sole basis of genetic descent by the 
maternal line from a woman who is Jewish, in the Mandla, as well as the 
religious sense. I can see no escape from the conclusion that this is direct 
racial discrimination.
346
 
Indeed, it was agreed that this form of discrimination could not be mitigated by the religious 
motivations of the parties nor the exception for conversion:   
A person who discriminates on the ground of race, as defined by the Act, 
cannot pray in aid the fact that the ground of discrimination is one 
mandated by his religion.
347
 
[M] was rejected because of his mother's ethnic origins, which were 
Italian and Roman Catholic. The fact that the Office of the Chief Rabbi 
would have over-looked his mother's Italian origins, had she converted to 
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Judaism in a procedure which they would recognise, makes no difference 
to this fundamental fact.
348
 
Although the minority reached the opposite decision, the reasoning of both the majority and 
the minority in this case centred on conflict between two facets of law.  The first was the 
prevention of discrimination and the promotion of equality which is encompassed in the 
value universalism and the second was the importance of conservation of religious tradition 
and the freedoms associated with it which is encompassed in the value tradition.   Lord 
Philips, who supported the majority decision, identified that these two competing values were 
central to the case and in reaching his decision he supported equality and the value 
universalism: 
This case cannot therefore be viewed as a mere disagreement between 
different Jewish denominations, for example about the criteria for 
conversion. It turns, more fundamentally, on whether it is permissible for 
any school to treat one child less favourably than another because the 
child does not have whatever ancestry is required, in the school's view, to 
make the child Jewish.
349
 
Those who supported the majority found that the policy gave rise to discrimination and held 
that the policy created inequality that could not be justified by religious tradition.  Indeed this 
was the central theme of all the majority judgments: 
To treat as determinative the view of others, which an applicant may not 
share, that a child is not Jewish by reason of his ancestry is to give effect 
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not to the individuality or interests of the applicant, but to the viewpoint, 
religiously and deeply held though it be, of the school applying the less 
favourable treatment. That does not seem to me either consistent with the 
scheme or appropriate in the context of legislation designed to protect 
individuals from discrimination.
350
 
Many of the majority judgments acknowledged the importance of tradition as a competing 
value, Lord Clarke in contrast dismissed religious tradition as ‘irrelevant’ to the decision: 
If that is so, as I see it, the fact that the discrimination was also on 
religious grounds is irrelevant, as are both the fact that the religious 
grounds have been adopted for thousands of years and the fact that the 
Chief Rabbi and the OCR (and therefore JFS) concentrated wholly on the 
religious questions.
351
 
All of the majority judgments espoused the importance of equality.  Other values 
encompassed by universalism were also espoused.  An individual who values universalism 
above other values will place the needs of society as a whole above those of the individual.  
This was reflected in the judgment of Lord Mance who identified the wider impact of the 
school admission policy and argued that the policy would have a detrimental effect not only 
on the individual affected but also on society as a whole: 
The school's policy was formulated without considering the extent to 
which others professing the Jewish faith, but not in the Orthodox Jewish 
tradition, were separated by it from friends and from the general Jewish 
                                                 
350
 ibid [90] 
351
 Lord Clarke in in R (on the application of E) (Respondent) v Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions 
Appeal Panel of JFS (Appellants) and others [2009] UKSC 15, [149] 
122 
 
community by the school's admissions policy, or about the extent to which 
this might cause grief and bitterness in inter- or intra-community relations 
– matters about which some evidence was tendered before the Court.352 
The judgments of the majority centred on values encompassed by universalism.  In contrast, 
those Supreme Court Justices (Lords Hope, Rodger, Walker and Brown) who held a minority 
position argued that the policy did not breach the Race Relations Act and espoused values 
encompassed in the opposing value, tradition.  Lords Hope and Walker argued that there was 
evidence of indirect discrimination but the discrimination was justified.  They focussed on the 
motivation underpinning the policy and argued that the motivation was religious not racial.  
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court Justices promoted the importance of religious 
tradition which they argued served to justify the indirect discrimination: 
I agree with Lord Brown that no court would ever dictate who, as a matter 
of Orthodox religious law, is to be regarded as Jewish.
353
 
 Jewishness based on matrilineal descent from Jewish ancestors has been 
the Orthodox religious rule for many thousands of years, subject only to 
the exception for conversion. To say that this ground was a racial one is to 
confuse the effect of the treatment with the ground itself. It does have the 
effect of putting M into an ethnic Jewish group which is different from 
that which the Chief Rabbi recognises as Jewish. So he has been 
discriminated against. But it is a complete misconception, in my opinion, 
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to categorise the ground as a racial one. There is nothing in the way the 
OCR handled the case or its reasoning that justifies that conclusion.
354
 
In reaching the same decision on the outcome, Lords Rodger and Brown relied on different 
reasoning.  The Justices argued that there was no evidence of discrimination (direct or 
indirect).  Indeed, the late Lord Rodger delivered a very strongly worded opinion which 
centred on the importance of the preservation of religious tradition: 
Rather, the whole point of such schools is their religious character. ….The 
School's policy is to give priority to children whom the Orthodox Chief 
Rabbi recognises as Jewish. From the standpoint of Orthodoxy, no other 
policy would make sense. This is because, in its eyes, irrespective of 
whether they adhere to Orthodox, Masorti, Progressive or Liberal 
Judaism, or are not in any way believing or observant, these are the 
children – and the only children - who are bound by the Jewish law and 
practices which, it is hoped, they will absorb at the School and then 
observe throughout their lives.
355
 
He criticised the courts’ intervention in the 3,500 years of Jewish law and argued that such an 
intervention would undermine this historic tradition.    Despite different reasoning, all the 
judgments of the Supreme Court Justices who reached the minority decision supported the 
values encompassed in tradition.   
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This brief extract of the reasoning of both the majority and minority judgments suggested that 
the case centred on a decision between the dominant values encompassed in universalism and 
tradition.
356
  The Supreme Court Justices identified the competing values in their reasoning 
and in reaching a decision the judge balanced these competing values and promoted one 
value above another.   In this context, the majority promoted values encompassed in 
universalism.  In contrast, the Supreme Court Justices who supported the minority position 
promoted the values encompassed in tradition.    
 
Qualitative content analysis of the judgments identified the values that underlie the key issues 
relevant to the decision.  Indeed, the qualitative analysis revealed that the decision can be 
understood as reflecting competing sets of values with the majority favouring universalism 
and the minority favouring tradition.  The qualitative analysis, although revealing, does not 
identify how frequently these values are discussed within the judgments and whether there 
was a quantitative difference in the expression of these values within competing judgments.  
The qualitative analysis also only served to identify the dominant values within the 
judgments, it does not address whether other values play a role.  To address these questions, 
the judgments were subjected to quantitative content analysis within the NVivo 
programme.
357
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3.5 Part II: Quantitative analysis of the values in the judgments of the JFS case  
The judgments in the JFS case ran to 259 paragraphs.  All nine Supreme Court Justices who 
sat on the bench wrote a judgment.
358
  Empirical analysis of the individual judgments 
revealed a stark contrast between the values expressed by the majority and those expressed by 
the minority.
359
  The results of the quantitative analysis are presented in Figure 3.5-1.  The 
judgments varied in length and in the number of coded sections which expressed a value.  
Therefore the minority and majority coding for each value motivation was expressed as 
percentage of the total number of coded sections in either the combined minority or majority 
judgments.  This form of analysis standardised the data and facilitated comparison of 
expression of individual values between minority and majority judgments.
360
   In presenting 
the data this way, it was standardised for the number and length of the minority/majority 
judgments and also the number of value codes per judgment. 
 
 
Figure 3.5-1 Quantitative analysis of the values expressed in the judgments of R v JFS. 
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Values espoused by the majority are presented in dark grey and those of the minority are 
presented in dotted grey.  The individual values are represented on the X axis.   
 
Stimulation, hedonism, achievement and benevolence were not coded in any opinion.  Power 
was only coded in the opinion of Lord Hope and security was only coded in the opinion of 
Lady Hale.   Conformity was coded three times in the opinion of Lord Hope and once in the 
opinion of Lord Phillips. 
 
Over half the values espoused in majority judgments were encompassed within universalism 
which represented 55% of all coding in these judgments.
361
  The majority also espoused 
values encompassed in self-direction (26% of all coding).  Although the majority did espouse 
values encompassed in tradition, it only represented 16% of the total.  
 
In contrast, the values espoused in the minority judgments were encompassed in tradition 
which represented 59% of the overall coding for the minority judgments.     Although the 
values encompassed in universalism were coded in the minority judgments, the coding only 
represented 16% of the total.  The values encompassed in self-direction were also coded, but 
the coding was less than the majority judgments at 18%. 
 
Quantitative analysis of the values espoused in the judgments revealed a different pattern of 
value expression in the judgments of those supporting the majority decision and those 
judgments supporting the minority position.  In the judgments of the majority, the 
preponderance of value coding was encompassed within universalism.  This contrasted 
starkly with the judgments of the minority which were dominated by the values encompassed 
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in tradition.  The quantitative analysis of values expressed in the judgments supports the 
qualitative analysis. 
 
 
Sub-analysis of the values content revealed further differences between the majority and 
minority judgments.   In the majority judgments, 75% of the universalism coding was in the 
sub-category of ‘equality’.362  This was in contrast to only 28% of the total coding in the 
minority judgments.  The minority espoused universalism in the context of ‘tolerance of the 
belief of others’ and ‘social justice’ which accounted for 71% of total minority universalism 
coding.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
Similarly, sub-analysis of the value tradition revealed that 80% of the coding encompassed 
within tradition in the minority judgments was espoused in the context of ‘respect for 
traditions in society including religious tradition’.  In contrast, although those who supported 
                                                 
362
 Coded statements were expressed as a percentage of the total coding for universalism in the majority 
judgments.   
Majority 
Equality
Tolerance
Benefit to
Society
Social Justice
Other
Minority 
Equality
Tolerance
Benefit to
society
Social
Justice
Other
Figure 3.5-2 : Sub-analysis of values the encompassed in universalism  
 
128 
 
the majority position also espoused tradition in this context, it only accounted for 45% of the 
coding with 55% espoused within the context of ‘respect for legal tradition’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
     
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
           
 
 
There was also a difference in the distribution of values in self-direction espoused by both the 
majority and the minority.  Self-direction encompasses concepts such as individual freedom 
and independence.  In the context of legal judgments, the value encompasses both the 
freedom of the individual but also judicial freedom to disagree or interpret the law 
differently.  For example: 
Majority 
Respect for
Traditions in
Society
(including
religious
tradition)
Respect for
Legal Tradition
Minority 
Respect for
Traditions in
Society
(including
religious
tradition)
Respect for
Legal Tradition
Figure 3.5-3 Sub-analysis of the values encompassed in tradition. 
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The reason I disagree with Lord Hope (or perhaps the ground on which I 
do so) is that his opinion depends upon the state of mind of the Chief 
Rabbi.
363
 
For my part I do not accept that more recent decisions of the House of 
Lords call for a more nuanced approach than that stated in the 
Birmingham and Eastleigh cases.
364
 
I would hold therefore that Lord Goff’s rejection of a subjective approach 
was expressed too broadly
365
 
Here the judges are identifying a choice, making it but not always justifying it.  They assert 
the right to (self) determine what and how these arguments are relevant to their decision.  
These exercises of judicial freedom accounted for 86% of the coding within self-direction in 
the majority judgments.  Individual freedom was also coded specifically in the judgments of 
Lord Mance.
 
  In contrast, individual freedom was not espoused in the minority judgments 
and coding within self-direction focused solely on judicial freedom to disagree or interpret 
the law differently.    
 
In summary, quantitative analysis of the values expressed in the judgments of the minority 
and majority identified a differential pattern of expression associated with the decision 
reached.   Although both the majority and minority espoused the values encompassed in self-
direction, the majority supported values encompassed in universalism and the minority 
supported values encompassed in tradition.  This study provides evidence of differences in 
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the expression of values related to opposing decisions in indeterminate cases.  The next 
question is whether the values expressed in the judicial judgments are reflective of the 
judicial personal values.  
 
3.6  Part III:  Are the values expressed in opposing decisions reflective of 
intrinsic personal values?  The experiment 
Ideally, the Supreme Court Justices who decided the case would complete a Schwartz Value 
Survey (SVS) to directly assess their personal values and relate these to the decision reached. 
However, judicial participation was declined and the letter on behalf of the Master of the 
Rolls, Lord Dyson, states: 
[A]ny perception that judges allow matters other than the evidence and 
arguments presented in court influence their decision making could 
undermine public confidence in the judiciary.
366
 
Given the perceived sensitivity of this research, an alternative approach was taken to 
experimentally test the value: decision paradigm.  
 
The subjects for this study were academics in Cardiff Law School.  It is acknowledged that 
this approach does not make a direct link between Supreme Court Justices’ values and 
decision making.  However, this study does examine whether such a link exists in 
sophisticated analysers of law.  Indeed, this approach has been used in other psychological 
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experimental examinations of judicial decision making including an experiment by Englich et 
al examining criminal sentencing.
367
   
 
Ethical committee approval was received for an experimental survey.  The subjects were 
presented with an online survey instrument which included six different vignettes based on 
cases which divided the Supreme Court.  One of the vignettes was based on the JFS case. The 
subjects were asked to decide each vignette and rate the factors that influenced their decision.  
The factors were designed to reflect majority and minority positions in the case.  Finally, the 
subjects were asked to complete a psychometric evaluation of values, the Schwartz Value 
Survey (SVS).  The SVS was completed after deciding all six vignettes and therefore it is 
unlikely that any individual vignette would influence the value survey.  The relationship 
between the decision reached in the JFS case vignette and personal values was assessed.   
 
3.6.1 The experimental methodology 
The vignette of the JFS case is presented in Appendix 1.  The vignette set out the brief facts 
of the case and a summary of the legal principles behind the decision.  The respondents were 
asked to decide whether the policy breached the Race Relations Act 1976 s1.  Once 
respondents reached a decision, the respondents were asked to rate the factors that influenced 
the decision reached on a scale of -1 (irrelevant) to 7 (extremely important).   
 
The factors listed included some of the factors that were coded within the judgments of the 
JFS case (such as autonomy, equality, social justice and respect for traditions) and factors 
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which were irrelevant and acted as controls.
368
   The respondents were also asked to decide 
five other vignettes and rate the factors that influenced their decisions. 
 
Once the respondents completed the legal decision making section, the respondents were 
asked to complete a SVS.  The questionnaire listed 31 different values which were related to 
the ten different value motivations.
369
  The respondents were asked to rate each value based 
on the ‘importance of the value to them’ on a scale of -1 (irrelevant) to 7 (extremely 
important).   A standardised mean for each of the ten value motivations was calculated.
370
  
 
Eighteen respondents completed the survey which reflected a response rate of 30%.  All were 
full time academics within the law school engaged in undergraduate and postgraduate 
teaching.  This survey was an experimental survey and was therefore not designed to identify 
the values or decisions that are representative of the academic population.  The experimental 
design simply identified in this group of respondents whether there was a relationship 
between personal values and the decision reached.  The limited number of respondents does 
mean that subtle relationships may not be identified.  There may be a response bias, as those 
who chose to complete the survey may have different value patterns to those who chose not 
to complete the survey.  Despite these limitations, the survey elicited significant results and 
revealed a relationship between personal values and decision making. 
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3.6.2 The experimental results - the value : decision paradigm confirmed. 
As in the Supreme Court case, the vignette divided opinion. The majority of the respondents 
agreed with the Supreme Court decision that the admission criteria breached the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (n=11).  A significant minority (n = 7) did not agree.   Statistical analysis 
revealed that there was a significant correlation between the respondents rating of values 
encompassed in universalism (equality, wisdom, social justice, broadmindedness and 
protection of the environment) and the decision reached.
371
  Those who rated these values 
highly were more likely to agree that the policy breached the Race Relations Act 1976.    
 
In contrast, as predicted by content analysis of the Supreme Court judgments, there was a 
trend to a negative correlation between tradition and the decision reached.
372
  This suggests 
that those who rate the values encompassed in tradition (respect for tradition, moderation and 
‘acceptance of my portion in life’) highly were less likely to agree that the policy breached 
the Race Relations Act 1976.   
 
This link between values and judicial decisions was extended by the experimental survey.  
The survey identified a clear relationship between intrinsic personal values and legal 
decisions.  Importantly, it reflected the findings of the content analysis.  Those who rated the 
values encompassed in universalism highly were more likely to decide that the policy 
breached equality legislation.  In contrast, those who reached the opposite decision were 
more likely to rate tradition highly.   
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The data supports the hypothesis that intrinsic personal values can influence the legal 
decision in indeterminate cases.   This relationship between values and legal decisions was 
not limited to the JFS vignette.  Indeed, in each vignette analysed there was a correlation 
between the decision reached and personal values.
373
  It is evident even in a small sample that 
there was a relationship between values and legal decisions in this legal expert population.  
 
3.6.3 How do these values reflect in reasoning? 
Finally, the respondents were asked to rate the importance of certain factors to the decision 
they reached (Appendix 1).  This aspect of the study was to examine whether there was an 
association between the reasoning and the decision reached.  The analysis assessed whether 
the factors which were identified by the respondents as significantly influencing their 
decision were related to their personal values.   
 
Respondents were asked to identify the factors that influenced their decision after deciding 
the case.  The respondents were given a list of 15 factors and asked to rate the ‘factor on its 
importance in your decision’. The scale used was the same as that for the SVS with -1 
(irrelevant) to 7 (extremely important).  Each factor was clearly defined.   
 
The 15 factors included factors which were identified in the judicial reasoning of the case 
including ‘equality’, ‘tolerance of others beliefs’ which was defined as a fair, objective, 
permissive attitude towards those whose judgments, beliefs, practices, race or religion differ 
from one's own and ‘respect for tradition’ which was defined as feeling or showing 
deferential regard for the inherited, established or customary pattern of thought, action or 
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behaviour (religious, social or legal).
374
  Other factors were included which had no relevance 
to the decision taken and acted as a control such as ‘freedom of enterprise’.  All factors 
included in this section could be related to underlying value motivations.   
 
Respondents rated ‘tolerance of others beliefs’ as the most important factor in reaching the 
decision regardless of the decision made.  However, analysis of the data also identified 
significant differences between the ratings of factors which were dependant on the decision 
reached.  The data is set out in the Table 3 below which relates these factors to the 
motivational values.   
Table 3:  Analysis of the respondents reported influences on reasoning 
Values Reasons Breach of  
Race 
Relations 
Act (N=11) 
No breach 
of Race 
Relations 
Act  (N=7) 
Kendall 
Tau-b
375
 
Significance 
(one-tailed) 
Universalism Equality 7 4.5 0.415 0.03 
 Social Justice 6 2 0.48 0.01 
 Protection of the 
Vulnerable 
3 -1 0.403 0.04 
 
Tradition Respect for 
tradition 
1 5 -0.657 0.002 
 Limits on the 
Obligations of the 
State 
1 4.5 -0.403 0.03 
 Conformity to 
Rules 
3 4.5 -0.392 0.04 
The higher the median value score  the more important the factor was to the decision reached for example a 
score of 7 represents a value that was extremely important, 3 (moderately important) and -1 (irrelevant). 
                                                 
374
 Equality was defined as equal treatment and rights for all people regardless of their difference. 
375
 Kendall tau-b coefficient is a non-parametric test to assess the association between two measured quantities.  
This test does not rely on any assumption of the distribution of X and Y.  It is commonly used in a 2x2 analysis 
as presented here.  
136 
 
 
Those respondents who supported the majority decision and decided that the admissions 
policy breached equality legislation rated both ‘equality’ and ‘social justice’ as extremely and 
very important to the decision reached.  This was a significantly higher rating than those 
respondents who adopted a minority position.
376
   
 
‘Protection of the vulnerable’ was defined as the principle that society should protect the 
weaker and less able members.  Again, those who found that the policy breached the Race 
Relations Act 1976 found that ‘protection of the vulnerable’ was moderately important to the 
decision.  In comparison those who do not agree rated this factor as irrelevant to the 
decision.
377
     
 
Equality, social justice and protection of the vulnerable are all concepts which are 
encompassed in the value universalism.  These data demonstrate that those who agreed that 
the policy breached the equality legislation and who rated the values encompassed in 
universalism highly also rated the factors, ‘equality’, ‘social justice’ and ‘protection of the 
vulnerable’, which are encompassed in universalism, as significantly more important to their 
decision, than those who reached the opposite decision.   
 
In contrast, those respondents who did not agree that the admission policy breached the Race 
Relations Act 1976 rated ‘respect for tradition’ as very important.  This was in stark contrast 
to those who reached the opposing view and tended to rate ‘respect for tradition’ as 
irrelevant.
378
  Similarly, those who did not find the policy breached the Race Relations Act 
                                                 
376
 Social justice was defined in this context as the principle of a society which is based on equality and fairness.   
377
 Median Score; Yes = 3 (moderately important), No = -1 (irrelevant).  Kendall tau-b = 0.403, p = 0.04. 
378
 Respect for tradition’ was defined as feeling or showing deferential regard for the inherited, established or 
customary pattern of thought, action or behaviour (religious, social or legal).   
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1976 also rated ‘the duty to conform to rules’ and ‘limitations of the obligations of the State’ 
as significantly more important than respondents who found that there was a breach.
379
    
These concepts are included in the values of tradition and conformity, which were revealed 
by quantitative analysis to be espoused by the Supreme Court Justices supporting the 
minority opinion. 
 
In summary, the respondents regarded factors that were consistent with their values as more 
persuasive.  These data provide further support for the relationship between intrinsic personal 
values and legal decisions.   
 
3.7 The value: decision paradigm 
This study translates theories and techniques from psychological research to start to address 
the critical socio-legal question ‘how do judges decide cases?’  Psychologists have 
demonstrated a relationship between personal values and decision making and this case study 
of a single close call case from the Supreme Court begins the task of translating 
psychological theory to legal practice.  The Schwartz value framework provides a new 
method of analysing and understanding judicial decisions and the validity of the content 
analysis method to identify values in legal judgments is established and affirmed by the 
experimental survey.  
 
                                                 
379
 Duty to conform to rules in this context was defined as an obligation of the individual or group to conform to 
the rules/regulations/laws governing society as a whole. Those who did not agree rated the duty to conform to 
rules as significantly more important than respondents who did agree that there was a breach of the Race 
Relations Act.  ‘Limitations on the obligations of the State’ recognises that although the State has a duty to 
individuals, the duty must have defined boundaries. The State cannot accommodate limitless obligations.  Those 
who did not agree that there was a breach of the Race Relations Act rated the limitations on the obligations of 
the State as more important to the decision than those who agreed that there was a breach. This concept was 
included in the content analysis coding scheme as contained within social order and security.  Although the 
concept was in keeping with the decision it was not coded in the minority opinion. 
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Drawing on the value content analysis, the case study employed several methods to explore 
the overarching hypothesis that there is an association between personal values and judicial 
decisions.  The initial qualitative analysis of the JFS case revealed values within the 
judgments in this indeterminate ‘close call’ case.    Quantitative content analysis of the value 
expression revealed evidence of competing values, with a different pattern of values 
expressed in the majority and minority judgments.  The analysis suggests that in deciding a 
case which narrowly divided the court, the Supreme Court Justices balance these values.  In 
reaching a decision, at least one not governed by precedent, the Supreme Court Justices 
support one or more values above another.  Indeed, in the context of this single case, the 
quantitative analysis of the judgments suggests that in close call cases, uncertain decisions, 
where the law does not provide a clear answer, values play a role.   
 
Personal values can be identified directly using the SVS psychometric instrument.   This was 
incorporated into an experimental survey and the value: decision paradigm was replicated in 
a small sample of legal academics using this instrument.  Indeed, the analysis suggests that 
values underpin both the decision and the selection of the factors that influence the legal 
decision.  This data suggests that the psychological model which demonstrates the role of 
personal values in decision making is applicable to judicial decision making.   
 
Current debates surrounding non-legal factors which influence judicial decision making focus 
on demographics, political and ideology positions.  Personal values act at a more 
subconscious level and may provide a link between these non-legal factors.  This case study 
suggests that judicial decision making is not binary between one position or another but a 
more detailed nuanced balancing of competing values which are more diverse than simply a 
political or ideological position.  Indeed, although the law provides the basis for framing and 
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constraining judicial discretion, in this legally uncertain case at least, it is the personal values 
of an individual judge that influences how that judicial discretion is exercised and that, in 
turn, can influence the way in which the law develops.  The following chapters start to 
investigate the extent and limitations of the value: decision paradigm.   
  
140 
 
4 Chapter 4 
Does the Value: Decision Paradigm Apply to all Indeterminate Cases? 
Division, dissent and judicial values 
 
The rules are created by the judges themselves. They are created out of 
materials that include constitutional and statutory language and previous 
cases, but these conventional materials quickly run out when an 
interesting case arises; in those cases the conventional materials may 
influence, but they do not determine, the outcome.  To decide these the 
formalist needs a metaprinciple….These principles are not found in 
orthodox materials (though that invariably is the pretence); they are 
imposed.  And there is no metric for arbitrating among them, just endless 
contestation.  That doesn’t exclude the possibility that one of them is true, 
but there is no way to determine which one that is, the choice among them 
is rationally indeterminate.
380
 
It could be argued that the JFS case is one such rationally indeterminate case.  A case where 
there is uncertainty, where the law does not provide a clear answer.  The division of the 
Supreme Court Justices reflects equally legally legitimate opposing positions.  The analysis 
of the JFS case revealed different values expressed in judgments written in support of 
opposing decisions.  The experimental survey supported the role of personal values in legal 
decision making.  This chapter sets out to examine the range and limitations of the value: 
                                                 
380
 RA Posner, 'The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century' (2006) 86 Boston University Law Review 
1049, page 1051 – 1052. 
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decision paradigm in cases decided by the Supreme Court which divided judicial opinion.  In 
doing so, this chapter draws on psychological research to start to develop a theory of judicial 
decision making linking the value: decision paradigm, the exercise of discretion, uncertainty, 
and division.   
 
4.1 Defining dissent and division 
This study defines dissent as Hanretty defines it, with a dissenting judgment as one ‘which 
disagrees with the majority of the court over how to dispose of the case.’381   Judicial dissent 
is typically conceptualised as disagreement, and it is judicial disagreement on the outcome of 
a case which results in division.  This thesis views judicial disagreement and division on the 
outcome of a case, as a continuum.  Cases with the highest level of judicial disagreement and 
division are close call cases, like the JFS case, cases in which the outcome turns on a single 
decision.  These are cases that divide the judicial panel, 3:2, 3:4 or 5:4.  The next stage are 
the  ‘minority decisions’, which are not close calls, but where both outcomes are viewed as 
valid and more than one Supreme Court Justice supports the minority position.  The next are 
‘single dissents’ where one Supreme Court Justice disagrees with the majority position, and 
delivers a lone dissenting judgment.  Cases where the Supreme Court Justices agree on the 
outcome but there is more than a single judgment may also be considered within the 
framework of disagreement, albeit of reasoning rather than outcome with total outcome 
consensus reflected as a single judgment.
382
  This is represented graphically in Figure 4.1-1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
381
 C. Hanretty , 'Comparative Judicial Dissent' European Consortium of Political Research< 
http://new.ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/eb76e6a8-2911-4d3c-8fcf-e61920b03e81.pdf> 
382
 It is recognised that consensus does not reflect total agreement, indeed institutional and personal factors may 
influence a Supreme Court Justice to achieve consensus on an outcome to which they may disagree. 
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Complete         Consensus 
Division         No Division 
 
Close calls Minority decisions Single Dissents      Consensus  Single judgment 
more than one SCJ        Outcome agreed 
opposes the majority       multiple judgments 
 
 
Figure 4.1-1: Graphic representation of the continuum of judicial division. 
 
 
4.2 Division in the UK Supreme Court 
The pattern of division in the decisions of the UK Supreme Court per calendar month is 
presented in Figure 4.2-2.  This data set comprised of 243 decided cases.  Of these cases, 57 
(23%) divided judicial opinion, 27 (11%) with single dissenting judgments and 20 (8%) were 
close call cases in which a single vote influenced the final outcome, for example 3:2, 4:3 and 
5:4 decisions.  Finally there was also a set of 10 cases (4%) which divided opinion with more 
than one judgment supporting the minority position (for example 5:2, 6:3 and 7.2).   
The data is presented per year in Table 4 (below).   
 
Table 4:  Division in the Supreme Court - First four years 
 Consensus Close Call Minority Single dissent 
Total 77% 8% 4% 11% 
Year 1  76% 11% 2% 11% 
Year 2 72% 7% 7% 14% 
Year 3 72% 8% 4% 16% 
Year 4 80% 9% 4% 7% 
The years run from October 2009 – end of September 2010 (year 1) etc.  The divided cases are categorised 
based on the form of division.  The rate of division and consensus is expressed as a percentage of the total 
number of judgments delivered in that year. 
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The average rate of division in the Supreme Court ranges from 28% (2010 – 2011) to 20% 
(2012 – 2013) with some variation in the prevalence of dissenting and minority judgments.  
The rate of close call divided cases between 7% – 11%.  There was significantly less minority 
cases, with a rate between 2% – 7%.  Single dissenting judgments were issued in between 
11% -16% of decided cases in the first three years.   The highest rate of dissent occurred in 
the Trinity term of 2010 – 2011, with five decided cases containing single dissenting 
judgments, two delivered by Lord Kerr and one each by Lord Mance, Lady Hale and Lord 
Rodger.    Although the rate of division decreased in 2012 – 2013, this decrease was reflected 
in individual dissenting judgments only and the proportion of minority judgments with two or 
more dissenting judgments has remained the same.   
 
The high rate of individual dissent in the first three years suggests that the Supreme Court 
Justice’s personal motivation to disagree overcame any psychological and institutional 
pressures towards consensus.    Although the rate of division has not significantly altered 
under the tenure of Lord Neuberger, the rate of single dissent has changed with a notable 
decrease to 7% in 2012 – 2013.  This suggests that institutional pressures may have changed 
which overcomes the internal drive to deliver a lone dissent. 
 
The central hypothesis of this thesis is that values are more likely to play a role in decision 
making in these cases that divide judicial opinion, however, institutional factors and features 
of the cases also influence the rate of division.  Indeed, there are some cases in the UK 
Supreme Court which are more likely to cause division than others.   
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Figure 4.2-2 Distribution of judgments in cases decided in the first four years of the UK Supreme Court.
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Each bar represents the number of judgments released in a single month, divided in consensus decisions, and those with a single dissenting judgment(dissent) and more 
than one dissenting judgment (divided cases – in the table referred to as minority). 
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4.2.1 Cases heard by panels of seven and nine. 
The pattern of division significantly increases in cases with larger panels of seven or nine 
Supreme Court Justices.
383
  The cases heard by larger panels are those where, 
[The] Court is being asked to depart from a previous decision, or there is a 
possibility of its doing so, or if the case raises significant constitutional 
issues or for other reasons is of great public importance.
384
 
 
The majority of cases were heard by a panel of five Supreme Court Justices (79%), of which 
18% divided judicial opinion, of these the majority were single dissents (62%).  The panels 
only increased beyond five Supreme Court Justices in approximately one fifth of all cases 
decided in the Supreme Court.  15% of all cases heard in the first four years of the Supreme 
Court were heard by a panel of seven Justices, 35% of these cases divided judicial opinion, 
there was proportionately less individual dissenting judgments and almost 70% were cases in 
which two or more Supreme Court Justices opposed the decision reached by the majority.  
Only 6% of cases were heard by a bench of nine Supreme Court Justices.  Of these cases 71% 
divided judicial opinion, of which 70% of cases were minority decisions.  An increased rate 
of division is also apparent in the US Supreme Court when the case involves the overturning 
of precedent.
385
   The rate of division may also be influenced by the subject matter of the 
case.  
 
                                                 
383
 Kendall tau-b = 0.286, p <0.001 
384
 Lord Hope, 'The Creation of the Supreme Court – Was it Worth it?' (Barnard’s Inn Reading, London, 24 June 
2010)  
385
 J Kaminski and GJ Shaffer, (2005) 'Unanimity and the Supreme Court:  Anatomy of a Judicial Blowout'  
<http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/apworkshop/kaminski-shaffer.pdf> accessed 20.1.2014 
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4.2.2 Subject matter of the case 
Corley et al (2010) identified that the subject matter of a case was associated with division in 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  Cases centred on topics that are contentious within society are more 
likely to have a similar effect on the court and result in division.
386
   Narrow cases, which 
only raise a single issue of law, are more likely to achieve consensus.
387
  However, Kaminiski 
and Schaffer identified cases which involved a ruling on civil liberties and rights issues, were 
more likely to end with division.
388
  This was confirmed by Corley et al (2010).
389
  Although, 
this form of analysis has not be carried out on cases heard by the UK Supreme Court Lord 
Kerr suggested that; 
Since the coming into force of the Human Rights Act decisions that 
judges must make in many cases are far less likely than in times past to be 
determined by their view of black letter law.
390
 
 
Indeed, Lord Kerr suggested that cases which centre on the application of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 are more likely to be rationally indeterminate and the outcome uncertain.  It is the 
exercise of discretion in these cases which may lead to disagreement and result in division.  
This was supported by empirical evidence by Chris Hanretty who suggested that cases 
involving human rights issues are less likely to achieve consensus.
391
  Although there are case 
                                                 
386
 P Corley and others, 'Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United States Supreme 
Court.' (2010) 31 Justice Systems Journal 1 
387
 DR Songer and J Siripurapu, 'The Unanimous Case of the Supreme Court of Canada as a Test of the 
Attitudinal Model' (2009) 42 Canadian Journal of Political Science 87 
388
 J Kaminski and GJ Shaffer, (2005) 'Unanimity and the Supreme Court:  Anatomy of a Judicial Blowout'  
<http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/apworkshop/kaminski-shaffer.pdf> accessed 20.1.2014 
389
 P Corley and others, 'Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United States Supreme 
Court.' (2010) 31 Justice Systems Journal 1 
390
 Lord Kerr, 'Dissenting Judgments - Self-indulgence or self-sacrifice.' (The Birkenhead Lecture, London, 8 
October 2012) 
391
 C Hanretty, 'Lumpers and Splitters on the United Kingdom Supreme Court' (American Political Science 
Association 2013 Annual Meeting, Washington, 1 September 2013) 
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features and institutional features that are more likely to result in division, these do not serve 
to explain the extent of division in the UK Supreme Court. 
 
The minority or dissenting judgment imposes significant personal costs on the judge writing 
the judgment.  These costs are in time and effort but also in potential loss of collegiality, 
which is particularly true of a strongly worded judgment.  Epstein and others argued that the 
minority or dissenting judgment also imposes additional costs upon the other majority judges, 
who may have to reconsider their opinion or address the minority opinion and in doing so 
expend significant time and effort revising their own judgment.
392
   
 
In deciding to dissent or write a minority judgment, a Supreme Court Justice must manage 
these conflicting pressures.  The pressure of unity and collegiality must be balanced against 
judicial individualism and judicial independence.
393
  So why do judges decide to bear the 
costs of a minority or dissenting judgment?  
 
4.3 What motivates dissent?   
Dissenting judgments rarely effect change.
394
   Indeed, dissenting judgments are rarely cited 
and with the few exceptions where the dissenting view has changed the law, the dissenting 
opinion disappears from view.
395
  As Lord Brown suggested; 
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 L Epstein, WM Landes and RA Posner, 'Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical And Empirical 
Analysis' (2011) 3 Journal of Legal Analysis 101.  The authors argue that the dissenting opinion forces the 
judges to revisit their opinion and risks the reputation of the majority if it is critical of their decision. 
393
 A Paterson, The Law Lords (Macmillan Press 1982), page 103 
394
 L Epstein , WM Landes  and RA Posner, 'Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical And Empirical 
Analysis' (2011) 3 Journal of Legal Analysis 101 
395
 For example the dissenting opinion written by Lord Rodger in Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] UKHL 20 
formed the basis of section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006.
395
 The dissent by Lord Rodger in O’Brien v 
Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd [2008] UKHL 34 resulted in a second reference to the Court of Justice which affirmed 
Lord Rodgers dissenting view.   
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[O]ne must recognise that in the great majority of final appeals, a dissent 
will remain forever just that – a statement of a judge’s disagreement with 
the conclusion of the majority, with no sensible prospect of it ever 
influencing the future development of the law.
396
 
With the possibility of no lasting impact from the dissenting judgment, rational choice theory 
would suggest that a judge would avoid writing a dissenting judgment, to minimise workload 
and maximise efficiency.
397
  Indeed as Justice Michael Kirby stated, 
Concurring in someone else's opinion may be more congenial to 
colleagues. It certainly involves less work than expressing one's own 
contrary opinion.
398
 
However, many choose to engage in writing dissenting judgments.  Central to the dissenting 
judgment is the concept of disagreement and the unifying motivation to highlight that the 
majority are wrong.  As articulated by Lord Brown, when he stated that ‘a  judge should 
nevertheless, assuming always that he is clear in his own mind that the majority’s view is 
wrong, give reasoned judgment saying so.’399 A perspective also highlighted by Lord Kerr 
who stated that ‘on the whole, judges dissent for what might be regarded by some as the 
seemingly banal reason that they have decided that their view is right or that the conclusions 
that their colleagues have reached are wrong.’400 
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 Lord Brown, 'Dissenting Judgments' in Andrew  Burrows, David  Johnston and Reinhard  Zimmermann 
(eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013) 
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 E Tiller and F Cross, 'What is Legal Doctrine?' (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 517  
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 Lord Justice Kirby, 'Judicial Dissent' (James Cook University, Cairns, 5 February 2005), 
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Although the initial intention may not be to dissent, but to persuade the majority that their 
position is wrong, any dissent which is centred on the judicial decision that the opposing 
position is wrong is termed by social scientists as a ‘sincere’ dissent, one which signals a 
judge’s disagreement with the other judges on the panel. 401  The ‘sincere’ dissent is central to 
the attitudinal model which argues that judicial dissent is motivated by ideological 
preferences and suggests that in hard cases judges reach decisions which align with their 
political views, with relatively little constraint.
402
  This model assumes that if a judge 
disagrees with an outcome, then the judge will willingly incur the costs (both personal and 
social) of writing a separate judgment.
403
   
 
The attitudinal model has been challenged by the strategic model which focuses on the 
interdependent nature of judicial decision making.   The model recognises that, although 
judges are influenced by their personal policy preferences, these preferences may be modified 
by strategic considerations including ‘the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect 
others to make and the institutional context in which they act.’404  According to the strategic 
model, in reaching a decision, a Supreme Court Justice may compromise their ideological 
preferences and be motivated by more strategic goals and sincere dissents may be sacrificed 
to further an alternative goal.  This theory is criticised by Harry T Edwards who argues that 
decision making is a collective process and the sacrifice of ‘sincere’ ideology simply reflects 
a response to colleagues opposing arguments and what the law requires.
405
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403
 JA Segal and others, 'Ideological Values and the Votes of the U.S. Supreme Court Revisited' (1995) 57 The 
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 L Epstein and J Knight, The Choices Justice Make (Sage 1997), page 10 
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 HT Edwards, 'The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making.' (2003) 151 University of 
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Although, there is a strong theoretical underpinning for both the attitudinal and strategic 
model, the empirical data has been more mixed.
406
  There is some evidence of the operation 
of the strategic model in the US Courts of Appeals but Hettinger et al suggests that the 
dominant model of dissent was better accounted for (but not totally accounted for) by the 
attitudinal model.
407
   Indeed, this is the model which is more evident in the US Supreme 
Court, with the frequency of dissent positively related to political ideological diversity among 
the judges.
408
    
 
JAG Griffith in his seminal book ‘The Politics of the Judiciary’ also suggested that judicial 
decision making in the UK House of Lords was underpinned by political preference.
409
    He 
argued that the House of Lords served as a political institution, not simply because the 
decisions reached in the final court of appeal had wide ranging impact on society and 
political institutions, but that the decisions had political motivations: 
When people like the members of the judiciary, broadly homogeneous in 
character, are faced with ….political situations, they act in broadly similar 
ways.  Behind these actions lies a unifying attitude of mind, a political 
                                                 
406
 The empirical assessment of these models traditionally adopts economic modelling approaches.  There are 
significant limitations to these models, not least those associated with the imprecise measurement of key 
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position, which is primarily concerned to protect and conserve certain 
values and institutions. 
410 
 
Robertson used both detailed examination of judicial reasoning and jurimetrics to examine 
the potential political motivation behind judicial disagreement in the House of Lords. 
Drawing on a subset of cases, which address potentially political issues, including tax cases, 
public law cases and civil liberties cases, Robertson compared judicial decisions and division 
on several ideological dimensions including egalitarianism (concern for those in a weaker 
economic position) and constitutionalism (finding for the plaintiff in constitutional cases).   
The author suggests that; 
[A] major factor in determining case outcome is the relative positions of 
the Law Lords on a basic dimension, for convenience labelled 
egalitarianism, which mirrors a traditional view of the courts doing justice 
by acting as a counter to social power imbalances.
411
 
The analysis provides evidence of an association between ideology, decision making and 
dissent in the House of Lords. 
 
A recent study by Hanretty also examined the motivation to dissent in the House of Lords, 
using a more political concept of ideology.
 412
   Drawing on both the attitudinal and strategic 
model of judicial decision making, Hanretty empirically assessed ‘political’ decision making 
in the House of Lords using facets of political ideology to locate members of the House of 
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Lords in a political space.  Hanretty did not find an association between political ideology 
and judicial dissent in the House of Lords.  
 
The work of Robertson and Hanretty, although conflicting, does provide evidence that 
ideology (albeit not political) in its broadest sense served to motivate judicial dissent in the 
House of Lords.  These models however, do not account for every dissent and are limited by 
their focus on political ideology and judicial attitudes which are overt and easily categorised.  
The focus on ideology alone serves to neglect the constraint, both internal and external on 
judicial decision making, the most notable of which is the law. 
  
4.4 Constraints on division 
In a recent book, Bailey and Maltzman highlighted the extent of these constraints in the US 
Supreme Court, revealing the clear limiting influence of legal doctrines and principles on 
judicial decision making.
413
  The authors extended constraint beyond overt limitations and 
argued that judges are also ‘internally’ constrained by ‘the judge’s integrity and degree of 
commitment to engage in an unbiased search for the correct legal answer.’414  Breyer agrees 
and attributes consensus to legal not political reasons.
415
  In reaching decisions judges draw 
on judicial principles derived from a distinctive set of institutional norms and customs, 
including legal principles and theories.  The internalisation of these judicial norms imposes 
an element of self-restraint and obligation to follow the institutional norms and customs.
416
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These internal constraints may act both consciously and subconsciously to adjust judicial 
decisions. 
 
These social scientific models draw on a range of factors that may motivate or serve to limit 
dissent, including ideology, collegiality and judicial cultural norms.
417
 One of the key 
limitations of the models as proposed is that they are discussed in isolation.  In the UK 
context, Alan Paterson identified many of these influences at play in the Supreme Court. 
Drawing on the multiple dialogues that take place in the Supreme Courts, Paterson revealed 
the multi-faceted influences on the final outcome of the Supreme Court decision making 
process.
418
 Psychologists also view decision making as a multifactorial system in which a 
variety of both external and internal factors can influence the outcome.   
 
4.5 Does the psychology of decision making explain dissent? 
Understanding judicial decision making as a psychological process facilitates a more nuanced 
understanding of judicial decision making.   The factors that encourage and constrain dissent 
can be examined through this lens.  Psychology views reasoning and decision making as the 
interplay between two systems or complex processes.
419
  These systems may be influenced by 
both internal and external factors, which may modify the process and ultimately the outcome.  
Psychology views decision making, where the outcome is uncertain, as mediated through two 
systems, the intuitive subconscious response (system 1) and the more deliberative conscious 
reasoned response (system 2).  It is the system 2 response, the more deliberative reasoned 
response that is most susceptible to conscious influences both external and internal.  
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 These are discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
418
 A Paterson, Final Judgment.  The Last  Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing 2013. 
419
 Discussed in chapter 1. 
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The links identified in legal research between ideology and judicial decision making may be 
underpinned by the psychological process of motivated reasoning.   Both the attitudinal and 
strategic models centre on the concept that a judge’s motivation influences the judicial 
decision, for example those who argue that judicial decision making is political, are arguing 
that judges are motivated by making good policy.
420
   Motivation is defined as any desire, 
wish or preference which influences the outcome of any cognitive task such a decision. 
Motivation therefore is a conscious desire which can influence a decision, for example a 
decision which aligns with political or other ideology may be influenced by conscious 
motivation.  This conscious desire may be constrained by institutional factors and the law and 
Baum suggests that motivated reasoning can only apply to ‘very hard cases’ where the law 
does not provide a clear answer.
421
   
 
Motivated reasoning suggests a conscious process, one where, in the absence of legal 
constraints, a judge chooses to follow an ideology, an explicit motivation that the judge 
knowingly and occasionally openly embraces.    However, in cases where the law is 
uncertain, subconscious psychological processes may also play a significant role.  As 
discussed in the introduction, in uncertain decisions, the process of decision making may be 
influenced by a ‘bias’ set of cognitive processes including heuristics mediated through the 
system 1 response.
422
  Values therefore may serve as a subconscious motivation in this 
decision making process. In uncertain decisions, in the absence of external and internal 
conscious restrains, it may be the conflict of values that underpins division. Indeed, Kahan 
suggests that even in the political US Supreme Court, personal values may underpin 
                                                 
420
 Indeed, JAG Griffiths would argue that this policy is not good for the general population but simply reflects 
the policy of an elite sub-population.  JAG Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (4th edn, Fontana Books 1991) 
421
 L Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior (Princeton University Press 2009), 
page 76. 
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 Z Kunda, 'The Case for Motivated Reasoning' (1990) 108 Psychological Bulletin 480.  Bias in this context 
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disagreement between majority and minority decisions.  Kahan argues that in cases which 
divide judicial opinion all justices base their decisions on their views of the law; 
But what they understood the law to require was nevertheless shaped by 
their values – operating not as resources for theorising law, but as 
subconscious, extra-legal influences on their perception of legally 
consequential facts.
423
 
In this way, personal values may subconsciously influence judicial reasoning, creating a 
hierarchy of legally consequential facts, emphasising those facts that align with values.
424
  As 
Segal and Speath suggest ‘Justices make decisions by considering the facts of the case in 
light of their ideological attitudes and values.’425  A judge may find a decision which aligns 
with their values to be more favourable.
426
    
 
The psychology of decision making however suggests that values may play a more 
significant role in uncertain decisions, where the law and the process of system 2 deliberative 
reasoning do not provide a clear answer.   This thesis argues therefore that values play an 
evident role in ‘hard cases’ where the law does not provide a clear answer, the outcome is 
perceived as uncertain and ‘there is a lack of consensus on the basic values and issues’. 427  In 
such cases a judge, can chose to adopt a position which aligns with their values and reject 
conflicting values. 
                                                 
423
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This thesis, is not arguing that every decision is a value based decision, indeed, psychological 
research suggests that highly regarded personal values can be overwhelmed by situational 
forces, where factors such as legal clarity, consensus and collegiality outweigh the value 
based decision.
428
 Indeed, Paterson highlights the many situational forces that may influence 
a decision in the Supreme Court.
429
   Decisions in the Supreme Court are socially constructed 
in a process of collective decision making, as such the decision of any individual Supreme 
Court Justice can be influenced by or influence another decision maker.
430
  Indeed, these 
factors may yield a decision that promotes alternative values. 
 
External factors may also influence the decision to dissent regardless of the value benefit, for 
example the significant work associated with writing a dissenting opinion may prevent a 
dissenting opinion where there is a high case load.
431
  The significant personal costs also 
ensure that a Supreme Court Justice will only write a minority or dissenting judgment on an 
issue the Justice regards as important.  Indeed Danelski suggests that ‘a justice does not 
dissent by himself unless he is expressing some intensely held value.’432 
 
4.6 Hypothesis 
The underlying hypothesis in this thesis is that in ‘ hard cases’, where the law is uncertain and 
judges exercise significant discretion,  subject to legal, personality or other institutional 
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constraints, personal values play a role in judicial decision making.  Division reflects judicial 
disagreement and this thesis argues this disagreement reflects differences in judicial values.  
In hard cases a Supreme Court Justice has a choice between competing views of the law 
which reflect competing values and that opposing values underpin judicial division.  
 
 In choosing to write a minority or dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court Justice is choosing 
to reject the majority position in support of their own values.  The analysis of the JFS case 
revealed the value; decision paradigm at play in a close call case, with a differential pattern of 
value expression in a case which divided judicial opinion.  This chapter extends this work 
with a more detailed examination of the role of values in a variety of cases which divide 
judicial opinion. 
4.7 Methods 
To identify personal values within legal judgments, a systematic, rule-guided content analysis 
of the text of the judgments of a selected subset of cases which divided the Supreme Court 
was carried out.
433
   The method of coding and data analysis is described in the previous 
chapters.
434
  The cases were analysed within the NVivo computer programme which 
facilitated empirical analysis of value expression.  
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4.7.1 Selection of cases 
A SPSS database was created of every case decided between October 2009 and September 
2013 which represented the first four years of the Supreme Court.
435
  The details recorded 
included, the case name, reference, date of the decision, area of law, the presence/absence of 
interveners, outcome, the Supreme Court Justices who sat on the panel, their individual 
position and whether they wrote a judgment.   Cases for each sub-category were selected 
sequentially.  This was homogenous purposive sampling which was limited to cases which 
divide judicial opinion. Although this form of sampling facilitates the understanding of the 
impact of values in the selected dataset, it will not facilitate any generalisation about all legal 
cases.
436
   
4.7.2 Divided cases including close calls 
The first subset of cases comprised of the first ten cases in which more than one Supreme 
Court Justice supported a minority position (divided cases).  These cases included both close 
call and minority decisions.  The first ten divided cases since the opening of the Supreme 
Court are detailed in Table 5.  It is proposed that these cases, like the JFS case, are the ‘hard’ 
cases and that a pattern of differential value expression will be identified in these cases 
regardless of the area of law concerned.  Within these cases, seven are close calls, cases 
where the outcome was decided by a single judicial decision. 
  
4.7.3 Single Dissents 
This thesis views single dissents as a subclass of judicial disagreement.  Indeed, in a single 
dissent only one Supreme Court Justice is prepared to deliver a judgment which disagrees 
with the majority.  The psychological literature suggests that the form of dissent (alone or 
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with others) is subject to different psychological pressures.  The seminal work of Solomon 
Asch on conformity identified that 37% of subjects facing a unanimous majority buckled 
under pressure and gave conforming incorrect answers.  When he added a second dissenter, 
the rate of conformity reduced significantly to 5%, demonstrating that it is psychologically 
less difficult to dissent with others than alone.
437 
  The psychological pressures of a single 
dissent are accompanied by other external pressures to conformity including institutional 
pressures and risks to collegiality.
438
  To limit selection bias, the cases chosen for analysis 
were selected based on chronological order and not the individual Supreme Court Justice.  
Ten cases with single dissents were selected chronologically from the opening of the 
Supreme Court.  The cases are set out in Table 6 below; four cases in which Lady Hale 
delivered a dissenting judgment, two with Lord Kerr dissenting, two with Lord Walker 
dissenting, one with Lord Hope dissenting and one with Lord Rodger dissenting.  
 
4.8 The value: decision paradigm in cases that divide judicial opinion. 
The analysis of the JFS case identified a differential pattern of value expression in a single case 
which divided judicial opinion.439  The JFS case centred on human rights an area of law 
recognised by both academics and the judiciary as one which facilitate the exercise of judicial 
discretion.   This section extends this analysis examining differential value expression in a range 
of cases, encompassing varied areas of law, which are unified by the divided outcome.   
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The ten cases which divided judicial opinion are detailed in Table 5.  These cases included both 
close call and minority cases.   Although three cases did engage aspects of human rights law, 
others were centred on areas of planning law, tort law, company law and employment law.   
161 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Divided cases selected for value analysis 
Case  
 
 Area of Law Majority Minority Form of Division 
R(on the application of E) 
v JFS Governing Body.  
 
[2009] UKSC 15. 
 
Human Rights Lord Phillips 
Lady Hale 
Lord Mance 
Lord Kerr 
Lord Clarke 
 
Lord Hope 
Lord Rodger 
Lord Brown 
Lord Walker 
Close Call 
Millar (Craig Martin) v 
HM Advocate (Scotland) 
 
[2010] UKSC10 Constitutional Law Lord Hope 
Lord Brown 
Lord Walker 
 
Lord Kerr 
Lord Rodger 
Close Call 
R (on the application of 
Sainsbury’s Supermarket 
Ltd) v Wolverhampton 
City Council  
[2010] UKSC 20 Planning Law Lady Hale 
Lord Mance 
Lord Walker 
Lord Collins 
 
Lord Hope 
Lord Brown 
Lord Phillips 
Close Call 
R (on the application of 
Smith) v Secretary of State 
for Defence  
[2010] UKSC 29 
 
Human Rights Lord Phillips 
Lord Hope 
Lord Brown 
Lord Collins 
Lord Rodger 
Lord Walker 
 
Lady Hale 
Lord Kerr 
Lord Mance 
Minority 
R(on the application of the 
Electoral Commission) v 
Westminster Magistrates 
Court  
[2010] UKSC 40 
 
Constitutional Law Lord Phillips 
Lord Mance 
Lord Kerr 
Lord Clarke 
 
Lord Brown 
Lord Walker 
Lord Rodger 
Close Call 
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Divided case  Area of Law Majority Minority Form of Division 
Star Energy Weald Basin 
Limited & Anor v Bocardo 
SA  
[2010] UKSC 35 
 
Tort Law Lord Brown 
Lord Walker 
Lord Collins 
 
Lord Hope 
Lord Clarke 
Close Call 
Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners v Holland  
 
[2010] UKSC 51 Company Law Lord Hope 
Lord Collins 
Lord Savillle 
 
Lord Walker 
Lord Clarke 
Close Call 
Walumba Lumba (Congo) 
v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department.  
Kadian Mighty (Jamaica) 
v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department.    
[2011] UKSC 12. Human Rights Lord Hope 
Lady Hale 
Lord Collins 
Lord Dyson 
Lord Kerr 
Lord Walker 
 
Lord Phillips 
Lord Brown 
Lord Rodger 
Minority 
Jones v Kaney  [2011] UKSC 13 
 
Procedural Law Lord Phillips 
Lord Brown 
Lord Collins 
Lord Kerr 
Lord Dyson 
 
Lord Hope 
Lady Hale 
Minority 
Baker v Quantum Clothing 
Limited.  
[2011] UKSC 17 
 
Employment Law Lord Saville 
Lord Mance 
Lord Dyson 
 
Lord Kerr 
Lord Clarke 
Close Call 
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Table 6: Cases with a single dissenting judgment selected for value analysis 
Case 
 
 
 Area of law Majority Dissenting judgment 
Re Sigma Finance Corp (In 
Administration)  
[2009] UKSC 2  Banking and Finance Lord Hope 
Lord Mance 
Lord Collins 
Lord Scott 
 
Lord Walker 
 
R (on the application of BA) 
(Nigeria) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department  
 
[2009] UKSC 7 Human Rights Lord Hope 
Lord Brown 
Lord Rodger 
Lord Scott 
Lady Hale 
Barratt Homes Ltd v Dwr 
Cymru Cyfyngedig (Welsh 
Water)  
 
[2009] UKSC 13    Utilities Lord Saville 
Lord Phillips 
Lord Walker 
Lord Clarke 
 
Lady Hale 
HM Treasury v Al-Ghabra  [2010] UKSC 2    Procedural Law Lord Brown 
Lady Hale 
Lord Phillips 
Lord Mance 
Lord Rodger 
Lord Walker 
 
Lord Hope 
A v Essex County Council  [2010] UKSC 33   Human Rights Lord Phillips 
Lord Brown 
Lord Kerr 
Lord Clarke 
 
 
Lady Hale 
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Case 
  
Area of law 
 
Majority 
 
Dissenting judgment 
Radmacher v Granatino  
 
[2010] UKSC 42   Family Law Lord Phillips 
Lord Hope 
Lord Brown 
Lord Rodger 
Lord Walker 
Lord Kerr 
Lord Collins 
Lord Mance 
Lady Hale 
R (on the application of 
Morge) v Hampshire County 
Council. 
[2011] UKSC 2 Environmental Law Lord Brown 
Lady Hale 
Lord Mance 
Lord Walker 
Lord Kerr 
Patmalniece (FC) v Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions   
[2011] UKSC 11 EU Law Lord Hope 
Lord Brown 
Lady Hale 
Lord Rodger 
Lord Walker 
In the matter of an application 
by Brigid McCaughey and 
another for Judicial Review  
(Northern Ireland) 
[2011] UKSC20 Human Rights Lord Phillips 
Lord Hope 
Lady Hale 
Lord Brown 
Lord Kerr 
Lord Dyson 
Lord Rodger 
R (G) v Govenors of X School  [2011] UKSC30 Human Rights Lord Hope 
Lord Walker  
Lord Brown 
Lord Dyson 
Lord Kerr 
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Those cases which centred on human rights and engaged the Human Rights Act 1998, 
demonstrated a differential pattern of value expression.   The first case after the JFS case to 
closely divide judicial opinion was the case of Millar (Craig Martin) v Her Majesty’s 
Advocate (Scotland).
 440
  A case which considered the validity of the power of the Scottish 
Government to legislate on the imposition of sentences of imprisonment under s45 of the 
Criminal Proceedings etc. (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007 for the offence of driving while 
disqualified.  The new sentences were higher than those offenders would have received on 
summary conviction under the formerly applicable Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.  The 
case divided the bench three to two, with the majority (Lords Hope, Brown and Walker) 
finding that the change in law related to procedure and the associated increased sentences was 
not reserved to Westminster.  Each Supreme Court Justice delivered a judgment which 
resulted in 180 paragraphs of text.   The values espoused in the judgments were different to 
those espoused in the JFS case, indeed the values encompassed in universalism were not 
espoused by either side, however as with the JFS case analysis revealed a differential pattern 
of value expression (Figure 4.8-3).  Those in the majority, who affirmed the validity of the 
Scottish legislation, more frequently espoused values encompassed within self-direction and 
conformity than those who opposed the decision.  The minority (Lords Kerr and Rodger) in 
contrast recognised the importance of self-direction but more frequently espoused the values 
encompassed in the more conservative value tradition.   
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  Millar (Craig Martin) v HM Advocate (Scotland) [2010) UKSC 10 
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Figure 4.8-3:  Value analysis of Miller (Craig Martin) v HM Advocate  
 Values expressed as a percentage of the values espoused within  
 the judgments of those supporting the majority and minority positions. 
 
The differential pattern of expression in the close call cases was not limited to cases which 
centred on Human Rights Act 1998.  The next case to result in judicial division and another 
close call was R (on application of Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd) v Wolverhampton City 
Council.
441
  This was one of the many planning disputes between multinational supermarket 
chains.  The case examined the powers of planning authorities to make compulsory purchase 
orders and the extent to which a planning authority can consider off-site benefits.  The 
decision of the Supreme Court limited the powers of the planning authority and held that it 
was unlawful to take into account off-site benefits.  The decision divided the bench four to 
three. The majority (Lady Hale and Lords Mance, Walker and Collins) limited the powers 
associated with a compulsory purchase order because of the serious invasion of property 
rights inherent in compulsory acquisition.  In contrast, the minority (Lords Phillips, Hope and 
Brown) argued that the benefit of the development to the community warranted 
consideration.   
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The judgment ran to 186 paragraphs, with each Supreme Court Justice contributing an 
individual judgment, albeit both the judgments of Lord Hope and Lady Hale were brief.442  
Value analysis of the judgments revealed a difference in the values expressed in the majority 
and minority judgments.  Those in the majority who advocated the limitation of the council’s 
power espoused values encompassed within universalism and self-direction and those who 
advocated extending the power of the council emphasised values encompassed within 
achievement (Figure 4.8-4).  Although, engaging different values than those identified in the 
judgments of the JFS case, a similar differential pattern of expression was identified.  A brief 
vignette of one aspect of this case was also included in the experimental survey.  There was a 
significant correlation between the values encompassed in achievement and the decision 
reached.443    
 
 
Figure 4.8-4: Value analysis of R (Sainsbury's Supermarket Ltd) v Wolverhampton City 
Council  
 Values expressed as a percentage of the values espoused within  
 the judgments of those supporting the majority and minority positions. 
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Star Energy Weald Basin Limited v Bocardo centred on the recovery and quantum of 
damages for trespass of subsoil at 800 to 1300 feet below ground level.
444
  This case also 
closely divided the Supreme Court.  The majority (Lords Brown, Walker and Collins) held 
that it was an actionable trespass.  Even in this case there was a differential pattern of value 
expression with the majority emphasising values encompassed in self-direction, conformity 
and tradition (Figure 4.8-5).  The minority (Lords Hope and Clarke) emphasised values 
encompassed in universalism. 
 
  
 
 
 
Each of the close call cases analysed revealed a differential pattern of value expression, with 
different values priorities in the opposing judgments of the majority and minority (Table 7). 
In the majority of cases, where the final decision was a close call, every Supreme Court 
Justice, both those in the majority and minority, delivered a judgment.  As highlighted by the 
Justices, the law surrounding these cases was uncertain and legitimate legal principles enable 
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Figure 4.8-5 : Value analysis of Star Energy Weald Basin Ltd v Bocardo SA 
 Values expressed as a percentage of the values espoused within  
 the judgments of those supporting the majority and minority positions. 
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two opposing decisions.  Indeed, in these cases there may have been a heightened awareness 
of the uncertainty and judicial difference with a need to strongly defend a position.  The 
exercise of judicial discretion was central to the decision making process and it is through the 
exercise of discretion, in these uncertain decisions, that values may be engaged.  Indeed, the 
judgments in these close call cases are laden with values.445  The presence of so many value 
statements suggests that these close call cases elicit a subconscious value centred response 
which is articulated in the judgments.  The analysis suggests that in writing the judgment, the 
Supreme Court Justices reveal the values which underpin the decision reached, and the values 
are different in opposing judgments.  What about those cases which divide judicial opinion 
but are not close calls?   
 
Three minority decision cases, which resulted in more than one minority judgment but not 
close calls, were analysed for the expression of values.  The first case analysed was R (on the 
application of Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence a case which centred on whether the 
Human Rights Act 1998 was applicable to those who were serving in the military in the 
Middle East.
446
   The case was heard by a panel of nine Supreme Court Justices and divided 
the court six to three.  The majority held that the jurisdiction of the ECtHR and therefore the 
Human Rights Act 1998 was territorial and did not extend beyond national boundaries.  As 
with the close call cases there was a difference in the pattern of value expression in the 
judgments between those who supported the majority position compared to those who 
opposed the decision.
447
  The majority emphasised the values encompassed within the 
conservative domain including tradition and conformity, the minority emphasised security 
and values encompassed within self-direction (Figure 4.8- 6). 
                                                 
445
 The number of expressions of values ranged from 55 – 107 per case.     
446
  R (on the application of Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] UKSC 29 
447
 The Supreme Court Justices who adopted a majority position were Lords Phillips, Hope, Brown, Collins, 
Rodger and Walker.  Those in the minority were Lady Hale, Lords Kerr and  Mance. 
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Table 7:  Value analysis cases that divided judicial opinion, with more than one Supreme Court Justice dissenting. 
Case Division Tradition Conformity Security Power Achievement Self-
Direction 
Universalism 
R(on the 
application of 
E) v JFS 
Governing 
Body.  
Majority 
(n=58) 
Minority 
(n=44) 
15.5% 
 
59.1% 
1.7% 
 
4.2% 
1.7% 
 
0 
0 
 
2.4% 
0 
 
0 
25.9% 
 
18.4% 
55.2% 
 
15.9% 
Millar (Craig 
Martin) v HM 
Advocate  
Majority 
(n = 26) 
Minority 
(n=41) 
19.2% 
 
61.1% 
27% 
 
4.9% 
3.8% 
 
0% 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
50% 
 
34% 
0 
 
0 
R (on the 
application of 
Sainsbury’s 
Supermarket 
Ltd) v 
Wolverhampton 
City Council  
Majority 
(n=24) 
 
Minority 
(n=19) 
4.2% 
 
 
5.3% 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
4.2% 
 
 
0 
4.2% 
 
 
52.6% 
20.8% 
 
 
10.5% 
66.6% 
 
 
31.6% 
R (on the 
application of 
Smith) v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Defence  
Majority 
(n=49) 
Minority 
(n=23) 
38.9% 
 
8.7% 
8.1% 
 
4.3% 
12.2% 
 
26.1% 
0 
 
4.3% 
0 
 
0 
12.2% 
 
30.5% 
28.6% 
 
26.1% 
Star Energy 
Weald Basin 
Limited & Anor 
v Bocardo SA  
Majority 
(n=33) 
Minority 
(n=22) 
24.3% 
 
18.1% 
9.1% 
 
0% 
3.0% 
 
4.5% 
0 
 
0 
12.1% 
 
9.1% 
51.5% 
 
36.3% 
0 
 
32% 
R(on the 
application of 
the Electoral 
Commission) v 
Westminster 
Magistrates 
Court  
Majority 
(n=41) 
Minority 
(n=22) 
19.5% 
 
54.6% 
0 
 
13.6% 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
36.6% 
 
13.6% 
43.9% 
 
18.2% 
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Case Division Tradition Conformity Security Power Achievement Self-
Direction 
Universalism 
Revenue and 
Customs 
Commissioners 
v Holland  
 
Majority 
(n=37) 
Minority 
(n=30) 
43.3% 
 
20% 
2.7% 
 
6.7% 
21.6% 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
2.7% 
0 
24.3% 
 
16.7% 
5.4% 
 
56.6% 
Walumba 
Lumba (Congo) 
v Secretary of 
State for the 
Home 
Department.  
Kadian Mighty 
(Jamaica) v 
Secretary of 
State for the 
Home 
Department.    
 
Majority 
(n=83) 
 
Minority 
(n=35) 
20.4% 
 
 
0 
7.2% 
 
 
8.6% 
3.7% 
 
 
5.7% 
0 
 
 
37.1% 
0 
 
 
0 
 
19.3% 
 
 
22.9% 
49.4% 
 
 
25.7% 
Jones v Kaney  Majority 
(n= 61) 
Minority 
(n=38) 
 
13.1% 
 
28.9% 
19.7% 
 
36.8% 
1.6% 
 
2.6% 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
21.3% 
 
7.9% 
42.6%* 
 
23.7% 
Baker v 
Quantum 
Clothing 
Limited.  
Majority 
(n=63) 
Minority 
(n=44) 
 
12.7% 
 
2.3% 
8.1% 
 
0 
33.4% 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
22.1% 
 
36.3% 
22.1%* 
 
61.4% 
 Benevolence featured in Jones v Kaney and accounted for 1.7% of the coding and in Baker v Quantum Clothing accounting for 1.6% of the coding
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Figure 4.8-6  Value analysis of R (On the application of Smith) v  
Secretary of State of Defence  
Values expressed as a percentage of the values espoused within the  
judgments of those supporting the majority and minority positions. 
 
 
A differential pattern of value expression was also identified in the two other cases which 
divided judicial opinion but were not close calls, Walumba Lumba v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department and Jones v Kaney.
448
  
 
The value analysis suggests that values are revealed in judgments in cases which divide 
judicial opinion with a differential pattern of value expression between Supreme Court 
Justices who support the majority and minority position.  In cases where two or more 
Supreme Court Justices support the minority position, the differential expression of values is 
not dependant on whether the case is a close call case.   
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Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC12; Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13; Jones v Kaney 
[2011] UKSC 13.  The data is presented in table 7. 
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4.9 The value: decision paradigm in cases with a single dissenting judgment.  
The pattern of judgments was very different in cases which resulted in a single dissent in 
comparison to both close call and minority cases.  In all of the close call cases analysed with 
the exception of Baker v Quantum Clothing, in which Lord Saville heard the case but did not 
deliver an individual judgment, every Supreme Court Justice who heard the case contributed 
an individual judgment.
449
  The number of individual judgments reduced in cases with more 
than one minority judgment, but again the majority of Justices hearing the case delivered a 
judgment.  In contrast, in cases which resulted in a single dissenting voice, there were fewer 
judgments.  In four of the cases analysed, each Supreme Court Justice did contribute a 
judgment, in three cases the majority issued a single judgment and in the remaining cases one 
or more Justice’s supporting the majority decision did not deliver an individual judgment.  
These data suggest that the motivation to write a judgment, which incurs costs in time, effort, 
and potentially collegiality, is higher in cases where judicial opinion is more closely divided.  
In contrast, the same motivation does not appear to be present in those Supreme Court 
Justices supporting the majority decision in cases where a single Supreme Court Justice 
stands alone in opposition to the majority.   
 
There are also significant differences associated with the pattern of engagement of the 
majority with the reasoning of the opposing Supreme Court Justices in the published 
judgments.  Engagement in this context is that defined by Paterson as critical engagement, 
not simply acknowledgement of the dissenting view, but discussion of the foundation of the 
disagreement.
450
  Although this form of engagement is a relatively common occurrence in the 
judgments of the Supreme Court, there is a relationship between the pattern of critical 
engagement by the majority with the reasoning of the minority and the form of division.  
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In cases where more than one Justice opposed the majority position, many of the Supreme 
Court Justices who supported the majority position critically engaged with the reasoning of 
the dissenting minority.
451
  Indeed, Paterson highlights the JFS case as a good example of 
judicial engagement, with those on both sides engaged in ‘frequent and sustained’ discussion 
of the opposing reasoning.
452
   
 
In contrast, in the majority of cases with a single dissenting opinion, the judgments delivered 
by those supporting the majority position did not engage with the reasoning of the dissenting 
judgment.  Indeed many did not even acknowledge the presence of an opposing judgment.   
Of the ten cases, with a single dissenting judgment, analysed for the presence of values, in 
seven of these cases, the majority did not critically engage with the reasoning of the 
dissenting judgment.   In the three cases with engagement, the engagement was limited.  For 
example, the judgment delivered by majority in Radmacher v Granatino did not critically 
engage with the dissenting reasoning of Lady Hale.
453
  Lord Mance, in his individual 
judgment supporting the majority position, did engage with the reasoning which underpinned 
the dissenting position, but only to a limited extent.  The case Re Brigid McCaughey for 
Judicial Review centred on the ‘shoot to kill’ policy in Northern Ireland. 454  The appellants 
sought a declaration that the scope of the inquest should comply with Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and thereby extend to an examination of the 
planning and control of the operation that led to the deaths.  This case was heard by a panel of 
seven Supreme Court Justices and each delivered a written judgment.  The lone dissenting 
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opinion by Lord Rodger in this case, was recognised by those in the majority as having 
significant merit and strength: 
 Lord Rodger makes a powerful case for the proposition that the temporal 
application of the Convention is irrelevant for purposes of deciding the 
temporal application of the HRA but that, as it seems to me, does not 
provide an answer to the essential question.
455
  
Yet despite the overt recognition of the strength of the argument, there was little critical 
engagement with the reasoning.  In contrast to those cases which closely divide judicial 
opinion, where critical engagement is commonplace, there is limited engagement by the 
majority with the reasoning of the lone dissenting judgment.   This lack of critical 
engagement may be related to the perception, by those supporting the majority position, of 
the certainty of their decision rather than the strength or weakness of the dissenting 
reasoning.  Indeed, a Supreme Court Justice who perceives no uncertainty in the decision 
they reach, who perceives the strength of the argument supporting their position as decisive, 
may not consider the need to critically engage with the opposing position.
456
   
 
The pattern of critical engagement in decisions with a single dissenting judgment is reflected 
in the values statements within the judgments with significantly less value coding in cases 
which result in a single dissent compared to more closely divided cases (Table 8). 
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Table 8:  Average number of value statements per judgment. 
Case division Value 
statements per 
case 
Majority 
(per judgment) 
Minority 
(per judgment) 
Dissent 
(per judgment) 
Close call 65 
 
13 12  
Minority 96 
 
11 16  
Single 
Dissent 
29 5  10 
 
 
This reduction was reflected in the judgments supporting the majority positon with less than 
half the number of value statements in the majority judgments of cases which result in a 
single dissenting opinion, in comparison to cases where more than one Supreme Court Justice 
opposes the decision of the majority.  It may be that judgments to which more than one judge 
contributes are developed through consensus and are more neutral in their position and this 
may be a facet of the reduction in values in the majority judgments of some of these cases. 
Indeed, the joint majority statement in the highly publicised decision in Radmacher (formerly 
Granatino) v Granatino only contained 23 value statements. 
457 
 Even in cases, where each 
Supreme Court Justice delivers a judgment, the expression of values within the majority 
judgments is substantially less than the values expressed in majority judgments of close call 
or minority cases.   Indeed, there was sufficient value expression for analysis in all cases in 
which more than one Supreme Court Justice supported a minority position.  In contrast, in the 
subset of ten cases with a single dissenting opinion, only half had sufficient value expression 
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for analysis in the majority judgments.   The quantity and pattern of value expression in all 
the cases analysed is presented in Table 9.   
The first case with sufficient value expression for analysis was A v Essex County Council.
458
 
The case involved a severely disabled boy who sought compensation after he was excluded 
from school for eighteen months whilst the council found him a suitable placement.  The 
question was whether the delay was sufficient to comprise of a breach of his right to 
education under article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR.  A majority of three Supreme 
Court Justices (Lords Clarke, Phillips and Brown) held that it was not arguable that A2P1 
gave A an absolute right to education.  Two Supreme Court Justices (Lord Kerr and Lady 
Hale) held that the claimant might have been able to establish a breach of the Convention in 
the form of a failure to provide educational facilities that were available, however a majority 
held that it would not be right to extend the one year time limit to enable him to bring his 
claim.  Lady Hale alone held that the limit should be extended and the case returned to the 
courts.  Despite the varying reasoning and different divisions in the court, there was a 
differential value expression between the values espoused by Lady Hale and those who 
reached the decision that the time limit should not be extended.  The judgment delivered by 
Lady Hale expressed polarised values encompassed within universalism and benevolence, 
both values are encompassed within the self-transcendence dimension.  In contrast, the 
majority espoused a wide range of values with the majority of expression in those values 
concerned with conservation and resistance to change (tradition, security and conformity) 
represented in Figure 4.9-7. 
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Figure 4.9-7:  Value analysis of A v Essex County Council [2010] 
 Values expressed as a percentage of the total values in the majority  
or dissenting judgment. 
 
A similar pattern of expression was also evident in R (on the application of G) v The 
Governors of X School another cases which centred on the application of the ECHR.
 459
   In 
this case, the Justices were asked to decide whether denial of a solicitor to a school assistant 
in a school disciplinary hearing, the result of which may have prevented the school assistant 
from working in the future, was a breach of Article 6(1), the right to a fair hearing.  The 
majority held that there was no breach.  Lord Kerr delivered a dissenting judgment.  The 
dissenting judgment expressed values limited to self-direction and universalism, in contrast 
the majority judgment espoused range of values encompassed within conservation including 
tradition, security and conformity (Figure 4.9–8). 
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Table 9:  Value analysis of cases with a single dissenting judgment (major values only) 
Case  Tradition Conformity Security Power Achievement Self-
Direction 
Universalism 
Re Sigma 
Finance Corp 
(In 
Administration) 
 
 
Majority 
(n=11) 
Dissent 
(n=5) 
 (Lord 
Walker) 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
40% 
72.7% 
 
40% 
27.3% 
 
20% 
R (on the 
application of 
BA) (Nigeria) v 
Secretary of 
State for the 
Home 
Department  
Majority 
(n=11) 
Dissent 
(n=3) 
(Lady Hale) 
63% 
 
33% 
 
 
0 0 
 
33% 
0 0 10% 
 
0 
27% 
 
34% 
Barratt Homes 
Ltd v Dwr 
Cymru 
Cyfyngedig 
(Welsh Water)  
Majority 
(n= 14) 
Dissent 
(n=6) 
(Lady Hale) 
28.6% 
 
50% 
0 
 
0 
21.4% 
 
0 
21.4% 
 
 16.6% 
 7.1% 
 
16.7% 
14.3%* 
 
16.7% 
HM Treasury v 
Al-Ghabra  
 
Majority 
(n=4) 
Dissent 
(n=11) 
25% 
 
18% 
0 
 
64% 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
18% 
0 
 
0 
25% 
 
0 
50% 
 
0 
A v Essex 
County Council  
 
Majority 
(n=54) 
Dissent 
(n=10) 
(Lady Hale) 
14.8% 
 
0 
3.8% 
 
0 
39% 
 
0 
1.8  9.2% 
 
0 
16.6%* 
 
90%* 
Radmacher v 
Granatino  
 
 
Majority 
(n=23) 
Dissent 
(n=31) 
(Lady Hale) 
13% 
 
35.5% 
21.8% 
 
9.7% 
0 
 
6.5% 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
30.4% 
 
12.8 % 
34.8% 
 
35.5% 
180 
 
Case  Tradition Conformity Security Power Achievement Self-
direction 
Universalism 
R (on the 
application of 
Morge) v 
Hampshire 
County Council. 
Majority 
(n=18) 
Dissent 
(n=13) 
(Lord Kerr) 
5.5% 
 
0 
16.8% 
 
0 
22.2% 
 
0 
0 
 
7.7% 
0 
 
0 
33.3% 
 
38.5% 
22.2% 
 
53.8% 
Patmalniece 
(FC) v Secretary 
of State for 
Work and 
Pensions   
Majority 
(n=14) 
Dissent 
(n=15) 
(Lord 
Walker) 
50% 
 
20% 
50% 
 
13% 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
27% 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
40% 
Re Brigid 
McCaughey  for 
Judicial Review  
(Northern 
Ireland) 
Majority 
(n=18) 
Dissent 
(n=7) 
(Lord 
Rodger) 
17% 
 
43% 
 
33% 
 
57% 
5% 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
11% 
 
0 
28%* 
 
0 
R (on the 
application of 
G) (Respondent) 
v The 
Governors of X 
School 
(Appellant) 
Majority 
(n=15) 
Dissent 
(n=9) 
(Lord Kerr) 
13% 
 
0 
20% 
 
0 
7% 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
20% 
 
22% 
40% 
 
78% 
*Benevolence featured in the case Barratt Homes Ltd v Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig (Welsh Water) accounting for 7.2% of the majority coding. 
   Benevolence featured in the case A v Essex County Council and accounted for 14.8% of the majority coding and 10% of the dissent. 
   Benevolence featured in the case In the matter of an application by Brigid McCaughey ( Judicial Review) (Northern Ireland) and accounted for  
   6% of the majority coding
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Figure 4.9-8 Value analysis of R (on the application of G) v The Governors of X School  
 Values expressed as a percentage of the values espoused within  
 the majority and dissenting judgments.  
 
 
Although, there is a differential value expression, similar to that of both close call and 
minority cases, there is a notable difference in the value expression of the dissenting opinion.  
In close call and minority cases, in the judgments of those supporting the minority position, 
there is recognition of the values expressed by the majority, however in the single dissenting 
judgment the values tend to be more polarised with little acknowledgement of the values 
espoused in the majority judgments.     
 
This polarisation of values was also identified in the third case which centred on the 
application of the ECHR, Re Brigid McCaughey for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) 
[2011] which is discussed above and centres on Article 2 (1) the right to life.
 460
  In the case, 
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the lone voice of dissent was that of Lord Rodger.  In his dissenting opinion, Lord Rodger 
affirmed the values encompassed in tradition and conformity.  As with the other cases of a 
single dissent, the dissenting judgment reflected a similar polarisation of values, with no 
espousal of self-direction or universalism, values espoused by those in the majority (Figure 
4.9-8). 
 
 
Figure 4.9-9 Value analysis of Re Brigid McCaughey for Judicial Review (Northern 
Ireland)  
Values expressed as a percentage of the values espoused in the majority and 
dissenting judgments. 
 
This pattern of value expression was not limited to cases which centred on the application of 
the principles encompassed within the ECHR (Table 9).  The unusual case of R(on the 
application of Morge) v Hampshire County Council asked the Court to review a local 
planning authority’s decision to grant permission for a rapid bus service development which 
would have a significant impact on the several species of protected bats which inhabited the 
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relevant area.
461
  The Court held that the planning permission was valid as the specimens of 
specific bat species in this context were not sufficient to engage the protection of the 
European Habitats Directive.  Lord Kerr delivered a dissenting judgment argued that the 
planning authority did not give due consideration to the Habitats Directive and the impact of 
the development on the bat species.   This case also had a polarised differential expression of 
values, with the majority espousing values encompassed in conformity, tradition and security 
(Figure 4.9-9).  These values are not reflected in the dissenting judgment of Lord Kerr. 
 
 
Figure 4.9-10 Value analysis of R(on the application of Morge) v Hampshire County 
Council  
Values expressed as a percentage of the values espoused in the majority and 
dissenting judgments. 
 
One case in this subset of cases with a single dissenting judgment is striking because of its 
difference.  This is the highly publicised landmark ante-nuptial contract case Radmacher 
(formerly Granatino) v Granatino.
462
  This case has several striking differences both in form 
and value expression.  It was one of the cases heard by a panel of nine Supreme Court 
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Justices.  It resulted in a consensus judgment delivered by seven of the majority with only 
one Supreme Court Justice (Lord Mance) delivering a judgment in agreement with the 
majority and finally as Paterson identified, the case took 211 days for a judgment, almost 
twice the average length of the other cases.
463
  The single dissenting judgment was delivered 
by Lady Hale and included the much quoted line, ‘there is a gender dimension to the issue, 
which some may think ill-suited to decision by a court consisting of eight men and one 
woman.’464 
 
Despite the strength of the feminist element of the dissenting judgment and the strong 
emphasis on the protection of the vulnerable, the value profile in this dissenting judgment 
reveals a tension between the opposing values encompassed in tradition and universalism.  
Indeed, the highly polarised value profile identified in other dissenting judgments is not 
evident in Lady Hale’s judgment in this case. 
 
Figure 4.9-11: Values analysis of Radmacher (formerly Granatino) v Granatino  
Values expressed as a percentage of the values espoused in the majority and 
dissenting judgments. 
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It is difficult to speculate why the values in the dissenting judgment of this case are different 
from the polarised values expressed in other cases.  It may be the nature of the case, the 
issues involved or the way the decision was reached, but the dissenting judgment in this case 
does not follow the pattern of value expression of other cases with a single dissenting 
judgment. 
 
In summary, the dissenting Supreme Court Justice draws on values to support their reasoning. 
Indeed, in many cases, the value expression is more polarised, with little recognition of the 
values encompassed in the majority reasoning.  In contrast, the Supreme Court Justices who 
support the majority in a case which results in an individual dissent are less likely to write a 
concurring judgment, less likely to critically engage with the opposing reasoning and less 
likely to reveal values in their judgments than when supporting the majority position in a case 
which is more closely divided.   To the Supreme Court Justices supporting the majority, the 
legal position may appear more certain and the opposing argument may appear to have less 
strength and less validity.  Values are not drawn upon to justify the legal position and 
although values are espoused the pattern of expression is diffuse drawing on a wide range of 
values in the judgment.   
 
4.10 Division, dissent and values 
This chapter uses the values methodology to examine the presence of values in judgments of 
a range of cases which divided the opinion of the Supreme Court.  It confirmed the 
expression of values in legal judgments and reveals differences in value expression associated 
with the form of division. 
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There are number of factors that are associated with an increased likelihood of division, these 
include institutional factors (norm of consensus, workload), personal factors (judicial attitude 
to division, collegiality), the details of the case and the law surrounding it.  Judicial decisions 
are framed and constrained by the law and it is only when the law does not provide a clear 
answer, where the judge perceives the law as uncertain, that division occurs.   
 
Close call ‘hard’ cases are decisions shrouded in uncertainty.465  Such cases are indeterminate 
where no settled rule of law ‘dictates a decision either way.’466 The decision is a choice 
between incomparable options where ‘one option is not better than another, one is not worse 
than the other but the two options are not equally good.’467   The law does not provide a clear 
answer and it is these cases with the highest degree of ambiguity which are most likely to 
result in division.  The prevalence of equally plausible choices is reflected in the high level of 
critical engagement in the reasoning of judgments supporting opposing decisions, with 
Justices recognising the merits of the conflicting position. 
   
Yet Supreme Court Justices are asked to make a choice.  In doing so the Supreme Court 
Justice exercises discretion choosing between two equally credible legal decisions. The 
decisions in these cases which Tamanaha argues have the ‘least legal guidance’ have to be 
justified.  This justification cannot be derived from the comparable options presented in the 
case but rely on the ‘non-comparative’ considerations which underpin the exercise of 
discretion.
468
  Indeed, in these cases where the law is uncertain, Supreme Court Justices 
exercise discretion and the non-comparative considerations may draw on intrinsic factors, 
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central to self, to reach their decision.  It is a central hypothesis of this research that the 
justification in these cases is underpinned by values.   
 
It is recognised that each case decided by the Supreme Court is unique and within each subset 
of cases there were cases which did not reflect the general pattern.  These cases are discussed 
within the text of the chapter.  Despite the individuality of each case, in close call cases, 
where the decision is most uncertain, values are most commonly identified.  Values are 
expressed in both judgments supporting and opposing the majority position, with little 
difference in the quantity of value expression.  There was however a significant difference in 
pattern of value expression.  In each case, the dominant values reflected in the judgments of 
the majority and the minority were different.  This differential pattern is not unique to close 
call cases and was also present in cases where more than one Supreme Court Justice 
supported the minority position.  Indeed, this pattern of expression was evident regardless of 
the area of law or the size of the panel hearing the case.  The analysis of values in these cases 
suggests that in cases which divide judicial opinion, hard cases, where the law does not 
provide a clear answer and requires the exercise of judicial discretion, values underpin the 
decision and these values are revealed in the judgments.   
 
It was suggested by Justice Benjamin Cardozo that ‘the closeness of the division attests to the 
measure of doubt’ and in cases where the court is closely divided there is uncertainty.  But 
the perception of uncertainty is not limited to a narrowly divided close call case. 
469
  Every 
case which reaches the Supreme Court is a hard case, which exist, as Dworkin suggests, 
because of the absence of clarity: 
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Statutes and common law rules are often vague and must be interpreted 
before they can be applied to novel cases.  Some cases, moreover, raise 
issues so novel that they cannot be decided by stretching or reinterpreting 
existing rules.
470
  
Even with this subset of ‘hard cases’ there are some cases where ‘one outcome can be ranked 
more legally compelling or defensible than the others.’471  Tamanaha argues that there is a 
more nuanced form of legal uncertainty at play in these hard cases.   
 
Cases where there is a single dissenting opinion, the choice may no longer be perceived by all 
the Supreme Court Justices as a choice between incomparable options.  In these cases the 
majority of the Supreme Court Justices identify a dominant legally plausible outcome.   This 
is supported by evidence of critical engagement.  In theory, a Supreme Court Justice who 
perceives no uncertainty in the decision they reach, who perceives the strength of the legal 
argument supporting their position as decisive may not consider a need to critically engage 
with opposing reasoning.   In the majority of divided cases, the majority critically engaged 
with the minority reasoning.  However, in the single dissent cases analysed, there was less 
critical engagement by the majority in the reasoning of the lone dissenter.  
 
The pattern of value expression in single dissent cases was also different to cases where the 
decision on the outcome is more closely divided, with fewer values expressed in dissent 
cases.  The majority of values expressed were identified in the dissenting judgment.  Indeed 
there was little difference in the density of value expression in dissenting judgments and 
judgments in divided cases.  The polarised pattern of values expression evident in the 
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dissenting judgments of Supreme Court Justices suggests that values may play a role in the 
decision.   In contrast, Justices supporting the majority position, in cases with a single dissent, 
were less likely to reveal values in their judgments than when supporting the majority 
position in a case which is more closely divided.  These data suggest that values may play a 
lesser role in the judgments of those supporting the majority position in the single dissent 
cases. 
 
The differing role of values in the judicial decision making process may be related to a 
perception of uncertainty.  System 1 reasoning and the affect response may be affirmed, 
rejected or amended by the more deliberative system 2 reasoning.  Personal values anchor the 
affect response, providing a lens through which system 2 reasoning is viewed.  Where system 
2 reasoning does not provide a clear answer and the outcome remains uncertain, the decision 
continues to be anchored in the system 1 response and personal values.  It may therefore be 
speculated, that values are revealed in decisions where deliberative reasoning does not 
provide a clear answer, where there is more than one ‘legally plausible’ solution.  The 
findings in this chapter support this theory, with values expressed in the judgments of the 
most uncertain cases, cases where two or more Supreme Court Justices support a position 
which opposes that of the majority.  In cases with a single dissent, values are expressed in the 
dissenting judgment, where the Supreme Court Justice views the decision of the majority as 
uncertain.  In contrast, fewer values are expressed in the judgments of those who support the 
majority position, who perceive that there is a single legally plausible solution.  To these 
Justices, the legally plausible solution may provide certainty and their values although 
affirmed or rejected are not revealed in their judgments. 
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This chapter confirms the value: decision paradigm in cases which divide judicial opinion.  
Psychological theory suggests that values play a role in uncertain decisions and the analysis 
of different forms of division demonstrates a link between judicial disagreement, uncertainty 
and the expression of values.  The next chapter sets out to test the limits of the value: decision 
paradigm.  If the expression of values is associated with uncertainty, then are values 
expressed in cases which do not divide judicial opinion, those cases that achieve outcome 
consensus? 
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5 Chapter 5  
Outcome Consensus, Values and Uncertainty 
 
Only by acknowledging the many influences on the justices’ decisions can 
we gain a complete understanding of how the Court arrives at its final 
judgments, and begin to disentangle the puzzle of unanimity.
472
 
Value analysis has demonstrated an association between values and judicial decision making 
in cases which divide judicial opinion, cases where the law does not provide a clear answer 
and judicial discretion is exercised.   By definition every case which is heard in the Supreme 
Court is a ‘hard case’, a rationally indeterminate case which does not have a uniquely correct 
decision determined by the entire background of the body of relevant law.
473
  Despite this, the 
UK Supreme Court reaches a consensus decision in the majority of cases.  Psychological 
theory suggests that it is absence of a clear outcome and continuing uncertainty after system 2 
deliberation which enhances the role of personal values in the decision making process.  The 
study of cases that divide judicial opinion suggests that values are revealed in the judgments 
in cases where the law is perceived as uncertain.  This thesis views judicial disagreement, 
division and uncertainty on a continuum from those cases which divide judicial opinion to 
complete consensus.  This chapter turns the focus away from those cases which divide 
judicial opinion to examine the limits of the value: decision paradigm in the decisions that 
achieve outcome consensus.  It will be argued that although consensus does not equate with 
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agreement, in the absence of a perception of uncertainty, values are not revealed in cases 
which achieve consensus on the outcome.   
 
5.1 Consensus in the UK Supreme Court 
In the first four years of the Supreme Court, consensus was achieved in 77% of all cases 
decided.  This compares favourably with other jurisdictions, with rates of consensus similar 
to the Canadian Supreme Court (75.6%) and significantly higher than both the US Supreme 
Court (42.9%) and the Australian High Court (58.9%), although the rate of consensus has 
increased in the Australian High Court since the departure of Justice Kirby.
474
  All cases 
which reach the Supreme Court are by definition ‘hard cases’, cases where the final outcome 
is not clearly dictated by law.  Yet there is a remarkably high level of consensus.  Several 
factors have been associated with consensus in final courts of appeal, some focus on the case 
and case selection and others centre on the institution and the characters within it, arguing 
that outcome consensus is a result of social interactions.   
 
In contrast to legal uncertainty which may result in division, it has been argued by a number 
of scholars that legal certainty, where the legal answer is simply more obvious and clear, 
explains consensus.
475
  Pritchett suggests that unanimous decisions occur when, ‘the facts and 
the law are so clear that no opportunity is allowed for the autobiographies of the Justices’ to 
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lead them to opposing conclusions’.476  Corley, Steigerwalt and Ward argue that it is this 
clarity which serves to constrain the exercise of discretion and results in consensus.
477
  A high 
level of consensus is achieved, according to Pritchett, by a high proportion of these ‘easy’ 
legally certain cases on the courts’ dockets.478   
 
There is no evidence to support this theory in the UK Supreme Court.  The court only hears 
appeals on arguable points of law and ‘concentrates on cases of the greatest public and 
constitutional importance.’479   Indeed, in comparison to other final courts of appeal, the 
Supreme Court hears very few cases and rejects over half the applications for permission to 
appeal, which suggests that the selection process alone should serve to reduce not increase 
this form of ‘easy cases’.  Although there is little evidence that case selection influences 
consensus in the UK Supreme Court, there is some evidence that institutional factors may 
influence the rate of consensus. 
 
5.2 Social theories of consensus 
Theories of consensus which focus on social interactions view consensus as a product of a 
multifactorial process and take both a broad and narrow view of the social institution.  The 
broad view sees the Supreme Court as part of wider society and suggests consensus is a 
reflection of social views. The narrow view looks at social interactions within the framework 
of the court itself. 
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5.2.1 Social consensus theory  
Social consensus theory views judicial decision making within the broader society.  It 
emphasises the persistence of shared values and norms as fundamental characteristics of 
society and suggests that a high rate of consensus in the final courts of appeal reflects a 
broader social consensus.  The theory suggests that judicial decision making reflects society’s 
values and norms and that consensus reflects societal agreement regarding the central issues.   
There is some traction in this theory and some cases which have divided judicial opinion 
have reflected the conflicted views of society.  
 
This conflict of social values was evident in the judicial division in the Nicklinson v Ministry 
of Justice.
480
  A case which centred on assisted suicide.   In his reasoning, Lord Sumption 
highlighted the association between social consensus and judicial decision making and 
revealed the difficulty in judicial decision making on issues where there is a conflict of social 
values: 
The first is that, as I have suggested, the issue involves a choice between 
two fundamental but mutually inconsistent moral values, upon which 
there is at present no consensus in our society.  Such choices are 
inherently legislative in nature.  The decision cannot fail to be strongly 
influenced by the decision-makers’ personal opinions about the moral 
case for assisted suicide. This is entirely appropriate if the decision-
makers are those who represent the community at large. It is not 
appropriate for professional judges. The imposition of their personal 
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opinions on matters of this kind would lack all constitutional 
legitimacy.
481
 
Social consensus theory suggests that in such cases judicial decisions reflect the divisions in 
society.  There are however several other theories on consensus, which centre on individual 
judges rather than society as a whole.  These theories suggest that the court as a social 
institution has norms of behaviour that encourages consensus. 
 
5.2.2 The court as a social institution  
Epstein and others argue that the level of consensus decision making in the U.S. Supreme 
Court does not reflect true consensus but rather an artificially raised level of consensus 
because Justices who disagree with the majority ‘suffer in silence’. 482  The authors suggest 
that in the US Supreme Court there exists an unarticulated strength associated with the norm 
of consensus which creates an obligation in the dissenting judge to mask their differences 
from public view.  
 
5.2.2.1 Norm of consensus 
Calderia and Zom develop this theory suggesting that consensual norms function as social 
institutions which structure interactions among participants within the Supreme Court.
483
   
These social institutions provide information about how people are expected to ‘act in 
particular situations’ and ‘structure the strategic choices of actors in such a way as to produce 
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equilibrium outcomes’.484  Within the context of the Supreme Court, the consensual norm, as 
a social institution, provides guidance to Justices as to when it is appropriate for them and 
their colleagues to go public with disagreement.
485
  
 
Empirical studies, of the ‘consensual norm’ in the U.S. Supreme Court, examine the principle 
of ‘vote shifts’ or changes of opinion which settle on supporting the majority as evidence of 
effectiveness of the institutional norm.  Although not in the context of the consensual norm, 
Paterson examined the principle of vote shifting in the UK Supreme Court when he discussed 
‘changes of mind’ and identified decisions which were replete with changes of position, 
many resulting in a final decision which supported the majority position.  Paterson does not 
suggest that the changes of mind are a facet of ‘silencing’ the dissention, indeed Paterson 
suggests that there is little evidence of a norm of consensus in the UK Supreme Court.
 486
 
Rather Paterson’s work highlights the influence of the multiple facets of the Supreme Court, 
as a social institution, on judicial decision making.  These include the influence of corridor 
(or coffee pot) discussions, collegiality and team working on individual decision making.
487
   
 
5.2.2.2 Collegiality 
The influence of collegiality within the small closed community cannot be underestimated.    
The influence of the process of collegiality alone may serve to modify individual decisions 
and encourage consensus as discussed by Harry T Edwards:
488
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Judges have a common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the 
law right and that, as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be 
persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect. Collegiality is a 
process that helps to create the conditions for principled agreement, by 
allowing all points of view to be aired and considered.  Specifically,…. 
collegiality plays an important part in mitigating the role of partisan 
politics and personal ideology by allowing judges of differing 
perspectives and philosophies communicate with, listen to and ultimately 
influence one another in constructive law-abiding ways.
489
 
He argues, a collegiate environment allows judges to disagree freely and to use their 
disagreements to improve and refine their judgments.    Although there is a little evidence of 
pressure to create harmonious conditions for mutual persuasion, there is evidence of 
friendships and team-working in the Supreme Court.   
 
5.3 Collective decision making in the UK Supreme Court 
Paterson clearly demonstrates that decision making within the Supreme Court is a social and 
collective process which is facilitated through formal and informal dialogue and engagement 
with the judgments of others.  It is accepted that not every Supreme Court Justice engages in 
the collective process, as articulated by Lady Hale: 
I think there probably is a spectrum of people who take an extremely 
individualistic attitude to things and people take a more consensus-
seeking attitude, which is rather different from an authoritative, a directive 
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thing.  I don’t think anybody tries to be directive and some place more 
weight on trying to get as many people to sign up to a particular 
identifiable point of view than others do.
490
 
Although individuals may select not to participate, the systems and processes in the Supreme 
Court encourage a more collective decision making process.  In contrast to the speeches from 
the House of Lords, in the Supreme Court a single Justice can deliver a judgment on behalf of 
the Court.  This affords the Justices the opportunity to avoid writing concurring judgments 
where they agree with the decision and the reasoning.  Indeed, in the first four years of the 
Supreme Court, 43% of the decisions in the Supreme Court were delivered through a single 
judgment.  The ability to deliver a consensus judgment may also create a pressure on 
Supreme Court Justices to reach consensus.  Lord Philips, the first President of the Supreme 
Court, acknowledged that the Supreme Court Justices are encouraged to reach consensus 
decisions and avoid minority and dissenting judgments.   Consensus decisions are also 
encouraged by Lord Neuberger, the current President of the Supreme Court: 
A presiding judge or the head of a court has no right to insist on a 
colleague not giving a judgment or not saying something he or she wants 
to say in a judgment: that is an important aspect of judicial independence. 
Nonetheless self-restraint is generally a judicial virtue….while I am not 
suggesting banning dissenting judgments, it may be that we could have 
fewer of them, and that they could be shorter.
491
 
The achievement of consensus is mediated though collective decision-making and team 
working.  Indeed, Paterson highlights the significant increase in single judgments as evidence 
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of team working.
492
  This team work is facilitated though a range of systems and processes 
within the Supreme Court including an increased number of formal meetings and pre-
meetings, which encourage dialogue and collective decision making.  Little is known about 
these meetings, but Lord Kerr provided some insight into the process and potential for 
developing consensus: 
[T]he discipline of deliberations immediately after the hearing, where 
every justice is not only entitled to give his or her view but is required to 
provide it and to support it with reasons.  This critical phase in every case 
gives us the opportunity to sway or be swayed by rehearsal of the 
arguments and even, perish the thought, a new perspective on the appeal 
that has somehow eluded counsel. No system is perfect but ours, with the 
continued value that it places on the oral tradition, is, in my entirely 
biased view, about as good as it can be and it is, I am sure, at least partly 
responsible for the small number of dissents.
493
 
Although the process may reduce individual dissenting judgments, as Lady Hale suggests 
Supreme Court Justices are individuals who engage to varying degrees with the processes of 
collective decision making. Indeed, there is some evidence that the personalities of the 
Supreme Court may also encourage consensus and collective decision making.  This is 
particularly true of the President of the Supreme Court.   
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5.3.1 The President of the Supreme Court and Consensus 
Since the creation of the Supreme Court, there have been two Presidents, Lord Phillips who 
retired in August 2012 and subsequently Lord Neuberger.  Both openly encouraged 
consensus, although Lord Phillips was more ‘flexible in his approach’: 
I think there are horses for courses.  I think if it’s an area of law that is 
developing…. It is much better that if people are coming at it from 
slightly different viewpoints they should express their view rather than 
trying to get some kind of compromise single judgment by laying down 
inflexible principles.
494
 
The President of the Supreme Court has an opportunity to influence judicial cohesion and 
collective decision making and has the potential to play an important role in social leadership.  
The importance of social leadership was identified by Danelski in his classic work on the US 
Supreme Court.
495
  He argued that a high level of consensus in Supreme Court decision 
making was due in large part to effective task and social leadership and that shifts in the 
judicial norms of consensus seen in the US Supreme Court were due to changes in 
behavioural expectations and judicial cohesiveness which was precipitated by social 
leadership and ‘depends on esteem, ability and personality’ of the leader.496  Danelski’s paper 
serves as a framework for much of the subsequent American literature examining the role of 
leadership and consensus in the U.S. Supreme Court.
497
  Statistical analysis of judicial 
decision making in the U.S. Supreme Court from 1800 – 1991 emphasised the association 
between social leadership and consensus, revealing a norm of judicial consensus which 
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varied under the leadership of different Chief Justices.
498
   Although, not the wide variation in 
consensus associated with leadership in the U.S. Supreme Court, there is a difference 
between the decision making during the tenure of Lord Phillips and the first year of Lord 
Neuberger’s tenure. 
 
In October 2012, in a speech delivered just after his appointment, Lord Neuberger 
emphasised unanimity as a judicial norm and made a call for more comprehensive judgments 
with less concurring and dissenting opinions.
499
  In contrast to the US literature which 
highlights the importance of the consensual norm for political reasons, Lord Neuberger 
emphasised the importance for clarity and access to justice.
500
  The difference in motivation 
is reflected in the nature and form of pressure towards consensus.  Although there is little 
evidence of a consensual norm and pressure for overall consensus, there is considerable 
evidence of pressure towards single majority judgments.   Under Lord Bingham, the House of 
Lords averaged 20% single majority judgments. In contrast, in the first four years of the UK 
Supreme Court it has increased to 43%.  Paterson suggests that this pressure stems from 
several members of the UK Supreme Court who served on the Court of Appeal who found 
working with several judgments led to uncertainty and mixed messages.
501
  The emphasis on 
single majority judgments has been reflected in the decisions of the Supreme Court, with less 
division in the court since the appointment of Lord Neuberger.
502
 A drop according to 
Paterson that is unparalleled in 20 years.
503
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5.3.2 Individualism 
The influence of individual personalities on division and consensus is not limited to that of 
the President, nor is the role of social leadership.  Indeed, Calderia and Zom argue that the 
norm of consensus could also be influenced by changes in the population of the Supreme 
Court.
 504
  They suggest that ‘the infusion of new judges, with different values might result in 
a decline in the willingness to supress dissent.’505   This is true of the UK Supreme Court as 
any other court.  Paterson agreed and highlighted distinct differences between Supreme Court 
Justices regarding collegiate working.  He argued that there exists on the Supreme Court 
bench a range of personalities from the more collectively minded (group-orientated) Justices 
‘whose primary aim was to engage with their colleagues’ for elucidation as to how they 
might together best resolve the problems posed by the appeal to those ‘who plough their own 
furrow’ and the ‘mid-spectrum’ judge who is somewhere in between.506  This thesis 
recognises the Supreme Court judiciary as individuals and therefore recognises that their 
attitude towards the collective decision making process may influence the rate of consensus 
and the decision to dissent. 
 
The level of consensus is also influenced by what is known as the ‘freshman effect’ where 
some newly appointed Supreme Court Justices follow the leadership of their senior 
colleagues and dissent less.  This pattern of behaviour was first identified in the U.S. 
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Supreme Court.
 507
  In an empirical analysis which encompassed data from several courts of 
final appeal outside the US,  Hanretty could not confirm the ‘freshman effect’ and did not 
identify an association between consensus and the length of time that the judges have been on 
the bench.
508
  Although, there is little evidence of a consistent freshman effect on the UK 
Supreme Court bench, there is a variation in the propensity of individuals to issue a lone 
dissenting opinion after joining the Supreme Court.   Lord Wilson did not dissent alone in the 
first two years after appointment to the Supreme Court bench.  He did join others in adopting 
a dissenting position in four cases, all of which were close call cases.  Lord Reed did issue a 
lone dissenting judgment, 17 months after delivering his first judgment.  In contrast, Lord 
Sumption delivered a lone dissenting judgment seven months after joining the Supreme Court 
bench.  In the absence of comprehensive data, there is little to be said about the ‘freshman 
effect’ in the UK Supreme Court.  These data, however, do suggest that individual Supreme 
Court Justices respond differently to psychological influences and pressures concomitant with 
joining the Supreme Court.   
 
5.3.3 Judicial similarity 
While studies of individualism recognise the difference between Supreme Court Justices, US 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer argues that it is judicial similarity that leads to a high 
rate of consensus.  He suggests that the judiciary achieve consensus because they share a 
‘similar view’ of the law and that judges who have a similar form of legal education and 
professional experience will have a similar view to the law and achieve agreement.
509
  This 
theory may have more traction in the UK Supreme Court, where the judiciary have a very 
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similar legal education, with the majority educated in Oxford or Cambridge with practical 
experience at the Bar.  Indeed, the lack of diversity on the Supreme Court bench has been 
discussed by many authors.
510
   However, despite the lack of diversity in legal education and 
background in the Supreme Court, there is still disagreement.   
 
5.4 Consensus and agreement 
There is an underlying assumption in discussions of judicial decision making that consensus 
reflects judicial agreement.  However, Paterson’s study of judicial decision making in the 
House of Lords and the Supreme Court highlights the variety of decision making and levels 
of disagreement that may underpin a consensus on the final outcome (outcome consensus).
511
  
 
The practice of the House of Lords was that each of the Law Lords could decide whether to 
write separately, with each judge having the opportunity to deliver a dissenting or concurring 
speech. 
512
  There was an opportunity to deliver a single agreed text, but it was only used in 
20% of cases decided in the House of Lords between 2000 and 2009.
513
  The creation of the 
Supreme Court afforded an opportunity for change and many academics and senior judiciary 
supporting the single judgment highlighted the potential uncertainty created by multiple 
written judgments in cases where the outcome was agreed.   Those who wished to maintain 
the multiple judgment status quo emphasised judicial independence and equality and 
highlighted that multiple judgments provided a more accurate reflection of the judicial 
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decision making process, revealing the variety of ways of reaching an answer and diversity in 
the application of the law.
514
  
 
Although the requirement for a single judgment was ultimately rejected, suggesting that it 
would create ‘spurious certainty’ where none exists, many of the Supreme Court Justices still 
favour the single majority judgment.
515
  This is reflected in the data, with a doubling of single 
majority judgments in the first year of the Supreme Court, and a reduction in concurring 
judgments.
516
  
 
The increased prevalence of single judgments would theoretically suggest the concurring 
judgments may be more prevalent where a Justice disagrees with the reasoning or decides 
there is an issue of law which requires further elaboration or highlighting.
517
  Concurring 
judgments may therefore reflect judicial disagreement, albeit disagreement about reasoning 
rather than outcome.   Indeed, Lord Neuberger suggested that concurring judgments should 
be limited to these cases:  
[C]oncurring judgments should only be written where they really add (or I 
suppose, subtract) something to (or from) the leading judgment.  On the 
whole, there is much to be said for giving a concurring judgment only 
where the topic really would benefit from judicial dialogue.
518
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Although based on a strong theoretical foundation, in reality, some Supreme Court Justices 
do not share this motivation.  It is impossible to estimate accurately how many cases reflect 
true consensus, but it may be represented in part by those cases which result in a single 
majority opinion which account for 55% of all cases which achieve outcome consensus.
519
  In 
the remaining 45% of cases at least one Supreme Court Justice has delivered a concurring 
judgment.  Indeed, these cases may also represent true agreement if the concurring judgment 
is, as defined by Lord Neuberger, a ‘vanity judgment’ which is a judgment, 
[I]ntended to agree with the lead judgment, but not to add anything other 
than saying ‘I have understood this case’ or ‘I think I can express it better’ 
or ‘I am interested in this point’ or simply ‘I am here too’. Such 
judgments, of which virtually every appellate judge, not least myself, has 
been guilty, are at best a waste of time and space, and, at worst, confusion 
and uncertainty – although they are popular with academics.520 
However, the presence of concurring judgments in these cases, which achieve consensus on 
the final outcome, may also reflect ‘types of disagreement’.521   
 
5.4.1 Consensus and disagreement 
The most obvious disagreement, within the context of consensus, is where a Supreme Court 
Justice agrees with the final outcome but disagrees or is uncertain about the reasoning of the 
lead judgment.  In such cases, the Supreme Court Justice may write a separate judgment 
highlighting the areas of disagreement and uncertainty.  Within these cases, a concurring 
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judgment reflects a level of uncertainty and potentially disagreement, however, the 
disagreement does not extend to the outcome and the strength of the disagreement does not 
result in a dissent.  Indeed, Lord Neuberger suggested that these are valuable concurring 
judgments which a judge may have a ‘duty’ to deliver: 
However, if you do not agree with all the reasoning in a judgment, it may 
be your duty to write – at least on the point or points you disagree with. 
And in some cases, eg where one is extending the scope of tort law in an 
area, it is often positively helpful to have more than one judgment to take 
the debate forward.
522
 
Writing any judgment imposes significant personal costs on the judge writing the judgment.  
Although the concurring judgment does not bring with it the costs to collegiality a dissenting 
opinion may risk, the costs of time and effort are significant.  These constraints may serve to 
limit consensus judgments and despite the potential of vanity judgments, no single UK 
Supreme Court Justice delivers a judgment in every case they hear.  On average a Supreme 
Court Justice will only deliver a judgment in 6% of cases which achieve outcome consensus.  
In comparison, every Justice delivered a judgment in 29% of close call cases and 21% of 
cases with a single dissenting opinion.  This suggests that in cases which there is no division 
of judicial opinion, Supreme Court Justices are less likely to deliver a concurring judgment 
 
5.5 The psychology of consensus. 
The systems model of the psychology of decision making centres on the uncertain decision.  
The influence of system 1 decision making, heuristics and the affect response, are heightened 
where the system 2 reasoning does not provide a clear answer.  Consensus in judicial decision 
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making could therefore be explained by a lack of uncertainty.  Indeed, consensus could be 
viewed as the product of system 2 reasoning where a single outcome is viewed by all as the 
most legally plausible.  But the systems theory of psychology of decision making also 
recognises the internal and external influences that may moderate the final decision. 
Psychology recognises the decision maker as an individual and accordingly that external and 
internal moderators may exert a varied influence.   
 
On average a Supreme Court Justice will deliver a consensus judgment in slightly more than 
a quarter of cases (27%).  Lords Phillips (28%), Mance (26%) and Dyson (30%) all deliver an 
average number of judgments.  Some Justices deliver a consensus judgment in more cases, 
including Lords Hope (33%), Brown (34%) and Collins (33%) with Lord Rodger the most 
likely to write a judgment delivering one in almost half the cases he heard (49%).  In contrast, 
Lord Kerr was the least likely to deliver a judgment, only writing a judgment in one in ten 
cases (9%).  Lady Hale and Lord Clarke deliver a judgment in one in five cases (20%) and 
Lord Walker slightly more but below average (22%).     
 
The variation in delivering concurring judgments in cases which achieve consensus could 
therefore simply reflect an individual’s propensity to write a judgment and heighted 
resistance to the potential institutional constraints that may limit judgment writing.  These 
concurring judgments could also reflect a form of judicial disagreement and perhaps 
uncertainty, not on outcome but reasoning. 
 
5.6 Hypothesis   
Cases in which more than one Supreme Court Justice delivers a consensus judgment may 
therefore reflect the next level on the continuum of uncertainty and division from true 
209 
 
consensus to the close call case.  Judicial decision making in the Supreme Court is influenced 
by many factors and is framed and constrained by the law.  In cases which are uncertain, 
legal considerations do not provide a clear answer and personal values are revealed.  
However, in cases where there is consensus in the outcome, it is argued that the uncertainty is 
less and values are less likely to be revealed.   
 
5.7 Selection of cases for analysis 
A high number of concurring judgments in a case may reflect the complexity of the case, the 
importance of the issues discussed but also a level of disagreement and uncertainty.   In 
outcome consensus cases with more than one judgment, there is range of judgment outcomes, 
from cases where a single Justice delivers a concurring judgment (55%) to one where every 
Justice delivers a judgment which represents 5% of all consensus cases. The number of 
judgments is not a reflection of the panel size (Table 10). 
 
Table 10:  Consensus judgments:  Number of judgments per case (n (%) in relation to 
panel size. 
Panel Size Cases (n) Single 
majority 
judgment 
Two 
judgments 
Three + 
Judgments 
All 
Justices 
deliver a 
judgment 
Five 154 88 (57%) 25 (16%) 32 (21%) 9 (6%) 
Seven 25 10 (40%) 3 (12%) 11 (44%) 1 (4%) 
Nine 5 3 (60%) 1 (20%) 1 (20%)  
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In an attempt to select cases which may reflect disagreement in reasoning, only cases where 
all the Supreme Court Justices agreed on the outcome but more than two Supreme Court 
Justices on the panel delivered a concurring judgment were selected for analysis.  Fifteen 
cases with outcome consensus were analysed for the expression of personal values (Table 
11).    Twelve cases were heard by a panel of five Supreme Court Justices and three by a 
panel of seven.  Each decision had a minimum of three judgments and the cases were selected 
in a sequential series based on the date of the judgment starting with the opening of the 
Supreme Court.  Six of the fifteen cases analysed resulted in three judgments, the remaining 
had four or more and in two cases every Supreme Court Justice delivered a judgment.  
Although, the judgments were shorter in consensus cases than in cases where more than one 
Supreme Court Justice opposes the position of the majority, there was little difference 
between the length of these judgments and judgments in cases which result in a single 
dissent.
523
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 Although there is a wide range in the length of judgments delivered in individual cases, the average length of 
the combined judgments in minority decision cases is 197 paragraphs.  In contrast the average length of the 
combined judgments of cases which result in a single dissent is 104 paragraphs and a consensus judgment with 
more than three Supreme Court Justices delivering an individual judgment is 95 paragraphs. 
211 
 
Table 11:  Outcome consensus cases selected for value analysis. 
*Joint judgments.  Those highlighted in bold delivered an individual judgment.  
Consensus  Cases  Area of Law Judgments 
 
The Office of Fair Trading 
v Abbey National plc & 
Others  
 
[2009] UKSC 6 
 
Banking charges 
 
Lord Phillips 
Lord Walker  
Lady Hale  
Lord Mance  
Lord Neuberger 
 
I (A Child) 
 
[2009] UKSC10 
 
Family law - Jurisdiction 
 
Lord Hope 
Lady Hale 
Lord Collins 
Lord Kerr  
Lord Clarke 
Secretary of State for 
Environment, Food, and 
Rural Affairs v Meier and 
another  
 
[2009] UKSC 11 Procedural land law Lord Rodger  
Lord Walker  
Lady Hale  
Lord Neuberger 
Lord Collins 
 
Ahmed Mahad (Ethiopia) 
v Entry Clearance Officer  
Sahro Ali (Somalia) and 
Amal Wehelia  (Somalia) 
(Appellants) v Entry 
Clearance Officer  
[2009] UKSC 16 Immigration Lord Hope,  
Lord Rodger  
Lord Brown  
Lord Collins  
Lord Kerr 
 
McInnes v Her Majesty's 
Advocate (Scotland) 
 
[2010] UKSC 7 
 
Disclosure /Evidence 
 
Lord Hope,  
Lord Rodger  
Lord Walker  
Lord Brown 
Lord Kerr 
 
Tomlinson and others 
(FC) v Birmingham City 
Council  
[2010] UKSC 8 Administrative Law *Lord Hope,  
*Lady Hale  
*Lord Brown  
Lord Collins  
Lord Kerr 
 
 
Inveresk plc v Tullis 
Russell Papermakers 
Limited ( (Scotland) 
[2010] UKSC19 Company Lord Hope,  
Lord Saville 
Lord Rodger  
Lord Collins 
Lord Clarke 
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Case  Area of Law Judgments 
 
HJ (Iran)  Secretary of 
State for the Home 
Department  
HT (Cameroon) v 
Secretary of State for the 
Home Department  
 
[2010] UKSC 31 Asylum  Lord Hope,  
Lord Rodger 
Lord Walker  
Lord Collins  
Sir John Dyson SCJ 
Yemshaw v London 
Borough of Hounslow  
[2011] UKSC 3 Administrative Law 
(Housing) 
Lord Hope,  
Lord Rodger 
Lord Walker  
Lady Hale  
Lord Brown 
ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary 
of State for the Home 
Department  
[2011] UKSC 4 Rights of the Child 
Deportation 
Lord Hope,  
Lady Hale  
Lord Brown  
Lord Mance  
Lord Kerr 
Global Process Systems 
Inc v Syarikat Takaful 
Malaysia Berhad  
[2011] UKSC 5 Marine Insurance Lord Mance  
Lord Collins 
Lord Clarke  
Lord Dyson  
Lord Saville 
Berrisford v Mexfield 
Housing Co- operative 
Limited  
[2011] UKSC 52 Land Law (Leases) Lord Hope,  
Lord Walker  
Lady Hale  
Lord Mance 
Lord Neuberger  
Lord Clarke  
Lord Dyson 
Farstad Supply A/S v 
Enviroco Limited  
[2011] UKSC 16 Company/Marine Lord Hope,  
Lord Rodger  
Lord Mance  
Lord Collins  
Lord Clarke 
Prest v Petrodel 
Resources Limited and 
others  
[2013] UKSC 34 Family Law – Financial 
remedies 
Lord Neuberger, 
Lord Walker  
Lady Hale 
Lord Mance  
Lord Clarke  
Lord Wilson 
Lord Sumption 
Jones v Kernott  [2011] UKSC 53 Co-ownership *Lord Walker  
*Lady Hale  
Lord Collins  
Lord Kerr  
Lord Wilson 
 
*Joint judgments.  Those highlighted in bold delivered an individual judgment.
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5.8 Expression of values in judgments of cases where there is consensus on the 
outcome 
Although there is little difference in the length of the judgments, there is a difference in the 
number of values statements in the judgments with notably less value statements in the 
judgments of cases where the Supreme Court Justices achieve consensus on the outcome 
compared to cases which divide judicial opinion (Table 12).  The average number of value 
statements in a case which achieved outcome consensus was thirteen substantially lower than 
cases which divided judicial opinion or those with single dissents.   
 
Table 12: Values expressed in judgments:  Consensus and divided 
Case division Average value 
statements per case 
Majority 
(per judgment) 
Minority 80 12 
Single Dissent 29 5 
Consensus 13 3 
 
Values presented as an average per case and per judgment. 
 
 
Within the judgments of cases that achieve consensus, the majority of the value statements 
were in the longer lead judgments with an average of 5 value statements per judgment 
compared to 3 value statements per judgment for consensus judgments. In the majority 
(13/15) of the consensus cases the values expressed in the lead judgment are also expressed 
(albeit to a lesser extent) in the consensus judgments.  Unlike cases which divide judicial 
opinion there was little difference in the pattern of value expression.  
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The consensus case with the most value statements per judgment was Berrisford v Mexfield 
Housing Co-operative Limited which re-examined the certainty of duration requirement in 
leases.
524
  The case was heard by a panel of seven Supreme Court Justices. Lord Sumption 
delivered the lead judgment and five Supreme Court Justices (Lords Neuberger, Walker, 
Mance and Clarke and Lady Hale) delivered consensus judgments.   Although, the case with 
the most value statements, there was on average only six value statements per judgment.
525
   
 
 
 
Figure 5.8-1 Values expressed in the lead judgment and consensus judgments in 
Berrisford v Mexfield Housing Co-operative Limited  
The values are expressed as a percentage of the total value expressed in the judgment 
(lead judgment n= 19, consensus judgments n= 17).   
 
Although there are very few value statements, the data suggests that there is very little 
difference in the pattern of expression of values in the judgments of cases which reach 
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agreement on the outcome (Figure 5.8 – 1).  This undifferentiated pattern of value expression 
was evident in 13 of the 15 cases analysed.  One case was notable in this subset of thirteen, it 
was HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department which involved asylum claims 
made by two homosexual men.
 526
   The court held that the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (1951) protects homosexual men, who should not have to deny their sexuality.  It 
is the judgment of Lord Rodger in this case which is remarkable, not because of the nature of 
values expressed in the judgment but because of the number of value laden statements within 
a consensus judgment.  Typically, there are few values expressed in the judgments of cases in 
which the panel agree on the final outcome.  However, in this case, Lord Rodger delivered a 
longer, more value laden judgment than the lead judgment delivered by Lord Hope.
527
  This 
value laden judgment is unusual for a concurring judgment.  Although unusual in the density 
of values, the values expressed were similar to those expressed by the majority and centred 
on self-direction: 
Although counsel for the Secretary of State was at pains to draw this 
distinction between assuming that the applicant would act discreetly to 
avoid persecution and finding that this is what he would in fact do, the 
distinction is pretty unrealistic. Unless he were minded to swell the ranks 
of gay martyrs, when faced with a real threat of persecution, the applicant 
would have no real choice: he would be compelled to act discreetly.
528
 
and equality: 
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 HJ (Iran) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC31 
527
 The judgment by Lord Hope consisted of 39 paragraphs with only three value statements.  In contrast, Lord 
Rodger delivered a judgment of 45 paragraphs with twelve value statements.  This value density is similar to a 
judgment in a case which divided judicial opinion.   
528
 Lord Rodger in HJ v Secretary of State for the Home Department (n 308), [59] 
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No-one would proceed on the basis that a straight man or woman could 
find it reasonably tolerable to conceal his or her sexual identity 
indefinitely to avoid suffering persecution. Nor would anyone proceed on 
the basis that a man or woman could find it reasonably tolerable to 
conceal his or her race indefinitely to avoid suffering persecution. Such an 
assumption about gay men and lesbian women is equally unacceptable.’529  
Within the cases which achieved consensus were three cases where individual Supreme Court 
Justices expressed some uncertainty regarding the final decision in their judgments.  The first, 
Secretary of State for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs v Meier was highlighted by 
Paterson as one with a ‘change of mind’.530   The case addressed whether an injunction could 
be issued to prevent somebody from trespassing on land which they do not currently occupy.  
The court decided that such an order could not be made.  Lord Collins although reaching a 
decision in support of the majority position, highlighted his initial attraction to the alternative: 
I was particularly impressed by the point that an injunction might be a 
remedy which was not capable of being employed effectively in cases 
such as this. But I am now convinced that there is no legitimate basis for 
making an order for possession in an action for the recovery of wholly 
distinct land of which the defendant is not in possession.
531
 
Despite the initial uncertainty, the majority of values within his judgment mirrored those 
expressed by the other Supreme Court Justices and lacked the polarisation of values observed 
in single dissenting judgments.   
                                                 
529
 Lord Rodger in HJ v Secretary of State for the Home Department (n 308), [76]. 
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 Secretary of State for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs v Meier [2009] UKSC11 
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Similarly, Lord Kerr, in the case of Tomlinson and others v Birmingham City Council also 
highlighted his initial uncertainty with the final decision.
 532
   The case reviewed the 
application of s193 of the Housing Act 1996 and the Council’s duty to provide 
accommodation to homeless persons.  The Supreme Court examined whether the system laid 
down by the 1996 Act was consistent with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  The Supreme Court unanimously held that the 1996 Act did not confer upon the 
claimants any ‘civil rights’ and Article 6 was not engaged.   There were three judgments in 
the decision, the lead judgment was written by Lord Hope with whom Lady Hale and Lord 
Brown agreed.  Lord Collins and Lord Kerr delivered separate concurring judgments.   
 
As with other judgments in cases which reached outcome consensus, the judgments were 
short with few value coded statements.  Lord Hope in the lead judgment which ran to 57 
paragraphs and espoused values encompassed across three main value domains self-direction, 
universalism and security, with the majority of values located within security and the 
maintenance of social order by recognising the limitation of State resources.  Lord Collins 
agreed with the outcome but was not completely convinced by the reasoning of Lord Hope.  
In his short judgment, of fifteen paragraphs, he also espoused values encompassed within 
security.  Lord Kerr, although again in agreement with outcome, highlighted his difficulty 
with the final decision:   
 I agree with Lord Hope and Lord Collins that this appeal should be 
dismissed. One can recognise, however, the initial attraction of the 
argument that the right involved here was a civil right within the 
autonomous meaning of article 6…..But I have been persuaded by the 
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 Tomlinson v Birmingham City Council [2010] , UKSC8.  This case is also cited as Ali v Birmingham City 
Council [2010] UKSC8.  T Cross, 'Is There a "Civil Right" under Article 6?  Ten Principles for Public Lawyers' 
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respondent’s argument that the case-law points unmistakably in the 
opposite direction and I think that now is the time to recognise its effect.  I 
have not found it easy to reach a principled basis for the distinction 
between social security payments and social welfare provision for both 
require the expenditure of public resources; both provide a valuable 
resource to the recipient; and both are activated by a need on the part of 
the beneficiary.
533
 
The importance of precedent to his final decision was reflected in the values expressed in his 
judgment, with Lord Kerr espousing values encompassed within tradition, values which were 
not espoused by the other Supreme Court Justices.  Although few in number, the polarisation 
of values observed in this consensus judgment was similar to that seen in single dissenting 
judgments.  In the Schwartz values model, the values encompassed in tradition are located 
adjacent to those encompassed in security and both are located within the broader 
classification of conservation. Both values centre on self restriction, preservation of the past 
and resistance to change. This colocation of values within conservation, may have served to 
facilitate consensus.  
 
Unlike, Lord Kerr who expressed initial uncertainty in the decision, Lord Brown in Yemshaw 
v London Borough of Hounslow expressed considerable uncertainty with the final decision 
throughout his judgment.
 534
  The case which centred on the definition of domestic violence 
in Part VII of the Housing Act 1996, deals with housing the homeless.
535
  The Supreme Court 
was asked to determine if domestic violence could be extended beyond physical contact to 
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 Lord Kerr Tomlinson and others v Birmingham City Council (n 527), [74-75]  
534
 Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow [2011] UKSC 3 
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 Housing Act 1996, s 177(1).  
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incorporate other forms of violent conduct and abuse.  The Supreme Court Justices held that 
(as per Lord Rodger): 
Parliament has provided that it is not reasonable for someone to continue 
to occupy accommodation if it is probable that this will lead to her being 
subjected to violence in the form of deliberate conduct, or threats of 
deliberate conduct, that may cause her physical harm. So the person at risk 
is automatically homeless for the purposes of the 1996 Act. I can see no 
reason why Parliament would have intended the position to be any 
different where someone will be subjected to deliberate conduct, or threats 
of such conduct, that may cause her psychological harm. I would therefore 
interpret ‘violence’ as including such conduct and the subsection as 
applying in such cases. To conclude otherwise would be to play down the 
serious nature of psychological harm.
536
 
This case was highlighted by Lady Hale as a case where the Supreme Court 
‘moved with the times’.537  Lady Hale delivered the lead judgment, with which 
Lord Hope and Lord Walker agreed.  Lord Rodger and Lord Brown delivered 
concurring judgments, and it was the judgment delivered by Lord Brown that was 
notable.   
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Figure 5.8-2: Value analysis of the judgments in Yemshaw v  London Borough of 
Hounslow  
 
The judgments by Lady Hale and Lord Rodger centred on the protection of the vulnerable 
and values encompassed in universalism and self-direction (Figure 5.8-2).  In contrast, Lord 
Brown expressed values encompassed in tradition and maintaining the status quo, with 
reasoning which centred on the importance of Parliamentary intention in statutory 
interpretation and which adopted a narrow approach to statutory interpretation similar to the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeal which yielded the opposite decision.  Indeed, in the opening 
paragraphs of his judgment Lord Brown highlighted his uncertainty with the decision:   
But I have nonetheless found this a much more difficult case than other 
members of the Court appear to have done and I cannot hide my profound 
doubt as to whether at any stage of their legislative history the ‘domestic 
violence’ provisions with which we are here concerned – now enacted as 
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sections 177 and 198 of the 1996 Act - were intended to extend beyond 
the limits of physical violence.538 
Tempting though it is to accept this argument – one does not, after all, like 
to appear old-fashioned – I confess to doubts and hesitation here too. 
….With the best will in the world I find it difficult to accept that there is 
quite the same obvious urgency in re-housing those subject to 
psychological abuse, let alone that it will be possible to identify this 
substantially wider class of prospective victims, however precisely they 
may be defined, with anything like the same ease.
539
 
Despite the residual uncertainty with the outcome Lord Brown openly 
acknowledged that he had chosen not to dissent concluding: 
Rather the Court has no alternative but to decide whether it is indeed now 
right, pursuant to the Fitzpatrick principle, to give to the terms ‘domestic 
violence’ and ‘violence’ the wider meaning contended for by the appellant 
and both interveners. In taking this course we would, of course, be 
overturning two clear and unanimous decisions of the Court of Appeal: 
respectively of Mummery, Jacob and Neuberger LJJ in Danesh v 
Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2007] 1 WLR 
69 and of Waller, Laws and Etherton LJJ in the present case. I have 
already indicated my very real doubts about doing so. At the end of the 
day, however, I do not feel sufficiently strongly as to the proper outcome 
                                                 
538
 Lord Brown in Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow [2011] UKSC 3, [48], emphasis added. 
539
 Ibid, [ 57], emphasis added. 
222 
 
of the appeal to carry these doubts to the point of dissent. I am content 
that the views of the majority should prevail and that the appeal should be 
allowed.
540
 
Although there was limited value expression, the doubt expressed by Lord Brown in the final 
outcome was reflected in the values he espoused. Indeed, the values expressed in the 
judgment would indicate dissent.  This case presents a good example of where values are 
overwhelmed by situational factors.  Lord Brown although uncertain about the decision, does 
not feel sufficiently strongly to dissent alone. 
 
5.9 Values and consensus decisions 
The analysis of values in judgments of cases which achieve outcome consensus was essential 
to identify the limits of the value: decision paradigm in legal judgments.  Value expression 
was reduced in the judgments of cases which do not divide judicial opinion compared to 
judgments of cases which do.  In 80% of the cases analysed, in which there was consensus on 
the outcome, the majority of values were expressed in the leading judgment.  Unlike cases 
which divided judicial opinion, the individual judgments of consensus cases reflected the 
same values.  In three cases, within the dataset, a Supreme Court Justice expressed some 
reservation about the final decision.  In two, of these three cases, the values espoused by the 
Supreme Court Justice who expressed the reservations did not reflect those identified in the 
lead judgment.   
 
In the same way that cases which divide judicial opinion can be viewed on a continuum of 
disagreement, cases can also be viewed as on a continuum of uncertainty.  If cases which 
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divide judicial opinion can be viewed as uncertain, then cases which achieve consensus could 
be represented on the continuum as closer to certainty.  In these cases, the Supreme Court 
Justices perceive the law which dictates the outcome as more certain, therefore limiting 
discretion and the role of non-comparative considerations.  As such, the Supreme Court 
Justices do not draw on values to support their reasoning.  This is reflected in the limited 
value expression in the judgments which achieve outcome consensus.  In the majority of 
cases the value expression was largely confined to the lead judgment.  Indeed, with the 
exception of specific cases where a Supreme Court Justice identified an element of 
uncertainty regarding the final decision, there was very little difference in the pattern of value 
expression between the judgments.  Differential value expression was only identified in 
judgments which highlighted some uncertainty.  The relationship between values, uncertainty 
and division is graphically represented below (Figure 5.9-3). 
 
 
 
High value expression      Low value expression 
High uncertainty     Low uncertainty 
High disagreement       Low disagreement 
      
 
Close calls Minority decisions Single Dissents      Consensus  Single judgment 
More than one SCJ        Outcome agreed 
opposes the majority       multiple judgments 
 
 
Figure 5.9-3: Graphic representation of the continuum of judicial division. 
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The analysis of consensus cases has served to further qualify the role of values in legal 
judgments.  Personal values are revealed in cases which divide judicial opinion, cases where 
the law is perceived as uncertain and judicial discretion plays a role.  This is particularly true 
of cases where more than one Supreme Court Justice supports a minority position. Although 
there is significant value expression in lone dissenting judgments, the Supreme Court Justices 
supporting the majority position view the outcome as more certain and are less likely to 
reveal values in their judgments.   Values are rarely revealed in cases which achieve 
consensus.   The findings do not suggest that values do not play a role in consensus decisions, 
but suggests that the values which underpin the decisions are not revealed in the judgments 
where there is agreement on the outcome.   
 
Psychological studies of decision making suggest that the influence of values is heighted in 
uncertain decisions, where system 2 reasoning does not provide a clear answer.  The value 
analysis of cases supports this, with increased value expression associated with legal 
uncertainty and the exercise of judicial discretion.  Epstein et al (2012) argues that the 
intrinsic personal influences on decision making are still present in cases which do not divide 
judicial opinion but suggests that if the perceived strength of the opposing argument is low 
then institutional and psychological factors which promote dissent aversion will prevail and 
produce a unanimous decision.
 541
  This thesis affirms this proposal, suggesting that the 
internal driver for dissent is the perception that the outcome is wrong and that this perception 
is mediated through uncertainty.  When the perception of uncertainty is weak, then the 
institutional and psychological factors will encourage consensus.     
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In framing judicial decision making as a psychological process, this thesis recognises that the 
influences of these institutional and psychological pressures on decision making will vary 
between individuals. The next part of the thesis will move from the case as the unit of 
analysis to the individual Supreme Court Justice.   In doing so, the analysis can examine the 
value: decision paradigm and the factors that may enable and constrain the influence of 
values on legal judgments at an individual level. 
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6 Chapter 6 
The Value: Decision Paradigm and Individual Decision Making 
 
 [F]rom time to time one’s own particular approach to concepts of justice 
and fairness, comes in as does one’s own particular background and 
experiences may lead one to look at a particular factual situation in a 
different way.
542
 
The previous chapters have centred on the cases heard in the Supreme Court revealing 
personal values in judgments of cases which divide judicial opinion.   This chapter turns the 
focus from cases to individual Supreme Court Justices, to examine whether individual 
Supreme Court Justices consistently espouse certain values and whether these values are 
reflected in their judicial decisions.   
 
Personal values are informed by life experiences and lurk beneath the surface of 
consciousness.  They serve as a largely subconscious influence on judicial decision making.    
The subconscious nature of this influence suggests that values may be viewed as a form of 
implicit bias.  Although, in law, bias has a very negative connotation, in psychology the term 
bias simply denotes a displacement of one’s responses along a continuum of possible 
judgments.  The term does not bear a pejorative meaning.   
 
 This chapter sets out four case studies revealing the value: decision paradigm at an 
individual level, the differences in individual value expression and considers the factors that 
may enable or limit that expression.  The cases were selected using maximum variation 
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sampling, a method of purposive sampling used in small datasets.  This method of purposive 
sampling is an extension of the statistical principle of regression towards the mean and is 
based on the premise that if the analysis is carried out on an extreme subpopulation then it 
will also reflect those within the population who are average.  By including in the analysis 
those Supreme Court Justices who have maximum variation, the average Justice is also 
included.   The case studies chosen are the best examples of value: decision paradigm 
variation and serve as the appropriate examples within the small subset of ten Supreme Court 
Justices assessed.   The values of all the Supreme Court Justices and the influences on these 
values on decisions are discussed in the final chapter. 
 
6.1 The role of the individual in judicial decisions 
The UK Supreme Court Justices have increasingly accepted the influence of personal factors 
on judicial decisions, especially in cases which divide judicial opinion:   
I am not surprised that there are differing opinions that is inevitable at this 
level with the nature of the cases that we hear.  They are complicated, they 
are difficult and some of them involve questions of judgment and 
philosophy… I mean an approach to life.  It is not at all surprising that 
there are different views.
543
 
In discussing the subconscious influences on judicial decision making, it is important to 
recognise the Supreme Court Justices as individuals and that the external and internal factors 
that influence decision making may have a different effect on each individual.   As with the 
variation in number of consensus judgments delivered by an individual Supreme Court 
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Justice, there is also a variation in the propensity to deliver a dissenting judgment.  The 
decision to dissent is not without a legal context and the facts and the law surrounding the 
case will have a significant influence on the decision to disagree.  But as highlighted in the 
judgment by Lord Brown, in Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow, institutional and 
psychological factors also play a significant role in the decision to dissent.
 544
  Psychological 
factors and institutional factors including a high workload, collegiality and a norm of 
consensus can all serve to limit dissent.
545
  These external and internal influences combine to 
create an effect known as ‘dissent aversion’ which was described in the US Supreme Court 
by Epstein et al (2010), and defined as a situation where a Justice may not dissent even when 
they disagree with the majority opinion.
  546
  It was dissent aversion which encouraged Lord 
Brown to join the majority in Yemshaw.547  
 
Lord Brown is not alone. Supreme Court Justices are individuals and the drive to dissent will 
vary within an individual.  Indeed, the perception of the barriers to dissent differs among 
Supreme Court Justices.  This was highlighted by Paterson.
548
  Some Supreme Court Justices 
view the threshold for dissent as a very high threshold as Lord Wilson suggests when he 
stated; 
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‘I swallow hard and accept a majority decisions unless there was a sort of 
propulsion… of objection.  I can’t live with it, I am sorry I can’t live with 
it – then I think you dissent.’549 
In comparison, Lord Kerr argues that the threshold is lower: 
 [I]f you feel that the decision is wrong or that the reasoning supporting 
the decision is wrong, you shouldn’t shirk away from writing a dissent.550 
This variation in the threshold to dissent and perception of the pressure for consensus is 
reflected in the propensity to dissent alone, which varies amongst the individual Supreme 
Court Justices (Table 13).  The majority of Supreme Court Justices have a rate of sole dissent 
of between one and two percent.  All Supreme Court Justices face similar social and 
institutional pressures to conform, yet as suggested by his statement Lord Kerr is more 
predisposed than average to dissent alone.  Lady Hale is also more likely than average to 
deliver a lone dissenting judgment.  Lady Hale and Lord Kerr are not ‘great dissenters’, both 
only delivered six and eight lone dissents respectively in the first four years.  The numbers 
are very low and therefore little can be made of the pattern of dissent, but notably neither 
Supreme Court Justice delivered a lone dissenting opinion in the first year of Lord 
Neuberger’s tenure suggesting that the increased external constraints can deter even those 
who are not as susceptible to the external pressures of consensus. 
 
6.2 Judicial decision making and transparency 
Kirby argues that the publication of minority or dissenting judgments serves to enhance the 
transparency of judicial decision making and the revealing disagreement within the judicial 
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body is more transparent than the creation of artificial coherence.
551
  This transparent 
disagreement according to Alder serves to draw public attention to the incommensurable ever 
changing values of society and keeps choices alive for the future.
552
    However, the 
requirements of transparency extend beyond the publication of dissent.  Transparency 
requires that a judgment reveals all the factors that influence the final decision.  Although the 
perception of justice and what is ‘right’ and ‘fair’ is influenced by many factors both external, 
such as the norms of the prevailing culture, and internal,  including personal experiences and 
values, these factors rarely appear in judgments.
553
  The influence of these factors is largely 
subconscious and hidden from view, even from the decision maker.  It is in uncertain 
judgments, which have a reliance on heuristics, that subconscious influences play a role and it 
these decisions that social cognition psychologists suggest are susceptible to subconscious 
bias.   
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Table 13:  Distribution of decisions of each Supreme Court Justice over the first four years. 
            All Cases Divided Cases             Close Call 
Cases 
           Majority Cases              Dissents 
Justice 
 
Total  Consensus Rate of lone 
dissent (%) 
Majority 
% (n)  
Minority  
% (n) 
Majority 
% (n) 
Minority 
% (n) 
Majority 
% (n) 
Minority 
% (n) 
Majority 
% (n) 
Dissent 
% (n) 
Lord 
Phillips 
76 68% (52)  1.5% (1) 76% (11) 24% (3) 80% (4) 20% (1) 78% (7) 22% (2) 90%  (9) 10% (1) 
Lord  
Hope 
126 75% (94) 0.8% (1) 58% (10) 42% (7) 50% (6) 50% (6) 80% (4) 20% (1) 95% (14) 5% (1) 
Lord 
Brown 
90 65% (58) 2% (2) 53% (8) 47% (7) 37% (3) 63% (5) 71% (5) 29% (2) 88% (15) 12% (2) 
Lord 
Rodger 
61 76% (45) 1.6% (1) 22% (2) 78% (7) 0 100% (5) 50% (2) 50% (2) 85% (6) 15% (1) 
Lord 
Walker 
104 72% (75) 2% (2) 71% (12) 29% (5) 58% (7) 42% (5) 100% (5) 0 83% (10) 17% (2) 
Lady  
Hale 
119 74% (88) 5% (6) 53% (9) 47% (8) 62% (5) 38% (3) 45% (4) 55% (5) 57% (8) 
 
43% (6) 
Lord  
Kerr 
101 69% (70) 8% (8) 76% (13) 24% (4) 
 
62% (5) 38% (3) 89% (8) 11% (1) 43% (6) 57% (8) 
Lord 
Mance 
92 74% (68) 2% (2) 58% (7) 42% (5) 75% (6) 25% (2) 25% (1) 75% (3) 91% (10) 9% (2) 
Lord 
Collins 
51  76% (39) 0 87% (7)  13% (1) 80% (4)  20% (1) 100% (4) 0 100% (4) 0 
Lord 
Clarke 
94 75% (71) 1% (1) 43% (6) 57% (8) 50% (5) 50% (5) 25% (1) 75% (3) 89% (8) 1% (1) 
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6.3 Judicial decisions and implicit bias 
A belief is explicit if it is consciously endorsed.  The study of implicit cognition suggests that 
actors do not always have conscious control over the processes that motivate their actions and 
implicit attitudes may exert a subconscious influence on the decision making process.
554
   
Implicit attitudes are defined by Greenwald and Banaji (1995) as ‘introspectively unidentified 
(or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favourable or unfavourable 
thought, feeling, or action toward social objects.’555  Of note these subconscious influences 
can be both favourable and unfavourable.  However, the subconscious nature of these 
attitudes, can serve to create a dissonance between expressed explicit attitudes and the 
implicit attitudes which control social behaviour.
556
   
  
The potential effect of these subconscious influences on decision making is to create an 
implicit bias and displace one’s responses along a continuum of possible judgments.  Implicit 
bias therefore serves as an subconscious and uncontrollable facet of decision making.  One of 
the remarkable features of implicit bias is that individuals may not be aware of their own bias 
and as suggested above, a decision maker may harbour implicit biases that are diametrically 
opposed to their explicitly stated and consciously avowed attitudes.
 557
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Conscious bias is easily ascertained in judicial decision making, indeed it is this form of bias 
that is explored in confirmation hearings and underpins the studies of judicial ideology and 
decision making.  This thesis is centred on the second form of bias, implicit bias.    
 
Although there are a large number of studies suggesting implicit bias is pervasive in society 
and there is extensive literature regarding the potential impact of judicial implicit bias, based 
on race, gender and other legally protected characteristics, there are few empirical studies 
which examine the influence of implicit bias on judicial decision making.
558
  These studies 
tend to highlight negative implicit bias against members of traditionally disadvantaged 
groups and demonstrate that even those who embrace non-discrimination norms can treat 
these groups differently.
559
  The majority of this work is carried out on sentencing in the US 
courts.  The authors use the differential pattern in sentencing correlated with race as evidence 
of implicit bias.
560
 Although, the equivalent studies have not been carried out in the UK, data 
from the UK Ministry of Justice Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2012, 
                                                 
558
 SR Bagenstos, 'Implicit Bias,“Science,” and Anti-Discrimination Law' (2007) 1 Harvard Law and Policy 
Review 477; J Kang and K Lane, 'Seeing Through Colorblindness:  Implicit bias and the Law' (2010) 58 UCLA 
Law Review 465; M Shayo and A Zussman, 'Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism' (2011) 126 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1447; J Kang and others, 'Implicit Bias in the Courtroom' (2012) 55 UCLA Law 
Review 1124 
559
 AG Greenwald, D McGhee and JLK Schwartz, 'Measuring Inidvidual Differences in Implicit Cognition:  The 
Implicit Association Test.' (1998) 74 Personality and Social Psychology 1464; G Mitchell and PE Tetlock, 
'Anti-Discrimination Law and the Perils of Misreading' (2006) 67 Ohio State Law Journal 1023; Greenwald AG 
and Hamilton Krieger L, 'Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations.' (2006) 94 California Law Review 945;  JJ 
Rachlinski and SL Johnson, 'Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?' (2009) 84 Notre Dame Law 
Review 1195 
560
 H Zeisel, 'Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience' (1981) 95 Harvard 
Law Review 456; C Spohn, J Gruhl and S Welch, 'The Effect of Race on Sentencing: A Re-examination of an 
Unsettled Question' (1981) Law and Society Review 71;  C Spohn, 'The Sentencing Decisions of Black and 
White Judges: Expected and Unexpected Similarities' (1990) Law and Society Review 1197; A Von Hirsch and 
JV Roberts, 'Racial Disparity in Sentencing:  Reflections on the Hood Study' (1997) 36 The Howard Journal of 
Criminal Justice 227; Englich B, Mussweiler T and Strack F, 'Playing Dice with Criminal Sentence:  The 
Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts Judicial Decision Making.' (2006) 32 Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 188 
234 
 
suggests the UK judges and magistrates may also be subject to similar influences.
561
  Indeed, 
the presence of negative implicit bias poses a significant challenge to judicial decision 
making.
562
  This thesis does not address negative forms of implicit bias, in contrast, this thesis 
addresses bias as a predisposition along a continuum without any negative connotations.  
 
It is possible to scrutinise and regulate explicit bias, indeed, the central focus of anti-
discrimination law is the prevention of explicit bias or conscious biased decision making.  In 
contrast, implicit bias cannot be afforded the same scrutiny or regulation.   Implicit bias 
operates in the absence of explicit intent and operates largely subconsciously.
563
  Although it 
may be argued that negative biases are morally wrong, the decision maker is not morally 
culpable.
 564
  As implicit biases defy intentional control, the control principle central to 
theories of moral responsibility attribution is violated.
565
  Even professional decision makers, 
are unable to prevent unwanted implicit biases from influencing their decision making. 
 
Judicial decision making is the subject of many inherent psychological influences which act 
at a subconscious level.  Personal values are one of these influences.  The role of personal 
values is mediated through intuition, instinctive reactions which vary from individual to 
individual.   Judicial instinct plays an important role in decision making as Richard A Posner 
                                                 
561
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suggests judicial instinct ‘may be a more accurate and speedier alternative in particular 
circumstances to analytical reasoning….[however] being tacit, it is inarticulate.’566 
 
The tacit, inarticulate nature of the influences which underpin these decisions may serve to 
bias a decision in favour of a specific outcome.  Personal values, mediated through instinct, 
may therefore serve as a form of implicit bias which ‘lurks beneath the surface of 
consciousness.’567  It is recognised that the judiciary strive to make decisions that are ‘correct, 
fair, ethical, and free from the influence of biases.’568  However, personal values, mediated 
through system 1 heuristics, influence decision making, even within the external constraints 
of judicial decision making, and may potentially serve as a pervasive form of implicit bias 
especially in cases which divide judicial opinion.   
 
6.4 Hypothesis 
By focusing on individual Supreme Court Justices, this chapter seeks to address the role of 
values as an implicit form of bias in judicial decisions.  In cases which divide judicial 
decisions, which require the exercise of judicial discretion, the absence of legal certainty 
facilitates decisions anchored in the initial gut reaction and personal values.   If personal 
values function as a form of implicit bias, then there should be a consistent pattern of value 
expression and decision making by individual Supreme Court Justices across a range of 
cases. 
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The hypothesis does not suggest that the expression of values is not without constraint, 
indeed it is accepted that there are significant legal considerations and that the decision 
making is modified and constrained by institutional and psychological pressures and by the 
judicial desire to make good law.
569
  The analysis of individual Supreme Court Justices’ 
decision making reveals both the influence of personal values on legal decisions but also the 
influence of external constraints on decision making in uncertain cases. 
 
6.5 Methods 
The method of coding the expression of values in judgments was as previously described.
570
  
This chapter focuses on the analysis of values not based on the case, but the individual 
Supreme Court Justice who delivered the judgment.  The first eighteen cases which divided 
the Supreme Court, and included divided cases and those with a single dissenting judgment, 
were used in the analysis. The judgments analysed for each Supreme Court Justice 
represented both judgments which supported and opposed the majority positions.  The 
analysis created a value profile which highlighted the key values expressed in the judgments 
of an individual Supreme Court Justice.   
 
Values in extra-judicial writing: To further identify the values of individual Supreme Court 
Justices, the espousal of values within extra- judicial writing was examined.  Although 
numerous judicial speeches were examined during this research, value content analysis was 
carried out on a maximum of 10 extra-judicial speeches for each Supreme Court Justice 
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analysed.
571
  Judicial speeches are not subject to the same limitations as judgments and the 
topic of the speech can be selected by the Supreme Court Justice based on their own interest 
as highlighted by Lord Kerr: 
I apologise for that.  On the basis that confession is good for the soul, I 
should admit that the title was chosen for the wholly unworthy reason that 
the Assange case was the one that came to mind as being among the most 
interesting coming up in our lists, at the time that I was asked to deliver 
this lecture.
572
 
The values identified in the extra-judicial speeches were also used to generate a profile of 
value expression for individual Supreme Court Justices.  Finally, to assess whether the 
decisions reached aligned with the values expressed, outcome values were calculated based 
on the decision reached in the cases analysed. 
 
Outcome values:   The case based content analysis of values in judgments revealed a different 
pattern of value expression between the judgments supporting and opposing the final 
outcome.   Psychologists argue that in reaching a decision between conflicting values, the 
decision maker will support one value above another.  Opposing judgments, in cases which 
divide judicial opinion, reflect this conflict between values.  For example in R v JFS, the 
Justices who supported the majority opinion supported self-direction and universalism when 
in conflict with tradition and conformity.
 573
  Those in the minority supported tradition and 
conformity when in conflict with self-direction and universalism.  The values in conflict 
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therefore were tradition versus self-direction, tradition versus universalism, conformity 
versus self-direction and conformity versus universalism.
 
 
 
The outcome value analysis used the analytical approach frequently used in political analysis 
of judicial decisions.  It is based on the assumption that in adopting a particular position 
whether supporting or opposing the majority, the Supreme Court Justice is affirming the 
values (or ideologies in political analysis) that are promoted by the decision.  In calculating 
outcome values, an individual Supreme Court Justice supporting the majority (or minority) 
decision was categorised as affirming values, when in conflict with opposing values, based 
on the decision they reached rather than the values they espoused, even if they have not 
espoused any or different values in their judgment or not delivered a judgment at all.  For 
example in the R v JFS case, all Justices supporting the majority position will be assigned a 
preference to universalism when it conflicts with tradition or conformity.   
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Table 14: Distribution of cases in the Supreme Court from October 2009 – April 2011 (Data set 1) 574.  
 Overall Cases Cases with Dissenting/Minority Judgments   
Supreme Court 
Justice 
Number 
 of cases  
heard 
Individual 
judgments 
Majority 
Decision 
No of 
cases 
heard  
Individual 
judgments 
Majority 
Decision 
Dissenting 
judgment 
Minority 
judgment 
Coded  
Statements 
Coding 
Density 
Lord Phillips 37 21 (57%) 35 (95%) 10 9 (90%) 8 (80%) 0 2 (20%) 126 14 
Lord Hope 58 33 (62%) 53 (91%) 12 10 (83%) 7 (58%) 1 (8.3%) 4(33.3%) 188 19 
Lord Brown 54 24 (44%) 49 (91%) 14 11 (79%) 10 (71%) 0 4 (29%) 100 9 
Lord Rodger (R.I.P) 52 28 (54%) 48 (92%) 9 6 (66%) 5 (55%) 0 4 (44%) 64 10 
Lord Walker 52 17 (33%) 47 (91%) 14 9 (64%) 9 (64%) 2 (14%) 3 (21%) 59 7 
Lady Hale 49 23 (47%) 43 (88%) 12 11 (79%) 6 (50%) 4 (33%) 2 (17%) 116 11 
Lord Kerr 37 14 (38%) 33 (89%) 10 9 (90%) 6 (60%) 1 (10%) 3 (30%) 97 11 
Lord Mance 37 16 (43%) 36 (97%) 8 7 (88%) 7 (88%) 0 1 (22%) 102 15 
Lord Collins 36 17 (47%) 36 (100%) 7 7 (100%) 7 (100%) 0 0 34 5 
Lord Clarke 36 13 (36%) 33 (89%) 7 5 (71%) 4 (57%) 0 3 (42%) 76 15 
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6.6 Case Study 1:  Lord Hope and tradition 
Lord Hope heard the most cases (n=58) during the study period and wrote the most 
judgments.
 575
   He supported the majority decision in 53 cases (91%), the minority in four 
cases and delivered a dissenting opinion in a single case (Table 14).  Lord Hope was the most 
likely of all the Supreme Court Justices to deliver a judgment, writing a judgment in 62% of 
cases which was 20% above the average of all the Supreme Court Justices analysed.  These 
findings align with the views expressed by Lord Hope who highlights the importance of 
writing individual judgments as a reflection of judicial independence, a point he made in  his 
discussion of the decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department  v AF;
576
 
We have rejected suggestions that we should strive to arrive at a single 
judgment in all cases. We value our independence from each other, and 
our right to say what we believe in if we want to.  There are, of course, 
cases where a single judgment is preferable. But if we wish to dissent or 
to express different reasons for arriving at an agreed conclusion then we 
are entitled to do this, and no one is actively discouraged from doing so. 
Lord Reid, who declared that it was never wise for the House to have only 
one speech dealing with an important question of law, would have 
approved.
577
 
 
In the period of analysis, Lord Hope heard twelve cases which divided judicial opinion and 
contained either a minority (more than one Supreme Court Justice adopting a minority 
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position) or a single dissenting judgment.  In these divided cases, Lord Hope supported the 
majority in seven cases and the minority in four and he dissented in one case.  Lord Hope was 
more likely to support the minority in the Supreme Court than in the House of Lords, but the 
difference was only marginal.
578
  
 
6.6.1 The expression of values in judgments 
Of the 18 cases included in the analysis, Lord Hope heard twelve and delivered ten 
judgments.  Within those judgments, Lord Hope had the highest value coding density, of all 
the Supreme Court Justices analysed, with an average coding density of 18 coded statements 
per case.
579
  The number of coded statements expressed as a percentage of the total number of 
coded statements in judgments delivered by Lord Hope is presented in Table 15 and Figure 
6.6-1.  The majority of coding (101 statements, 57%) was within the overarching motivation 
of conservation, which encompasses the values (tradition, security and conformity).  These 
values emphasise order, self-restriction, preservation of the past, and resistance to change. 
Within this overarching motivation, the majority of values expressed within Lord Hope’s 
judgments were encompassed within tradition (61 statements, 34%).  Lord Hope did express 
values encompassed within the other three overarching motivations, with self-direction which 
encompasses freedom and independence representing 20.7% (36 statements) of the coding.  
Although Lord Hope did express values encompassed within universalism, these values 
represented only 18% (32 statements) of the coding.   
 
                                                 
578
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of 2001 – 2009. During that time Lord Hope sat on the bench for 25 cases which divided the court and he 
supported the minority in seven cases (28%) as compared to the 33% in this study. B Dickson, 'Close Calls in 
the House of Lords' in Lee J (ed), From House of Lords to Supreme Court; Judges, Jurists and the Process of 
Judging (Hart Publishing 2011), page 284. 
579
180 coded statements in 10 judgments 
242 
 
Lord Hope espoused values encompassed within tradition in his judgments however the high 
level of coding for tradition may be a reflection of the cases he heard during that period.  
Therefore, the coding for Lord Hope was compared to the average value expression of the all 
the judgments delivered by the Supreme Court Justices in same time period.  In comparison 
to other Supreme Court Justices, Lord Hope was more likely than average to espouse values 
encompassed by tradition (51% higher than average) and conformity (increased by 82%).  In 
contrast, Lord Hope was less likely than the average of all the Supreme Court Justices to 
espouse values encompassed by universalism (decreased by 40%) in his judgments.   
 
In summary, analysis of the values expressed in Lord Hope’s judgments suggests that Lord 
Hope was more likely to espouse values encompassed within tradition and conformity and 
less likely to espouse values encompassed in universalism than other Supreme Court Justices.   
 
6.6.2 The expression of values in extra-judicial writing 
The case facts and law which frame any judgment may have a significant influence on the 
values expressed within that judgment.  Although judicial speeches are subject to the 
limitations and constraints imposed on those in a senior judicial position and the audience to 
whom the speech is delivered, judicial speeches may reveal personal values which are not 
constrained by the context of a legal case and may provide a more holistic view of judicial 
values.
580
 Indeed, speeches have an additional advantage, as the Supreme Court Justice, 
within certain limitations, was likely to select a subject matter that was of interest to them at 
the time. 
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Ten speeches by Lord Hope were analysed.  The speeches were delivered on a diverse range 
of topics from the general role of the Supreme Court in ‘The role of the Supreme Court in 
protecting the rights of individuals in a jurisdiction with no written constitution,
581
 
‘Sovereignty in question: A view from the Bench’582  to more specific aspects of the law in 
speeches such as ‘Family law in the UK’583 and banking law in ‘A light at the end of a tunnel 
– BNY in the Supreme Court’.584  There were 75 coded statements within the 10 speeches, 
which reflected an average coding density of 7.5 statements per speech.
585
  Despite the 
diversity of topics discussed, Lord Hope expressed similar values to those he espoused in his 
judgments.  Indeed, the majority of value coded statements within the speeches were 
encompassed in the overarching motivation of conservation, which accounted for 61% (46 
statements) of the overall coding (Table 15). 
 
Forty two percent of the values expressed were encompassed within conformity or tradition.  
For example, Lord Hope frequently espoused the importance of adherence to legal traditions 
stating that ‘the task [of the judiciary] was to construe the agreement by reference to the 
statute, not the statute by reference to the agreement.
586
  Indeed, he also highlighted the 
supremacy of the legislature: 
While the judges, who are not elected, are best placed to protect the rights 
of the individual, including those who are ignored or despised by the 
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majority, the elected members of a legislature of this kind are best placed 
to judge what is in the country’s best interests as a whole.587 
Lord Hope lamented the loss of tradition associated with the move to the Supreme Court
588
  
and referred to himself as ‘a relic of an old system’.589 
 
Lord Hope was less likely to espouse values encompassed within universalism in his 
speeches in comparison to his judgments. When he did espouse values encompassed within 
universalism, the statements tended to centre on flexibility of the law to adapt to changing 
times; 
But I also believe very strongly that, if it is to be kept up to date and able 
to compete with the English system, our system must look outwards and 
not inwards as it adapts to the realities of modern life.
590
 
I echoed those remarks when I said that one of the strengths of the 
common law is that it can take a fresh look at itself so that it can keep 
pace with changing circumstances.
591
 
Lord Hope was as likely to express self-direction within his speeches as in his judgments.  
His expressions of self-direction centred on judicial independence and freedom rather than 
individual autonomy stating that the judiciary ‘value our independence from each other, and 
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our right to say what we believe in if we want to.’592  The value profile of Lord Hope, in 
graphic form, is presented in Figure 6.6-1.  
 
6.6.2.1 Understanding the value profile graphs  
This series of graphs presents the number of coded statements of each value expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of coded statements per individual Supreme Court Justice.    
The data is represented by three columns.  The first is the ‘control’ column which represents 
the average percentage value expression for each value in the all of the judgments and 
represents the mean value coding for all the Justices who heard the cases.  This control 
column therefore was the standard for value expression in the judgments.  The second 
column represents the percentage value expression in the judgments of the individual 
Supreme Court Justice (light grey bars).  This was higher, lower or equal to the control, 
which reflected that the Supreme Court Justice was less or more likely than other Supreme 
Court Justices to express that value in legal judgments.  The final column is the value 
expression in the extra-legal speeches of the individual Supreme Court Justice (medium grey 
bars).   
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Table 15:   Values espoused by individual Supreme Court Justices in Judgments and extra-legal speeches 
 
  
Self-enhancement 
 
Conservation 
 
Self-Transcendence 
 
Openness to Change 
 
Supreme 
Court Justice 
 
Power 
 
 
Achievement 
 
 
Security 
 
 
Tradition 
 
 
Conformity 
 
 
Benevol 
-ence 
 
Universalism 
 
Self-
Direction 
 
Stimula-
tion 
 
Hedon-
ism 
Overall Cases  2.5%  
 
2.5% 
 
9%  
 
23% 
 
7% 
 
1% 
 
30% 
 
25% 0 0 
Lord Hope 
Judgments 
Speeches 
 
1.6% 
8.0% 
 
2.2% 
5.3% 
 
10.1% 
18.6% 
 
34% 
21.4% 
 
12.8% 
21.4% 
 
0% 
0% 
 
18.6% 
9.3% 
 
20.7% 
16% 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
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Figure 6.6-1: Value profiles of Lord Hope 
 
In both his judgments and speeches Lord Hope espoused values encompassed within 
conservation including tradition, conformity and security and he was less likely to espouse 
values encompassed within universalism.    
 
6.6.3 The influence of values on legal decisions 
The analysis of Lord Hope’s values would suggest that in reaching a decision in cases which 
divide judicial opinion, within legal constraints, Lord Hope would support the values 
encompassed in tradition and conformity when in conflict with other values.  Analysis of the 
legal decisions of Lord Hope revealed that Lord Hope did support tradition when it was in 
opposition to any other value in 77% of all cases.  Similarly, Lord Hope supported conformity 
when it was in opposition to any other value in 72% of cases.  When tradition was opposed to 
conformity Lord Hope supported either value which suggests that Lord Hope held these 
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values in approximately equal regard.
593
  Indeed, with the exception of one case, where Lord 
Hope was in the minority, Lord Hope supported the values encompassed in tradition and 
conformity when these values were in conflict with any other value.
594
 
 
Analysis of Lord Hope’s values expressed in his judgments suggests that Lord Hope is less 
likely than average to promote the values encompassed in universalism.  This was also 
reflected in his decisions.   Lord Hope opposed the values encompassed in universalism when 
they were in conflict with any other value in three quarters (75%) of the cases he heard.  
When tradition was opposed to universalism Lord Hope supported tradition in all of the 
cases.
595
  Indeed, Lord Hope dissented in opposition to the values encompassed in 
universalism and opposed universalism in the 75% of cases in which he was in the 
minority.
596
 
 
In summary, Lord Hope espoused the values encompassed within tradition and conformity in 
his judgments and he was less likely than average to espouse values encompassed in 
universalism.  Value analysis of Lord Hope’s extra-judicial writing confirmed that Lord Hope 
supported the values encompassed within tradition and conformity.  This profile was 
reflected in his legal decisions.  Indeed, in three quarters of the decisions analysed Lord Hope 
reached a decision which affirmed values encompassed within tradition and conformity.  
Lord Hope was less likely than average to espouse values encompassed within universalism.  
This was also reflected in his decisions, with Lord Hope less likely than average to affirm a 
decision which encompassed values within universalism, especially if universalism was in 
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conflict with tradition.   The analysis of the data suggests that, in cases which divide judicial 
opinion where the decision is uncertain, within the legal limits, personal values may influence 
individual judicial decisions.   
 
6.6.4 Institutional influences on Lord Hope’s decision making 
Judicial decision making is not without significant constraint.  Indeed, the author recognises 
the considerable influence of legal factors on the decisions of the Supreme Court.  This study 
does suggest however, that within these constraints, in cases where the law does not provide a 
clear answer, that other factors may have a conscious or subconscious influence.  Despite 
Lord Hope’s express desire to limit his decision making to the application of the law when he 
stated that ‘our task is to apply the law, not to decide cases according to our personal 
preferences’, this case study suggests that personal values may serve as a subconscious 
influence on his decision making.
597
  Indeed, it could be argued that the values Lord Hope 
espoused were reflected in three quarters of the decisions he reached in cases which divided 
judicial opinion.  However, psychological theory of decision making suggests that the 
anchoring effect of values in uncertain decisions may be modified by conscious factors.  One 
such conscious factor is the law, and in this study, Lord Hope highlighted some other 
conscious influences on his decision making.   
 
6.6.4.1 ‘Real expertise’ 
The influence of two Scottish Supreme Court Justices on the decisions of the court has been 
discussed by Paterson who highlights the ongoing debate among commentators surrounding 
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the legitimacy of non-Scots judges deference to their Scottish counterparts.
598
  Although 
Paterson suggests that these arguments of deference are flawed, he recognises this form of 
deference as one element of the general deference to expertise.  Lord Hope also regarded this 
form of deference as deference to ‘real expertise’.  Indeed, within his speeches, Lord Hope 
expressed respect for the ‘real expertise’ of his colleagues:  
Of the five of us on the panel in BNY, Lord Walker was the undoubted 
specialist.
599
 
We are careful, when deciding upon their composition, to ensure that the 
panel will comprise those Justices with real expertise in the area of law 
that is in issue. In family and employment law cases, for example, there is 
Lady Hale; in chancery law cases, Lord Walker; in commercial cases, 
Lord Mance and Lord Collins.
600
 
Lord Hope suggested that conscious deference to expertise is part of the judicial culture 
within the Supreme Court and in deferring to the expertise of others Lord Hope has an 
expectation of deference to his expertise: 
So, just as our practice is to respect the judgment of the English Justices 
who are specialists in their own field, we expect that of them when issues 
of Scots law are involved. And the other Justices do defer to our expertise 
but, of course, will reason their way to their own conclusions…..we do 
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expect them to respect our judgment, and in my experience they almost 
always do so.
601
 
A quote from a Law Lord in Paterson’s book also highlighted this element of reciprocity with 
regard to Scots law: 
I think in Scots cases involving Scots law particularly, almost all Scottish 
cases will have both David Hope and Alan Rodger on them.  If they agree 
and it’s not an English law point as well, I think it would be quite difficult 
to disagree. [B]ut when there’s a difference between them… then you can 
make a decision in the same way as anyone else.
602
 
Indeed, Lord Hope suggested that as a consequence of this deference the Scots judges have 
significant influence on the Scots Law decisions: 
If the fear that the Supreme Court is an anglicising court is still present, it 
is best answered by studying what the Court actually does and the 
influence on its work of the two Scots Justices.
603
 
Deference to expertise may serve as a conscious institutional influence on decision making 
and moderate the role of values. 
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6.6.4.2 Consensus in “Scottish” Cases  
This study highlights the external influences especially in Scot’s Law cases which may 
encourage a unified position from the two Scot’s Supreme Court Justices.   In a discussion of 
decision making on Scottish cases, Lord Hope identified the importance of reaching a similar 
decision but recognises that disagreement can occur, which leaves decision making on 
‘Scottish’ cases in the hands of the ‘other judges’.   However even with the pressure of 
collegiality Lord Hope, as his value profile would predict, valued judicial independence: 
[W]hat would have happened if Lord Rodger and I had disagreed in 
Grainger – which, as it happened, seemed both during the hearing (to the 
obvious alarm of Professor Reid, who was listening to the argument) and 
in our discussion afterwards to be very real possibility?  The judgment 
would then have lain in the hands of the other judges.   Lord Rodger and I 
are careful to be seen as independent of each other, to maintain our 
credibility with our colleagues.  So the possibility of our disagreeing with 
each other because we see things differently is not at all remote….604 
Indeed, disagreement did arise in the case of Martin v HM Advocate, a devolution case, 
which highlighted Lord Hope’s espoused values of judicial independence:  
And if there is this variety of views – as existed in Martin – can it really 
be said that in choosing one over the other, judges are somehow being 
insensitive to the distinctive nature of Scots law? Instead, they are 
reasoning their way to what each believes to be the most coherent 
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position, in light of the arguments presented to them and, in that case two 
detailed, but different, judgments of the two Scottish judges.
605
 
Further analysis of  cases which divide judicial opinion would suggest that despite the desire 
to avoid division between the Scottish Supreme Court Justices in cases which are centred on 
the law of Scotland,  there is little consensus between Lord Hope and Lord Rodger in cases 
which divide judicial opinion suggesting that although there is a perceived pressure for 
consensus, it may not have a significant influence on the decisions of Lord Hope.
606
  
 
Lord Hope expressed and affirmed the values encompassed within tradition.  A recurring 
theme within Lord Kerr’s speeches was the difference between his decisions and those of 
Lord Hope.   Indeed, in three of the six speeches available on the Supreme Court website at 
the time of analysis, Lord Kerr emphasised this difference.
607
  The lack of agreement was 
reflected in the striking contrast between the values they espoused, indeed, it may be this 
contrast which underpins the differences in decisions reached by both Supreme Court 
Justices. 
 
6.7  Case Study 2: Lord Kerr and universalism608 
In contrast to Lord Hope, Paterson suggests that Lord Kerr favours a single majority 
judgment with supporting concurring judgments only where appropriate.
609
  This was 
reflected in the number of written judgments Lord Kerr delivered, writing a judgment in only 
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approximately a third of the cases he decided.
610
  This was less than the average for the 
Supreme Court Justices who will write judgments in almost half the cases they hear.
611
  Of all 
the Supreme Court Justices assessed, Lord Kerr was one of the least likely to write a 
concurring judgment. Despite his reluctance to deliver a concurring judgment, Lord Kerr was 
not reluctant to dissent.  Indeed, in the first four years, Lord Kerr (with Lady Hale) was the 
most likely to write a dissenting judgment.  Something, Lord Kerr highlighted in his extra-
judicial speeches:  
This lecture takes as its starting point what many might wearily describe 
as yet another of my dissenting judgments. Or at least it builds on a 
judgment of mine that, although a dissent as to outcome, at least, for once, 
tried to find common ground with my colleagues and to reconcile in a 
harmonious way various different approaches to the question of when an 
appellate court should quash a conviction.
612
 
Due to his propensity to write a dissenting judgment, Lord Kerr was as likely as any other 
Supreme Court Justice to deliver a written judgment in cases which divide judicial opinion.    
Lord Kerr heard 37 cases in the Supreme Court during the period of analysis.  He supported 
the majority decision in 33 (89%) cases, the minority in three and delivered a single 
dissenting judgment.
613
   
 
Ten of the cases heard by Lord Kerr during this time period divided judicial opinion.  In these 
ten cases, Lord Kerr supported the majority in six, the minority in three and delivered the 
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only dissenting judgment in one case.  He delivered nine judgments which contained 97 value 
statements and represented an average coding density of almost 11 codes per judgment.  The 
value analysis of these judgments is represented in Table 15 and Figure 6.7-2.  
 
6.7.1 The expression of values in the judgments of Lord Kerr. 
The values expressed by Lord Kerr in his judgments are in stark contrast to those expressed 
by Lord Hope.  Lord Kerr was less likely than average to espouse values encompassed within 
the overarching motivations of conservation, security, tradition and conformity (60%, 72%, 
65% decrease respectively).  Coding within this overarching category of conservation, only 
accounted 14% (14 statements) of the values espoused by Lord Kerr.   
 
In contrast, the majority of coding (56%, 54 coded statements) within Lord Kerr’s judgments 
was encompassed within the overarching motivation of self-transcendence, which affirms 
motives which transcend personal interests in favour of the welfare of others.  This 
overarching motivation includes the values encompassed within universalism and 
benevolence with the vast majority of coded statements (53%, 52 statements) of Lord Kerr 
within universalism.  Indeed, Lord Kerr was more likely than any other Justice to espouse 
values encompassed in universalism, with a coding of 77% above average.     This value 
encompasses concepts such as equality, social justice, protection of the vulnerable which 
were all themes espoused in the judgments of Lord Kerr.   
 
As with all of the Supreme Court judiciary, Lord Kerr espoused values encompassed within 
self-direction, including freedom, autonomy and independence.
 614
  Almost half of Lord 
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Kerr’s expressions of independence centred on judicial independence and the right to reach a 
different decision: 
 Other members of the court have expressed the view that this is what the 
committee would have decided. Had I felt it possible to do so, I would 
have been glad to be able to reach that conclusion. As it is, I simply 
cannot.
615
 
It was reported that Lord Kerr was more likely than most Supreme Court Justices to support 
the individual rather than the government, and the value profile would support this claim.
616
   
 
6.7.2 The expression of values in extra-judicial writing 
Lord Kerr was less likely than the majority of Supreme Court Justices to deliver speeches 
outside of the Supreme Court.  The value analysis was based on the six speeches available on 
the Supreme Court website on a range of topics from human rights and European arrest 
warrants to collaborative law.
617
  In his speeches, Lord Kerr highlighted the competing 
influences on judicial decision making.  For example, in his speech delivered at Queens 
University, Lord Kerr, highlighted the conflict between human rights and the ‘war on terror’ 
revealing the conflict between the values encompassed in security and universalism: 
But that very circumstance raises a particular challenge for the 
administration of justice and for judges charged with defining the 
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boundaries on the state’s encroachment on fundamental rights in its efforts 
to protect national security.
618
 
In contrast to Lord Hope, in his speeches Lord Kerr emphasised values encompassed within 
benevolence and universalism:  
That conclusion must resonate strongly with all who subscribe to the 
notion that we should not require those who are entitled to look to the 
state for the protection of their fundamental rights to accept a lesser 
standard of justice than we consider is the irreducible minimum of a fair 
trial.
619
 
Overall, the values analysis revealed a pattern of value expression in his speeches similar to 
those in his judgments, with the majority of values espoused by Lord Kerr encompassed 
within universalism (53%).  Indeed, Lord Kerr identified the values of justice and fairness as 
central elements of the legal system and supported these values encompassed within 
universalism when in conflict with the opposing value of power: 
 Although the court was master of its own procedure, it could not 
fundamentally alter the system of trial. In particular, it could not exercise 
its power to regulate its own procedures in such a way as would deny 
parties their fundamental constitutional right to participate in the 
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proceedings in accordance with the common law principles of natural 
justice and open justice.
620
 
Lord Kerr also highlighted the importance of transparency and flexibility in the law, 
encompassed within universalism.
621
  Indeed, transparency in the law is a central theme of his 
speech on ‘Human Rights Law and the War on Terror’.622  Lord Kerr also affirmed a link 
between dissent and the necessity for transparency, suggesting that delivering a dissenting 
opinion, when it is required, renders the outcome and the decision making process more 
transparent:  
And if exposing a minority judgment to the critical onslaught of the 
majority involves a degree of self-sacrifice on the part of the dissenter, 
that is, in my view, a small price to pay for the transparency of the 
debate.
623
 
Affirmation of dissent is encompassed within self-direction, which affirms the values of 
judicial independence and freedom.   In both his judgments and speeches, Lord Kerr 
associated judicial dissent with independence and the right to reach a different decision 
stating that, ‘the great dissents in British legal history speak loudly of the independence of 
our judiciary.’624  Indeed, he described judicial independence as ‘the most precious of 
freedoms’.625  This freedom extends beyond the right of an individual Supreme Court Justice 
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to dissent to the Supreme Courts right to disagree with other judicial authorities including the 
European Court of Human Rights.
626
   
 
His espousal of freedom and independence is not limited to judicial freedom.  Lord Kerr also 
affirmed an individual’s right to self-direction and autonomy, a theme which is evident in 
both his judgments and speeches:  
I have long been convinced that the happiest clients are not necessarily 
those who have achieved the best possible outcomes but are those who 
have felt best informed of the process in which they are participants and 
who sense that their views have been absorbed in a way that has allowed 
them to influence the result.627 
As in his judgments, the values encompassed within self-direction accounts for one fifth of 
the value coding in his speeches.  Like Lord Hope, the pattern of value expression in Lord 
Kerr’s speeches reflected the values espoused in his judgments.  The value profile is 
presented in the graph below: 
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Figure 6.7-2 Value profiles of Lord Kerr 
 
In stark contrast to Lord Hope, the values espoused by Lord Kerr centre on the values 
encompassed in universalism.  Indeed, in his judgments he was more likely than any Supreme 
Court Justice to espouse these values.   In contrast to Lord Hope, Lord Kerr was less likely to 
espouse the values encompassed within tradition and conformity.   
 
6.7.3 The influence of values on legal decisions 
The judicial decisions of Lord Kerr reflected his value profile.  Lord Kerr supported 
universalism when it was in conflict with any other value in 81% of cases.  Lord Kerr 
opposed the values encompassed within tradition in three quarters (77%) of cases when the 
values conflicted with any other value.  Indeed, he also opposed the other values 
encompassed in conservation (conformity (79%) and security in (57%).  In this dataset, Lord 
Kerr dissented in support of universalism and was in the minority in support of universalism 
or in opposition to conformity.   
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As with Lord Hope, the values expressed by Lord Kerr are reflected in over three quarters of 
the decisions he reached in cases which divide judicial opinion.  Highlighting once again, that 
in cases which divide judicial opinion where the decision is uncertain, within legal limits, 
personal values may influence the judicial decision.  
 
Lord Kerr recognised the influence of both conscious external factors and subconscious 
factors on his decision making; 
The pressures, overt or subconscious, on judges making decisions about 
the lawfulness of measures taken by governments at times of national 
crisis or where a real terrorist threat to the state is evident are 
considerable.  And, in truth, those pressures have on occasions, because of 
the exigencies that have been perceived to exist, proved impossible to 
defy.
628
 
Despite the clear acknowledgement of external and internal influences, there is little evidence 
within Lord Kerr’s speeches of the exact nature of the external influences that moderate his 
decision making.   
 
6.8 The value: decision paradigm in individual legal decision making. 
The value analysis of the judgments, speeches and decisions of Lord Hope and Lord Kerr 
revealed that although subject to legal and institutional constraints, there was a close link 
between the values espoused and the decisions reached by individual Supreme Court Justices, 
in cases which divide judicial opinion.  
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The value: decision model was also identified in the judgments and decisions of other 
Supreme Court Justices. For example, Lord Brown was one of the Supreme Court Justices 
who was least likely to espouse values encompassed in universalism, and this was reflected in 
his decisions with Lord Brown opposing universalism in 81% of cases.  As with Lord Hope, 
Lord Rodger espoused tradition in his judgments which was reflected in his decisions.  Lord 
Rodger supported tradition in 80% of cases where it was opposed to any other value.  In 
contrast, Lord Clarke was less likely than average to espouse the values encompassed in 
tradition and this was reflected in his decisions in which he opposed tradition in 91% of 
decisions where this value is opposed to any other value.   
 
The value: decision paradigm was not limited to the values encompassed within tradition and 
universalism.  Lord Walker was less likely than other Supreme Court Justices to espouse 
values encompassed in security and this was reflected in his decisions with Lord Walker 
opposing security in 78% of his decisions related to this value.  Lord Mance espoused self-
direction in his judgments and this was reflected in his decisions.  He supported self-direction 
in 74% of cases which relate to this value.   
 
This analysis suggests that personal values play a role in the individual decision making 
processes of the Supreme Court judiciary.  Psychological theory suggests that personal 
values, in legal decisions, act as a subconscious influence and although there is evidence of 
the values espoused within judgments and speeches, there is little evidence that the Supreme 
Court Justices are aware of the influence that personal values have on their legal decisions. 
Although, there is some recognition by the Supreme Court Justices of the role of instinct in 
the decision making process, there is no overt recognition of the factors that may influence 
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the instinctive reaction.
629
  The subconscious nature of personal values, and the concomitant 
lack of recognition by the judiciary of the potential role of values in judicial decision making, 
suggests that personal values may act as a form of implicit bias within the decision making 
process.  Where the law does not provide a clear answer, personal values may frame the 
decision making process and serve to move the response along the continuum in favour of an 
outcome that affirms individual judicial values. 
 
6.9 Modifying influences on the expression of values. 
The influence of values however is not without limitation and the theory of systems decision 
making suggests that both internal and external factors can modify the influence of these 
subconscious processes on decision making.  Indeed, Lord Hope recognised the influence of 
deference to expertise on his decision making.  In deferring to expertise, Lord Hope may 
reach a decision which conflicts with his values.  This study identified the potential influence 
of internal or external factors on the expression and perhaps the decisions of two Supreme 
Court Justices, Lord Phillips and Lady Hale.   
 
6.9.1 Lord Phillips and system 2 reasoning 
Expression of values within judgments may be constrained by the context of the judgment.   
Despite this limitation, the majority of Supreme Court Justices expressed values within their 
legal judgments, in cases which divide judicial opinion, which were consistent with the 
decisions reached.   
 
The analysis of Lord Phillips’ decisions and judgments suggested that the expression of 
values within judgments may be subject to other conscious or subconscious constraints.  Lord 
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Phillips was the President of the Supreme Court during the period of analysis.  Paterson 
suggests that the values of those in leadership positions play a disproportionate part in the 
outcome of the hard cases which come before them.
630
  This occurs when those in leadership 
roles express an early preference for a position and there is a norm of consensus.  However, 
this may not be true for Lord Phillips.  Indeed, in his latest book Paterson, in reference to the 
leadership of Lord Phillips, suggests that the ‘position is not clear cut’.631   
 
During the period of analysis, Lord Phillips heard 37 cases in the Supreme Court.  He 
supported the majority decision in 35 (95%) of cases and the minority in two cases.  
Although, Lord Phillips heard less cases that the deputy President Lord Hope, he delivered 
the leading judgment in the majority of cases he heard.   Ten cases resulted in minority or 
single dissenting judgments.  Lord Phillips supported the majority in eight of these divided 
cases.  During this time, Lord Phillips was as likely as any other Supreme Court Justice to 
support the minority position.  The values expressed by Lord Phillips in his judgments and 
extra-legal speeches are represented in Table 15 and Figure 6.9- 3. 
 
Lord Phillips was less likely than average to espouse values encompassed within tradition in 
his judgments.  This lack of affirmation of tradition was evident in his judicial speeches, in 
which Lord Phillips highlighted his support for change and the creation of a Supreme Court 
in contrast to the more traditional Lord Hope.
632
  Indeed, he decided to break with tradition as 
Lord Chief Justice and hear cases in both the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the Court of 
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Appeal.
633 
  Other aspects of Lord Phillips’ value profile were unusual. Although the values 
most frequently espoused in his speeches were encompassed within self-direction and 
universalism, he was not more likely than average to espouse these values in his judgments.  
He was, however, more likely than average to espouse values encompassed in the opposing 
values of power and achievement.      
 
 
Figure 6.9-3: Value profiles of Lord Phillips 
 
As with other Supreme Court Justices, there was some alignment between the decisions of 
Lord Philips and the values he espouses, or does not espouse.  Analysis of the decisions, in 
cases which divided judicial opinion, revealed that Lord Phillips did oppose tradition (67%) 
and conformity (57%) when these values were in conflict with any other value.
634
  However, 
there was no consistent alignment between the other values that Lord Phillips espoused in his 
judgments and the decisions he reached.  In contrast, to the expectations based on the analysis 
of the values espoused in his judgments, Lord Phillips was more likely to reach a decision 
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that affirmed universalism and self-direction when these values were in conflict with any 
other value.
635
   
 
Although, Lord Phillips did not highlight these values in his judgments, he did positively 
affirm these values in his extra-judicial writing, particularly prior to becoming the President 
of the Supreme Court.  There were only three speeches available on the Supreme Court 
website at the time of analysis, but Lord Phillips had delivered numerous speeches, during his 
time as Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.
636
  In these speeches, Lord Phillips 
affirmed values encompassed by universalism.
637
  Indeed, in contrast to the expectations 
based on the values espoused in his judgments where Lord Phillips espoused values 
encompassed within security, when discussing his decisions in cases where national security 
and human rights conflict, including the control order cases, Lord Phillips identified that he 
opposed security in favour of universalism and the protection of human rights.
638
  Lord 
Phillips also emphasised the importance of judicial independence and personal liberty in his 
speeches, both values are encompassed within self-direction.
639
  Indeed he has stated that ‘a 
judge should value independence above gold, not for his or her benefit but because it is the 
essence of the rule of law.’640  The affirmation of self-direction and universalism was 
reflected in the decisions of Lord Phillips and his extra-judicial speeches but not in his 
written judgments.   
                                                 
635
 Universalism and self-direction were affirmed in 58% and 70% of cases respectively. These values were 
opposed to other values in seven and eight cases decided by Lord Phillips. 
636
 Lord Phillips, 'Crime and Punishment' (The High Sheriffs Law Lecture, Oxford, 11 October 2006);  Lord 
Phillips, 'Equality Before the Law' (East London Muslim Centre,  London, 3 July 2008) 
637
 Lord Phillips, 'Youth Justice' (Royal Society of Edinburgh’s Alternatives to Prison Conference, Edinburgh, 9 
December 2006).  The theme of this speech was the promotion of alternatives to custodial sentences for less 
serious offences.   
638
Lord Phillips, ' Terrorism and Human Rights , ' (University of Hertfordshire Law Lecture, Hatfield, 19 
October 2006); Secretary of State for the Home Department  v AF [2009] UKHL 28;  Lord Phillips, 'European 
Human Rights - A Force for Good or a Threat to Democracy' (Centre of European Law Lecture, London, 17 
June 2014) 
639
 Lord Phillips, 'Equality Before the Law' (East London Muslim Centre,  London, 3 July 2008) 
640
 Lord Phillips, 'Judicial Independence' (Commonwealth Law Conference, Nairobi, 12 September 2007) 
267 
 
 
Indeed, there is difference between the values espoused by Lord Phillips in his Supreme 
Court judgments and both the values he espoused in his extra judicial writing and the values 
he affirmed in his decisions.  Two factors may influence the values expressed in the 
judgments of Lord Phillips.  The majority of judgments delivered by Lord Phillips were lead 
judgments.  It was noted by Schubert that; 
The extent to which a judicial opinion represents the personal views and 
language of the author varies inversely with the size of the group which 
accepts the opinion; and so institutional opinions should tend to be more 
depersonalised than concurring or dissenting opinions.
641
 
Indeed, this external pressure, as the President of an institution delivering a lead judgment, 
may serve as a conscious influence on the written judgments of Lord Phillips. 
 
However, an insight from Paterson’s book suggests that the inconsistency between the values 
affirmed in the decisions reached by Lord Phillips and values evident in his judgments may 
reflect his decision making process.  Paterson suggests that Lord Philips ‘tended to keep an 
open mind in difficult cases far later than most of his colleagues.’642  Indeed he highlighted 
that Lord Phillips was likely to change his position relatively late in proceedings.  This may 
suggest Lord Philips’ reasoning is less anchored in system 1 thinking and personal values.  In 
a recent documentary about the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips recognised the tension between 
the decision he would like to reach and the one the law tells him he should reach.  In 
reference to his decision making he stated that ‘what you feel…. is not necessarily 
                                                 
641
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relevant’.643  Although the decisions Lord Phillips reached were more consistently in favour 
of universalism and opposed to tradition, this was not as consistent as other Supreme Court 
Justices.   The less consistent value: decision paradigm in his judgments may simply reflect 
his ability to consciously moderate the influence of the affect response and personal values on 
his decisions. 
 
Psychological theory of decision making suggests that system 1 reasoning and the affect 
response can be overridden by deliberative system 2 reasoning.  The analysis of the decisions 
of Lord Phillips suggests that some elite decision makers are less anchored in the instinctive 
system 1 response than others.  Indeed, Guthrie et al demonstrated a range of system 1 
heuristic responses in their judicial population.
644
  Although both systems are evident in the 
judicial decision making, judges are located on different parts of the scale from intuitive to 
deliberative and the data would suggest that Lord Phillips is located at the more deliberative 
range of the scale.   
 
6.9.2 Lady Hale and judicial culture 
Lady Hale also has an unusual value decision profile, with a lack of consistency between the 
values espoused in judgments and the decisions reached.  Lady Hale heard 49 cases in the 
Supreme Court, during the period of analysis, including twelve cases which resulted in a 
minority or dissenting judgments.  She delivered eleven individual judgments in these cases, 
six in support of the majority, two in support of the minority and four single dissenting 
judgments.  Indeed, Lady Hale delivered a dissenting judgment in 8% of cases she heard 
                                                 
643
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during this time and she was the least likely to support the majority. Lady Hale’s unusually 
“high” rate of dissent was also noted by Brice Dickson who  identified that in the period from 
her joining the House of Lords in 2004 to October 2009, Lady Hale had joined the dissent in 
nine cases, significantly more than the majority of other judges.
645
  
 
Lady Hale is less likely than average to espouse values encompassed in self-direction in her 
judgments.  These values include autonomy and independence but also freedom of a Justice 
to reach a different decision, a freedom that Lady Hale affirmed by delivering dissenting 
judgments, both alone and joining the minority positon.   This is not the only unusual aspect 
of the values expressed in the judgments delivered by Lady Hale.  Although Lady Hale is 
more likely than average to espouse values encompassed within universalism, she is also 
more likely than average to espouse the opposing values encompassed both within power and 
conformity.  The value profile for Lady Hale is presented below. 
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Figure 6.9-4: Value profiles for Lady Hale 
 
Lady Hale has had a career in academia which has resulted in extensive extra-judicial 
writing.
646
  Indeed, this has continued and Lady Hale has the most speeches available for 
analysis on the Supreme Court website.
 647
  Analysis of ten of her speeches revealed a value 
profile, which centres on self-direction and universalism.  The majority of her speeches have 
been in the area of human rights and equality, in which she espoused values which are 
encompassed in universalism, a value reflected in her judgments.
648
  Lady Hale also espoused 
values encompassed within self-direction.
 649
  She has described herself as having a reform 
agenda and recognised that she is happy to support a minority position with a distinctly 
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different view point.
 650
  This was evidenced by her propensity to dissent both in the House of 
Lords and in the Supreme Court yet is not reflected in her judgments. 
 
It was the values espoused in Lady Hale’s extra-judicial speeches which were reflected in her 
decisions.  Analysis of Lady Hale’s decisions revealed that Lady Hale supports self-direction 
in 56% of cases and universalism in 63% of cases in which they were opposed to other 
values.  Indeed, Lady Hale has delivered single dissenting judgments which affirmed the 
values encompassed within universalism. This finding is in accordance with Dickson’s work 
which suggests that Lady Hale will staunchly uphold human rights.
651
  This is also evident in 
her earlier decisions in the House of Lords.
652
    
 
But it is the opposition of power that Lady Hale was the most consistent.  In contrast to the 
positive affirmation of power in her judgments, Lady Hale opposed power in 84% of cases in 
which power is in conflict with any other value.  When universalism was opposed to power, 
Lady Hale supported universalism in all cases.  Power has a motivational objective of the 
attainment of social status and prestige and control or dominance over people and resources.  
The values contained within this motivational goal include social power, wealth, authority, 
public image and social recognition. 
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As with Lords Hope and Kerr, Lady Hale reached decisions which align with certain values, 
however as with Lord Phillips there is an inconsistency between the values expressed within 
the context of the judgments and the values affirmed by the decision reached.  
 
Lady Hale acknowledged that a judicial decision in a hard case; 
….often involves a choice between different conclusions, any of which it 
may be possible to reach by respectable legal reasoning.  The choice made 
is likely to be motivated at a far deeper level by the judges own approach 
to the law, to the problem under discussion and to the ideas of what makes 
a just result.
653 
In the same speech, Lady Hale suggested that judicial choice is guided, not only by the 
judge’s own views of what is right and just, but also by his or her personal philosophy of 
judging but that ‘most judges in this country never have occasion to own up to a personal 
philosophy, whether of life or judging’.654   
 
Although she dismissed the ‘unique voice’ theory, she did highlight her different perspective 
associated with gender:  
This is not to say that Lady Justice Arden and I speak ‘in a different 
voice,’ for we use the same kinds of reasoning and sources as do the men. 
Rather it is that our experience of leading women’s lives allows us to see 
things that the men cannot always see, including the institutionalised 
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inferiority involved in many socially accepted practices, as much in our 
own countries as elsewhere.655 
Lady Hale identifies her philosophy as a feminist position with which she aligns with a 
‘concern to see the world through other eyes than those of the traditionally empowered.’656 
This view aligns with the decisions reached by Lady Hale, which affirm universalism and 
self-direction but values which do not consistently prevail in her written judgments.  This is 
unusual and may be related to several factors both conscious and subconscious.  As with Lord 
Phillips, Lady Hale suggests that she attempts to regulate the control of system 1 reasoning 
and gut reaction on the decisions she reaches: 
If one’s being serious about being a judge, you have to be really quite 
careful to separate out your personal feelings about what the result ought 
to be from your rational and considered view as a judge as to what the 
result is.
657
 
Indeed, this focus on system 2 reasoning may serve to modify the values expressed in the 
judgments.  However, the inconsistency with values espoused in legal judgments and the 
decisions reached may also be due to the judicial culture.   Her position as a single female 
Justice from an academic background may have an influence on the values that Lady Hale 
expresses in her judgments, not based on gender, but on the uniqueness of her position and 
the potential for social isolation.  Most people are a combination of a ‘pragmatic intuitive 
politician’ who seeks approval and personal affirmation and the competing motivation of 
asserting ones autonomy (self-direction) and personal identity by remaining true to ones 
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innermost convictions.
658
  Although Lady Hale can assert her autonomy, and does so in the 
decisions she reaches, the potential for social isolation may allow the pragmatic politician to 
prevail in some of her written judgments. 
 
Lady Hale is a highly respected member of the Supreme Court bench, indeed she was 
appointed to the deputy President position when Lord Hope retired.  Her decisions have had a 
significant impact on the decisions of other Supreme Court Justices, certainly Lord Hope 
recognises her as an expert to whom he would defer.  In Stack v Dowden(2007), Lord Walker 
openly acknowledges her draft opinion as having an influence on his decision.
659
  However 
the decision in Radmacher v Granatino [2010], Lady Hale wrote 
In short, there is a gender dimension to the issue which some may think 
ill-suited to a decision by a court consisting of eight men and one woman. 
It is for that reason I have chosen to write a separate judgment....’ 660 
The statement highlighted the potential that gender has to isolate.  Schultz and Shaw 
characterises the judicial culture, not limited to the UK, as one which can serve to isolate 
based on gender.
661
  Indeed, in discussion about her role as a Supreme Court Justice, Lady 
Hale identified the potential for isolation within the judicial community:  
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I have spent quite a lot of my life in a minority situation. Sometimes it can 
be a bit lonely. Sometimes you think oh wouldn’t it be good to have 
another woman to natter with.
 662
 
It is accepted that many factors may modify the expression of values in written judgments, 
the judicial culture is just one which may underpin the difference between the values 
espoused in the judgments of Lady Hale and the values affirmed in the decisions she reaches.   
Although the external pressures influence the expression of values in written judgments, 
these pressures do not appear to modify the impact of values on the majority of  the decisions 
reached by Lady Hale. 
6.10 Psychology of judicial decision making: Values, legal judgments, decisions 
and bias. 
It has long been argued by legal and jurisprudential theorists that subconscious internal 
factors may influence expert judicial decisions in ‘hard cases’.  Indeed, there is increasing 
recognition by the judiciary that extra-legal factors may influence decisions in cases where 
legitimate legal reasons do not provide a clear answer.  This series of case studies suggests 
that personal values represent one element of the subconscious factors that influence decision 
making and this study provides further evidence to suggest that even with the constraints of 
the judicial oath, in decisions that divide the opinion of the Supreme Court, personal values 
play a role.   
 
The literature on the psychology of decision making by individuals suggests that all experts 
are susceptible to system1 instinctive influences and these instinctive responses may serve to 
bias the decision making process.  These influences are not always perceived as negative, 
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indeed, Daniel Kahneman argues that experts are experts precisely because their experience 
leads them to instinctively sort out complex patterns of data and come to the right 
conclusion.
663
  However, the association between these subconscious influences and 
decisions brings into sharp focus discussions of judicial implicit bias.   Again, it is important 
to note, that bias in this context is not a pejorative term.  Indeed, in judicial decisions implicit 
bias may serve as a ‘meaningful manifestation of social and cultural norms.’664    
 
However, the presence of implicit bias creates a tension with the expectations of transparency 
and accountability associated with judicial decisions.  Accountability is in social psychology 
the link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social systems on the other.  
Accountability, like decision making, is a system which merges several variables including 
the belief that the decision makers’ individual inputs can be identified and the reasons for an 
individual’s view will be scrutinised.665   Judicial decisions must therefore be able to 
withstand the scrutiny necessary to render them accountable.  This is particularly true for 
decisions of the Supreme Court where the decision has such far reaching consequences.  
However, decisions of the Supreme Court are not subject to appeal and as Lord Phillips 
suggests the accountability of these decisions relies on the individuals and the systems and 
processes of the court itself:  
So far as our judicial decisions are concerned, the appellate system 
provides accountability.  Decisions of the Supreme Court are not subject 
to appeal. The buck stops with us….666 
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In the absence of appeal, it is argued that to render a decision of the Supreme Court 
accountable, it is essential that the factors that influence the final decision are transparent.  
Many Supreme Court Justices have discussed the essential need for transparency and Lord 
Kerr highlighted the specific importance of transparency of reasoning;  
And if exposing a minority judgment to the critical onslaught of the 
majority involves a degree of self-sacrifice on the part of the dissenter, 
that is, in my view, a small price to pay for the transparency of the 
debate.
667
 
However in cases which divide judicial opinion, this chapter demonstrates that there is an 
association between the values espoused by the individual Supreme Court Justices and their 
judicial decisions.  Personal values serve as largely subconscious influences on decision 
making and it is the subconscious nature of these influences which creates the tension with 
the narrow definition of transparency and accountability.  However, these subconscious 
influences are not without constraint.  Indeed this research suggests that personal values 
function within the framework of judicial discretion which is as Dworkin suggests ‘like the 
hole in a doughnut, it does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of 
restriction.’668   
 
6.10.1 Constraints on the influence of values: Internal and external 
It is accepted that system 2 reasoning provides an internal constraint on the system 1 
influences including values and the influence of values will only take effect if affirmed by 
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system 2 reasoning.  Indeed, any judicial decision is constrained by the “evidence and 
arguments” and the legal considerations surrounding the decision.669  However, other factors 
also serve to constrain judicial decision making, as recognised in the letter on behalf of Lord 
Dyson which opened this thesis, the judicial culture also serves to constrain the exercise of 
discretion and the influence of personal values.
670
   
 
The judicial culture encompasses not only the constraints of the judicial oath but also a 
‘distinctive set of norms and customs, including legal principles and theories.’671  Any culture 
provides a shared meaning system that determines socialisation process and encompasses 
communication of ideas, values and behavioural expectations.
 672
  Roccas and Sagiv argue 
that culture can moderate the relationship between values and behaviour ‘by determining the 
repertoire of normative behaviours.’673  This study suggests that aspects of the judicial culture 
in the Supreme Court, including collegiality and respect for expertise, may modify the 
influence of values on decisions reached.   
 
This thesis is not taking a normative position on the rightness or wrongness of values in 
judicial decision making or whether the presence of values undermines the accountability of 
Supreme Court decisions.  However in cases which divide judicial opinions, where the 
evidence, arguments and law surrounding the decision do not provide a clear answer and 
there is legal uncertainty, the decision requires the exercise of discretion which is influenced 
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by personal values.  The role of values is largely subconscious, and although some of the 
judiciary do identify this role in the decision making or that of “instinct”, it is largely 
unarticulated in written judgments.   In these limited cases, personal values serve to create 
bias and within the confines of the judicial process, personal values may consistently move a 
decision along the continuum in favour of a specific outcome.   
 
There is, of course, a potential for bias to be negative, where it serves to discriminate, indeed 
unfettered discretion would serve to do just that, but values are not unfettered, they influence 
decisions within a narrow framework and although a single Supreme Court Justice may reach 
a decision in divided cases which consistently aligns with their values, the outcome of cases 
in the Supreme Court is not decided by a single Justice.  In the Supreme Court, decisions are 
made by a panel of Justices.   The case studies revealed a stark difference in value profiles of 
Lord Hope and Lord Kerr and demonstrated an association between these differences in 
values and differences in decisions.   The following chapter looks at the court as a whole and 
draws on debates surrounding judicial diversity to address whether the study of values can 
contribute to these debates. 
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7 Chapter 7 
What does the Value: Decision Paradigm Contribute to the Diversity 
Debate?  
 
 
 [I]n disputed points you need a variety of perspectives and life 
experiences to get the best possible results.  You will not get the best 
possible results if everybody comes at the same problem from exactly the 
same point of view.  You need a variety of dimensions of diversity, I am 
talking not only about gender and ethnicity but about professional 
background, areas of expertise and every dimension that adds to the richer 
collective mix and makes it easier to have genuine debates.
674
 
This thesis has demonstrated that personal values play a role in the exercise of judicial 
discretion and judicial decision making in cases which divide the Supreme Court.  Indeed, 
there is a consistent pattern between the values espoused in judgments and the values 
affirmed by the decisions of the majority of individual Supreme Court Justices.  The case 
studies suggest that there is a differential pattern of value affirmation by individual Supreme 
Court Justices. It is this differential pattern of value expression that is explored in this 
chapter.  Decisions, in the Supreme Court, are made by panels and this chapter centres on the 
Supreme Court Justices as individuals within a community of collective decision makers.  In 
doing so, this chapter will discuss the impact of judicial values and the value decision 
paradigm on the wider debates surrounding the importance of judicial diversity.  
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 It has long been argued that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, now the UK 
Supreme Court, is characterised by justices who are white, male, with a public school, and 
Oxbridge education.  Indeed, since opening in 2008, eight Supreme Court Justices have been 
appointed to the bench, all male, all privately educated and seven from Oxbridge.  It is clear 
that despite continuous debate and reflection on the lack of diversity by academics, 
government and the popular press, little has changed.  These debates tend to centre on overt 
diversity, overt characteristics that are easily codified and reflect how the judiciary are seen.  
The study of personal values reveals that judicial decisions are the subject of tacit influences.  
Personal values are formed by life experiences and are influenced by gender, ethnicity and 
professional backgrounds and reflect many of the traits identified within the overt diversity 
debates.  However, personal values are influenced by more than simple demographic 
variables.   This chapter draws on the study of personal values and judicial decision making 
to highlight the tacit diversity of the Supreme Court judiciary and address debates 
surrounding judicial diversity, judicial appointments and panel selection. 
 
7.1 Judicial diversity:  The statistics 
Debates surrounding the importance of diversity on the bench have fuelled the reform of the 
judicial appointments process and served to encourage a wider range of applicants.
675
  
Despite this the Supreme Court bench remains predominantly, the domain of public school 
educated, white males who have graduated from Oxbridge.   Since the Supreme Court was 
formed in October 2009, 20 Supreme Court Justices have sat on the bench full-time.
676
  All 
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but Lord Kerr and Lady Hale went to an independent school.
677
  All but two Supreme Court 
Justices attended Oxford or Cambridge.
678
   Occasionally, judges are invited to sit on the 
Supreme Court bench, six invited judges heard cases in the Supreme Court during the period 
of analysis.
679
  All of these judges were male, but they did have a more diverse education, 
with four of the six attending independent schools and only three attending Oxbridge.  
Although the social background of the judges is not recorded by the Judicial Appointments 
Commission (JAC), studies in the UK demonstrate a close association between educational 
background and social class, with those attending independent schools typically from higher 
social classes.
680
  To date only one female has sat on the Supreme Court bench, Lady Hale.
681
  
No Black Minority Ethnic (BME) judge has sat on the UK Supreme Court bench. As Lady 
Hale stated ‘in the Supreme Court there is still only me and the only ethnic minorities we 
have are the Scots and the Irish’.682 
 
 This lack of diversity is not new nor is it limited to the UK.  However, the UK has the lowest 
proportion of women sitting on the bench in the highest court when compared to other 
common law countries.
683
  Despite two decades of attention and growing support, the rate of 
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change has been remarkably slow.  Indeed Kate Malleson goes further and argues that rather 
than making steady progress the UK judicial bench is becoming less diverse.
684
  In the setting 
of increasing media concern regarding the power of the Supreme Court, the public discussion 
of the lack of overt diversity has once again increased in prevalence.
685
  These debates centre 
on overt diversity, that which can be seen.  This chapter will examine a second form of 
diversity, tacit diversity, which encompasses those influences on decision making that are not 
overt. Although there has been recognition that these influences exist, the influences have 
been difficult to ascertain and have not been reflected in the diversity debate.  The central 
argument in this thesis is that personal values are one of these tacit influences.  The study of 
personal values transcends many of the limitations of the current studies of tacit influences on 
judicial decision making and provides a tool to examine tacit influences that extend beyond 
demographic characteristics. 
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7.1.1 Why do we want judicial diversity? 
There are several strands to the arguments in support of a more diverse judiciary which are 
eloquently discussed by Erika Rackley in her book Women, Judging and the Judiciary:  
From Difference to Diversity and by Baroness Neuberger in her 2010 report from the 
Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity.
686
  The same arguments have been raised by American 
legal academic and Court of Appeals judge Harry Edwards in relation to black judges in the 
U.S.A.
687
   
 
Two of these arguments relate to democratic legitimacy and are centred on the perception of 
the judiciary as the ‘other’ by the general population.  The first argument is that the overt lack 
of diversity may cause those appearing before the courts to believe that they are being judged 
by a society to which they do not belong.  The second argument concerns the wider 
population and suggests that the lack of diversity may serve to undermine public confidence 
in the decisions reached.  It is argued that the limited demographic diversity of the bench 
serves to create the perception that being a judge is the preserve of a very limited elite 
subclass in society.   It is this perception which serves to undermine public confidence in the 
judiciary.
688
  Erika Rackley highlights the need for a ‘reflective’ judiciary arguing that 
although legitimacy can be derived from legal experience, this is no longer sufficient and the 
judiciary increasingly must ‘reflect’ the community it serves.689   Indeed, this is the argument 
supported by the House of Lords Constitution Committee:  
                                                 
686
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It is vital that the public have confidence in our judiciary. One aspect of 
ensuring that confidence is a more diverse judiciary that more fully 
reflects the wider population.
690
 
The diversity arguments extend beyond democratic legitimacy.  The lack of overt diversity 
risks the loss of potential judicial talent due to the absence of lawyers from non-traditional 
backgrounds.
691
   Furthermore, given that legal talent is not gender specific and is not 
associated with class or race, then the lack of diversity suggests inequality in career 
progression or judicial appointments. 
692
  Indeed the advocates of diversity argue that the lack 
of apparent diversity on the judicial bench creates a situation which deters potential 
candidates who do not belong to the perceived stereotype.
693
  Therefore it is argued that a 
more diverse bench would serve to enhance equality of opportunity both for women and 
those in minority sections of society.
694
   
 
There is agreement amongst academics, politicians and the judiciary that more women and 
minority candidates should be appointed to the judicial bench and it is clear how this would 
play a role addressing the issue of public confidence.  These arguments relate to overt 
diversity, how the judicial bench is seen by the general public or those aspiring to the 
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judiciary.
695
  However, there is another strand to the diversity debate and this centres on 
whether altering the demographic profile of the judicial bench will alter judicial decisions.  
This line of argument suggests that judicial decision making is subject to tacit influences that 
are associated with overt demographic differences.   
 
7.2 Tacit diversity 
Michael Polanyi described tacit knowledge as ‘things that we know but cannot tell’.696  The 
knowledge that influences decisions but is not articulated and includes personal ideals and 
influences which are acquired and transmitted through social networks and experience, yet 
not set out explicitly.  The debates surrounding judicial diversity which highlight the 
importance of tacit knowledge, centres on the individual and their unique knowledge:  
[T]he greater the diversity of participation by [judges] of different 
backgrounds and experiences, the greater the range of ideas and 
information contributed to the institutional process.
697
 
These ideas, according to Mr. Justice Cameron, are the ‘inarticulate premises in the process 
of judging’; 
Judges do not enter public office as ideological virgins. They ascend the 
Bench with built-in and often strongly held sets of values, preconceptions, 
opinions and prejudices.  They are invariably expressed in the decisions 
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they give, constituting inarticulate premises in the process of judicial 
reasoning.
698
 
Indeed, Robert Stevens suggests that it is these ‘inarticulate premises’ that serve as the main 
reason why England and Wales require a more diverse judiciary.  
699
  
 
The majority of work examining judicial tacit (inarticulate) premises has focused on the 
female judge.  It has been argued that increasing judicial diversity would lead to better 
decision making because women and minorities bring something different to the decision 
making process.
700
  This gendered difference has been characterised by Carol Gilligan who 
contends that the unique female voice is a result of both biological and social differences 
which facilitates greater insight into feminist issues.
701
  This was translated to judicial 
decision making in the US, in 1977, by Herbert Kritzer and Thomas Ulhman who argued that 
‘common sense as well as sociological theory suggests that the socialisation experiences of 
men and women are significantly different’ and these differences, in combination with 
cultural norms, should lead to differences in judicial behaviour.
702
   
 
The concept of the different voice has been approved by feminist legal theorists who argue 
that as a consequence of the different life experiences women judge differently to men and 
                                                 
698
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bring a different perspective to the judicial decision making process.
703
  This view is shared 
by many women judges in the US and New Zealand.
704
  One study in New Zealand found 
that 70% of women judges and 39% of male judges agreed with the statement that  
‘Judges judge by what they think is right and proper and that necessarily 
involves a particular set of values and standards which are influenced by 
gender.’705   
A survey of judges in America, in 1993, highlighted that male and female judges reported 
different life experiences in which women appeared to experience more gender inequality and 
discrimination than men.
706
   In these surveys, the majority of female judges and a large 
proportion of male judges consider that gender influences not only values but judicial 
decision making. 
 
Lady Hale has acknowledged that she is a ‘feminist judge’ and suggested that her gender did 
play a role in the decision that she reached.
707
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In short, there is a gender dimension to the issue which some may think 
ill-suited to decision by a court consisting of eight men and one woman.
708
  
Indeed in a BBC documentary Lady Hale suggested that if the bench had not been ‘all men’ 
then a ‘different decision’ would have been reached.709  However, Lady Hale has denied the 
‘different voice’ principle.710  In contrast, to this narrow approach to the role of gender in 
judicial decision making, Lady Hale suggests a more nuanced approach to “difference” which 
highlights gender as one element of the many facets of the different life experiences that a 
female judge brings to the decision which will enhance the judicial decision making process 
and make the system of justice “richer”.711   Indeed, in a speech in 2013, Lady Hale stated 
I too used to be sceptical about the argument that women judges were bound to 
make a difference, but I have come to agree with those great women judges who 
think that sometimes, on occasions, we may do so.
712
These arguments of 
difference are founded on a more subtle theoretical approach to the influence of 
gender on decision making, which suggests that the multiple facets of a gendered 
life experience add different perspectives which ‘enrich judicial decision 
making’.713 This more nuanced approach to difference has a strong theoretical 
foundation and suggests that women bring a different perspective to the process 
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of decision making.
 714
 This ‘gendered sensibility’ reflects that ‘women view the 
world and what goes on in it from a different perspective than men.’ 715 It 
encompasses the many life experiences which are experienced differently by 
women including but not limited to the experiences surrounding childcare and 
childbirth. 
716
  Central to the more nuanced approach to difference is the 
recognition that the alternative views that enrich the decision making process may 
or may not be reflected in the final outcome. Indeed, as Rackley suggests 
difference lies in the fact that she hears a different story (rather than 
simply the fact that it has a different ending) and more specifically, in the 
potential of her counter-narrative to open up new avenues for exploration 
and alternative understandings of the judge and judging.
717
  
Indeed, Lady Hale suggests the difference may not be reflected in the final 
outcome in the context of a panel decision; 
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If you are a group who are trying to reach a common answer, different 
people will put in different things to that debate and, hopefully, produce a 
common answer.
718
 
Difference in this context is reflected in the enriched decision making process and 
the factors that influence the final decision, but may only “on occasion” be 
reflected in the final outcome.
719
  To date, empirical studies have not been carried 
out to test this complex multivariate theory.  Indeed, to date the empirical 
research has centred on the ‘different voice’ theory examining outcomes for 
difference associated with gender.   The majority of studies have been centred on 
the US judiciary where there are sufficient female judges for analysis and 
although gender appears to influence the political ideology of US Supreme Court 
Justices, the influence of gender on decision making is much more varied.
720
   
These empirical studies examine two forms of influence: individual and panel 
effects.   
7.2.1 Direct effect of gender on decision making – ‘Individual effects’ 
Studies which consider ‘individual effects’ on decision making focus on the judge as a 
unitary subject and argue that individual male and female judges will reach different 
decisions.  To date the vast majority of these studies have examined the United States 
Supreme Court and have not identified a significant difference between the decisions reached 
                                                 
718
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by male and female justices.
721
  This was not limited to the United States.  There was no 
significant overall difference between male and female judicial decisions in criminal appeals 
in the Alberta Court of Appeal.
722
  Although, there was no general difference when the 
decisions in all cases were assessed, there was a difference in a subset of cases that involved 
gendered issues including sex and employment discrimination cases. 
 
Two studies of the United Sates State Supreme Courts demonstrated that female judges were 
more likely than male judges to support plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases.
723
  Similarly an 
analysis of the United States Court of Appeals, by Songer et al, did not identify a difference 
in decision making between male and female judges in obscenity or criminal search and 
seizure cases but the authors did find a difference in decision making in employment 
discrimination cases.
724
   
 
Although in the majority of cases, there is no difference in decision making associated with 
gender, in a small subset of cases which have a gendered element, female judges may decide 
differently and if cases are decided by a female judge alone, the gender of that judge may 
influence the final decision.  Unlike in the lower courts, cases in the superior courts tend to be 
heard by a panel of judges.   In such cases, does the gender of the judges influence the 
decision?  Can a single female voice be heard? 
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7.2.2 Indirect effects of gender on decision making – ‘Panel effects’. 
The study of decision making by panels of judges moves away from the decisions of an 
individual judge to the influence of an individual judge on the decision of the panel as a 
whole, or ‘panel effects’.  Again, as with the study of direct gender effects, in the vast 
majority of cases the presence of a female judge on the panel does not make an appreciable 
difference on the decision reached, however as Boyd et al suggest: 
The results of this exercise are now reasonably clear: the presence of 
women in the federal appellate judiciary rarely has an appreciable 
empirical effect on judicial outcomes. Rarely, though, is not never.
725
  
A large scale study by Peresie et al examined the influence of the presence of a female judge 
on a three judge panel in a subset of cases which have a gender element (sexual harassment 
and sex discrimination cases) in the Federal Appeal Courts over a three year period (1999 – 
2001).
  726
  The authors identified that the plaintiffs lost in the vast majority of cases, but that 
they were twice as likely to prevail when a female judge was on the bench.  Indeed, the 
authors demonstrated that the presence of a female judge significantly increased the 
probability that a male judge would support the plaintiff in the cases analysed.
727
  Similarly, 
Moloney Smith identified that the presence of women on the bench has resulted in more 
verdicts for female plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases.
728
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This was confirmed by Boyd et al in an analysis of approximately 8,000 cases heard in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
729
  The authors also demonstrated that 
the presence of a female judge on a panel would lead to significantly more rulings in favour 
of the party alleging discrimination in cases of sexual discrimination.  Indeed, Boyd et al 
stated: 
[W]e observe consistent and statistically significant individual and panel 
effects in sex discrimination disputes: not only do males and females 
bring distinct approaches to these cases, but the presence of a female on a 
panel actually causes male judges to vote in a way they otherwise would 
not—in favour of plaintiffs.’730 
Why does the presence of a single female judge on a panel influence the panel’s decision in a 
limited set of cases?  The authors contended that this was also related to informational 
effects.  It was argued that male judges recognised that female judges possessed information 
that male judges perceived as more credible and persuasive than their own knowledge on 
these gendered issues.  In doing so, female judges either directly or indirectly influenced the 
choices of their male colleagues.
731
   Indeed, this theory was supported by Farhang and 
Wawro who analysed evidence from sexual harassment cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals.
732
  
The authors demonstrated that female judges influence the panel through the exchange of 
ideas and information rather than male counterparts making concessions to women to achieve 
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unanimity.
733
 Although not the influence of a female judge, a very small study by Glynn and 
Sen suggested that in gendered issues, male judges who have daughters may adopt a more 
feminine position.
734
   
 
There is very little empirical work examining the influence of the gender of judges on judicial 
decisions in the UK.    Indeed, the paucity of research may be due to the small number of 
female judges in the UK.
735
   However, a survey of a small subset of female judges in the UK 
revealed that almost 38% of judges thought that female judges had a different approach to 
judging.
736
  The study did not investigate whether this difference influenced the judgments 
reached.  The Feminist Judgments Project provides theoretical evidence to support the 
alternative difference theory in the UK by revealing the underlying gendered influences in 
judgments.
737
  The relevance of the project was highlighted by Lady Hale in evidence to the 
Select Committee on the Constitution in 2012,  
You may be aware that there was a very interesting project recently, the Feminist 
Judgments Project, where some academic, feminist lawyers decided that they would 
rewrite from a feminist perspective the judgments in a range of mostly famous cases 
from areas all around the law. Sometimes they reached exactly the same conclusion 
but with a different reasoning and sometimes they reached a different conclusion, 
demonstrating with varying degrees of success that where you start from can have an 
effect on where you end up.
738
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7.2.2.1 The limitations of empirical analysis of the role of gender on judicial 
decision making– critical mass theory. 
One of the key limitations to the analysis of the role of gender in judicial decision making is 
the principle of ‘critical mass.’  This principle as applied to gender and judicial decision 
making suggests that until women, working in a predominantly male environment, increase in 
number beyond ‘token status’ they will largely conform to the characteristics of the dominant 
male group.
739
 A study by Collins et al, applied critical mass theory to the role of gender in 
legal decision making in the United States Federal District Courts.
740
  The authors identified 
the presence of more than one female Justice did influence decision making.  This was 
limited to specific areas of law, with female judges adopting a more liberal position in 
criminal justice cases and cases concerning civil liberties and rights.  However there was no 
detectable variation in cases which concerned labour and economic regulation.  The authors 
proposed that critical mass theory may explain many of the inconsistencies in previous 
studies and suggested that the influence of gender may indeed be more profound if the 
number of female judges increased to a critical mass. 
 
7.3 The influence of other demographic variables on judicial decision making. 
The tacit influence of other demographic variables on judicial decision making has also been 
assessed, but to a much lesser degree.  A study by Massie et al found that race had no effect 
on judicial decision making in the United States Court of Appeals when all cases were 
analysed.
 741
  However, as with gender effects, race associated differences could be detected 
                                                 
739
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Women' (1977) 82 American Journal of Sociology 965 . 
740
 PM Collins, KL Manning and RA Carp, 'Gender, Critical Mass and Judicial Decision Making.' (2010) 32 
Law and Policy 260  
741
 T Massie, SW Johnson and SM Gubala, 'The Impact of Gender and Race in the Decisions of Judges on the 
United States Courts of Appeals' (Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 25 April 
2002) 
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if the data was limited to specific types of cases which had a racial element.
742
  Similar 
findings were identified by Cameron and Cummings, who demonstrated that increased racial 
diversity on the panels of the United States Court of Appeals substantially changed the voting 
behaviour of the judges on the panels in affirmative action cases, mimicking the panel effect 
of female judges. 
743
  Indeed, Kastellec has demonstrated that a black judge was more likely 
to than a non-black judge to support affirmative action and the presence of a single black 
judge on a panel of three would significantly increase the likelihood that the panel would vote 
in favour of affirmative action.
744
  Chew and Kelley also suggested that African American 
judges reach different decisions to white judges, but the difference was limited to a very 
specific set of cases that concerned racial harassment.
745
 
 
The study of criminal cases and sentencing suggests that the influence of race may extend 
beyond a distinct subset of race-related cases, but the differences are minimal and 
inconsistent.  Welch et al suggested that ethnicity influences judicial decision making with 
the black judge more ‘even-handed’ with white and black defendants than the white judge 
who tended to treat the white defendant more leniently.
746
  Steffensmeier and Britt examined 
the influence of race on sentencing in Pennsylvania between 1992 -1996.
747
  The authors 
identified a very small race-judge effect, with black judges more likely to sentence both black 
and white offenders to prison.  However, black and white judges largely weighted case and 
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offender information in similar ways when making punishment decisions and there also was 
similarity in sentencing practices.  Despite the limited data, ethnicity appears to exert a tacit 
influence on judicial decision making. 
 
There is also very limited data available on the influence of sexual orientation of judicial 
decision making.  Leslie Moran undertook a series of interviews with lesbian and gay 
members of the judiciary and legal professionals in Australia, England, Wales and South 
Africa.   The interviews revealed that judges do not feel that their sexuality has any impact on 
judicial decisions.
748
 Similarly there is very little evidence on the role of religion on judicial 
decision making, however one small study, carried out in the USA, did identify that religion 
played a role in judicial perception of role orientation.  In a very small survey of 22 judges, 
Wold identified that Protestant judges tended to adopt a more restraintist position, strictly 
adhering to precedent, than Catholic or Jewish judges.
749
  In contrast, a study by Ashenfelter 
et al, did not identify any association between the religion of a judge and decision reached in 
civil rights cases in three federal districts.
750
 
 
7.4 Personal values and the diversity debate 
In summary, there is some empirical evidence that specific overt characteristics such as 
gender and race may be associated with tacit influences on judicial decision making, in a 
limited subset of cases.  Whether this is related to unique information or experiences, tacit 
knowledge appears to play a role in decision making.  One of the key limitations to the 
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assessment of the influence of tacit knowledge is the need to relate tacit influence to overt 
easily characterised demographic variables. 
 
The study of personal values transcends many of the limitations of the current studies and 
may provide a tool to examine tacit influences that extend beyond overt demographic 
characteristics. Personal values are both informed and formed by life experiences. They 
reflect demographic characteristics but are not limited to overt demographics.  Personal 
values therefore provide an insight into the individual which goes beyond overt demographics 
and as such may provide a tool to start to explore the multifaceted influences on judicial 
decision making highlighted by “difference” theory The examination of judicial values may 
serve to provide deeper insight into the tacit knowledge that influences judicial decisions and 
add another deeper layer to the diversity debate.   
 
7.4.1  Personal values, demographics and genetic inheritance 
The relationship between overt characteristics and decision making may be related to 
personal values.  For example Gilligan argued that women define themselves through 
connection with others and emphasise care and the preservation of relationships when solving 
disputes.
751
  Indeed, Beutel and Marini demonstrated that females are more likely to express 
concern and responsibility for the well-being of others and less likely to espouse materialism 
and competition.
752
  This association with values has led authors such as Davis et al to 
propose that the ‘different voice’ of the female judge was a reflection of these values and 
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should lead a female judge to support community values over individual rights when they 
come into conflict with each other.
 753
   
 
There is an association between personal values and demographic characteristics at a 
population level. Empirical population studies, using the Schwartz psychometric test, 
identified that women attribute more importance to universalism, conformity and security 
values.  In contrast, men tend to attribute more importance to power values and those 
encompassed within achievement, hedonism, stimulation and self-direction.
754
 The value 
difference associated with gender is nuanced and subject to social moderators.
755
  Indeed, the 
gender difference may also be associated with culture and nationality, with more apparent 
value differences associated with gender in Israel, South Africa and Italy as compared to 
Canada.
756
  
 
The data regarding the influence of race on personal values is mixed.  A small study of 
managers in 1977 did not identify any variation in values associated with race.
757
  However a 
small study in Israel demonstrated that ethnicity had a significant impact on the rating of 
values encompassed within tradition, conformity, self-direction and achievement, with a 
positive correlation between the more traditional ethnic groups and the values encompassed 
in tradition and conformity.
758
  
                                                 
753
 S Davis, S Hair and D Songer, 'Voting Behaviour and Gender on the US Courts of Appeals' (1993) 77 
Judicature 129  
754
 SH Schwartz and T Rubel, 'Sex Differences in Value Priorities:  Cross-Cultural and Multimethod Studies' 
(2005) 89 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1010  
755
 E Prince-Gibson and SH Schwartz, 'Value Priorities and Gender' (1998) 61 Social Psychology Quarterly 49.  
The difference was only identified at a population level. 
756
 SH Schwartz and others, 'Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory of Basic Human Values with a 
Different Method of Measurement' (2001) 5 Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 519  
757
 J Watson and J Williams, 'Relationship Between Managerial Values and Managerial Success of Black and 
White Managers' (1977) 62 Journal of Applied Psychology 203  
758
  E Prince-Gibson and SH Schwartz, 'Value Priorities and Gender' (1998) 61 Social Psychology Quarterly 49  
The ethnicity classification used was based on birth country and father’s ethnicity dividing the subjects into five 
groups, Israeli born/ Israeli father,  Israeli born/ European or American father, European or American 
301 
 
7.4.2 Personal values beyond demographics 
Population studies reveal an association between some demographic variables and personal 
values.  However these studies also reveal that personal values are more nuanced and 
encompass more than simple demographic difference.  Although at a population level 
females tend to support values that are encompassed within universalism, conformity and 
security, this is moderated by nationality.
759
  Moreover, a study of directors of publically-
traded corporations in Sweden suggested that female directors tend to care less about 
conformity and security and more about stimulation and self-direction than the general female 
population.
760
   
 
Variation of personal values was also demonstrated to be influenced by education, with less 
educated respondents attributing more importance to security, tradition and conformity values 
than more formally educated respondents, regardless of gender.
761
 Indeed, education was 
associated with increased self-direction and stimulation and reduced tradition and 
conformity.
762
  There is also some evidence that value priorities differ amongst university 
students in relation to their area of study.  Students who were engaged in the study of 
economics accorded higher priority to power and achievement, values associated with 
autocratic behaviour.  In contrast, those who were studying the humanities were more likely 
to rate universalism highly.
763
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A relationship has also been identified between political choice and personal values, centre-
left voters rated universalism, benevolence and self-direction higher than centre-right voters.  
Centre-right voters were more inclined to rate security, power, achievement and tradition 
higher than their centre-left counterparts.
764
  
 
It has been argued that when people attain stable positions in the occupational world and 
engage with family life, they tend to become less preoccupied with their own success and 
more concerned with the welfare of others.
765
   This change in motivation is reflected in 
personal values, with an association identified between increasing age and an increased 
priority of benevolence and universalism and a negative correlation with power and 
achievement.
766
  Self-direction and stimulation were also negatively correlated with age, with 
an associated increase in tradition, conformity and security.
767
 
 
Subjective religiosity or ‘the personal perception of how religious one is’ has also been 
related to personal values.  Indeed, those who perceived themselves as very religious were 
more likely to rate tradition and conformity highly, values associated with self-restraint.  In 
contrast there is a negative correlation between religiosity and hedonism, self-direction, 
achievement and power values.  These values are associated with change-seeking 
attributes.
768
   
 
                                                 
764
 GV Caprara and others, 'Personality and Politics: Values, Traits, and Political Choice' (2006) 27 Political 
Psychology 1 
 
765
 J Veroff, D Reuman and S Field, 'Motives in American Men and Women Across the Adult Life Span' (1984) 
20 Developmental Psychology 1142  
766
 SH Schwartz and others, 'Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory of Basic Human Values with a 
Different Method of Measurement' (2001) 5 Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 519  
767
 M Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values (Free Press 1973); NT Feather, Values in Education and Society. 
(Free-Press 1975) 
768
 SH Schwartz and others, 'Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory of Basic Human Values with a 
Different Method of Measurement' (2001) 5 Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 519  
 
303 
 
7.5 Hypothesis – There is diversity of values on the Supreme Court bench 
The findings of this thesis suggest that personal values are more nuanced than demographics 
and reflect a wider variety of life experiences and influences.  The central hypothesis of this 
chapter is that the study of values will provide a more discriminating view of judicial 
diversity.  With the exception of Lady Hale, the overt demographic characteristics of the 
Justices on the UK Supreme Court bench are the same. All male, all white and all of a certain 
age.  Personal values however reflect more than overt demographic characteristics and the 
case study analysis suggested that individual Supreme Court Justices, despite the 
demographic uniformity of the Supreme Court bench, have a variety of personal values which 
are reflected in their decisions. This chapter will build on this finding and examine personal 
values and decision making in the context of the judicial diversity debate.   
 
The key questions addressed in this chapter are as follows: 
 Do Supreme Court Justices emphasise different values?   Is there tacit diversity? 
 
 If Supreme Court Justices emphasise different values, is the difference in values 
reflected in decision making? 
 
 What does this mean for judicial diversity? 
 
7.6 Judicial values 
The values expressed by individual Supreme Court Justices were identified using cases from 
data set 1 decided between October 2009 and April 2011.
769
   Of these cases, the Supreme 
Court Justices heard an average of 45 cases of which 22% divided judicial opinion which 
represented an average of 10 cases which divided opinion with a range of 7 – 14 cases.  In 
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these cases, each Supreme Court Justice delivered between 5 – 11 judgments which were 
analysed for value statements and the average coding density per judgment was 11 coded 
units.  Two Supreme Court Justices, Lords Walker and Collins were less likely to express 
values within their judgments.     
 
The Supreme Court Justices supported the majority position in an average of 68% of cases 
with Lords Phillips and Mance more likely to support the majority position.  Lord Collins 
supported the majority position in all of the seven cases he delivered a judgment on in this 
time period.
770
  In this data set, Lady Hale was most likely to issue a dissenting judgment, 
delivering a single dissenting judgment in one third of cases she heard during this time 
period.  Single dissenting judgments were also delivered by Lord Hope, Lord Walker and 
Lord Kerr.  The combined values of all the Supreme Court Justices, expressed as a 
percentage of the total coded statements in the eighteen cases analysed, are presented below 
(Table 16).   
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Table 16: Values identified though content analysis of judgments in divided cases. 
Value Total Coding  
(N = 1086) 
Total number of cases 
(N= 18) 
Universalism 315 (30%) 18 
Self-direction 269 (25%) 18 
Tradition 244 (23%) 17 
Security 100 (9%) 16 
Conformity 72 (7%) 12 
Power 27 (2.7%) 9 
Achievement 23 (2.3%) 4 
Benevolence 15 (1%) 3 
Stimulation 0 0 
Hedonism 0  0 
   The values are expressed as n (% of total value expression). 
 
Eight of the ten values were identified in the judgments.  Over three quarters of the coding 
was within three key value motivations tradition, self-direction and universalism, these 
values were expressed in all of the cases analysed.  This result is unsurprising given the 
nature of the values encompassed within these groups.  Although not as frequently espoused, 
security, conformity and power featured in half or more of the judgments analysed.  
 
Stimulation and hedonism were not coded in any of the judgments. This is also unsurprising 
given the nature of these values.  The defining goal of stimulation is excitement, novelty and 
challenge in life.  Hedonism is defined as the pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself.  
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By the nature of these values, it is unlikely that either will be espoused, denied or affirmed in 
a legal case.  Indeed, in a legal context it is difficult to envisage a case which would allow the 
Supreme Court Justices to reveal such values.   
 
7.7 Is there diversity of expression of values by the Supreme Court Justices? 
The values expressed by the Supreme Court Justices in the 18 cases analysed in data set one 
are presented in Table 17.    The average expression of all the Supreme Court Justices is 
presented at the top.  It is notable that the pattern of value expression varied between 
individuals Supreme Court Justices. 
 
The most commonly espoused value was universalism, which accounted for 30% of the 
overall coding within all judgments.  Five Supreme Court Justices espoused this value more 
often than average, with Lord Kerr most likely to espouse universalism which accounts for 
53.6% of his total coding.
771
   Although many of the Supreme Court Justices expressed 
universalism more often than average, others were less likely to espouse these values.  Lord 
Rodger was the least likely to espouse the values encompassed within universalism, 
accounting for 12.5% of coding, with Lords Brown and Hope also less likely than average to 
espouse these values. 
 
In contrast, these Supreme Court Justices were more likely than average to espouse values 
encompassed within tradition and conformity.  Lord Rodger had the highest percentage 
coding for tradition, which accounted for over half (58%) of his value statements.  The 
majority of the coding reflected adherence to statutory purpose and affirmation of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. 
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Other values that were frequently expressed included self-direction, security, achievement 
and power.  Lord Mance is the most likely to espouse self-direction which encompasses 
autonomy, freedom and independence and accounts for 36% of  the value statements of Lord 
Mance compared to an average of 25%.  Lord Mance also had the highest percentage coding 
for security, which accounted for a fifth of his value expression.  Security was expressed in 
16 of the cases analysed and encompasses family and national security but also preventing 
uncertainty in the law. 
 
The analysis of the expression of values in judgments suggested that despite the lack of overt 
diversity, there was a wide variation in the rate and pattern of value expression by individual 
Supreme Court Justices.  Indeed, the distribution of value expression suggested that there was 
evidence of tacit diversity in the Supreme Court.  As discussed in the earlier chapters, there is 
an association between value expression and decisions in cases which divide judicial opinion.  
The next question is whether the diversity of values expressed by Supreme Court Justices is 
reflected in judicial decisions? 
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Table 17 :  Values espoused by individual Supreme Court Justices in judgments 
Supreme Court 
Justice 
Total 
number of 
coded 
statements 
Coding 
density 
Power 
 
 
Achievement 
 
Security 
 
 
Tradition 
 
Conformity 
 
Benevol 
-ence 
 
Universalism 
 
Self-
Direction 
 
Average 
 
  2.7%  
(27) 
2.3% 
(23) 
9%  
(100) 
23% 
(244) 
7% 
(72) 
1% 
(15) 
30% 
(315) 
25% 
(269) 
Lord Phillips 126 14 10.3% 3.9% 13.5% 15.1% 4% 0.8% 30.1% 22.3% 
Lord Hope 188 19 1.6% 2.1% 10.1% 34% 12.8% 0% 18.6% 20.8% 
Lord Brown 100 9 4% 6% 7% 27% 8% 4% 17% 27% 
Lord Rodger  64 10 0% 0 1.6% 57.8% 4.7% 0% 12.5% 23.4% 
Lord Walker 59 7 0% 8.5% 3.4% 23.7% 6.8% 0% 35.6% 22% 
Lady Hale 116 11 2.5% 0% 8.7% 22.4% 10.3% 0.8% 38 % 17.3% 
Lord Kerr 97 11 2.1% 0% 3.1% 9.3% 2.0% 3.1% 53.6% 26.8% 
Lord Mance 102 15 0.9% 0% 17.6% 7.8% 5.9% 0% 31.3% 36.5% 
Lord Clarke 76 15 0% 2.6% 6.6.% 14.5% 1.3% 1.3% 39.5% 34.2% 
Lord Collins 34 5 2.9% 2.9% 11.8% 26.5% 0% 0.8% 20.6% 34.5% 
 
There was no coding for hedonism or stimulation and these values are not included in the table.  The values are expressed as a percentage of the total number of value coded 
statements for each Supreme Court Justice. 
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7.8 Judicial values and agreement 
Studies on the tacit influence of gender suggest that the influence is only evident in a subset 
of cases where gender plays a role.  Personal values reflect many facets of the individual and 
the influence of personal values should therefore not be limited to a narrow subset of cases.  
To address whether individual judicial values are reflected in the decisions reached, analysis 
of agreement between Supreme Court Justices with broadly similar values was carried out.  If 
values have a tacit influence on judicial decision making, then Supreme Court Justices with 
similar values will reach similar decisions in cases that divide judicial opinion. 
 
A larger data set was used to assess judicial agreement. This data set included all of the cases 
for which a judgment was delivered in the first four years of the Supreme Court (cases 
decided between October 2009 and September 2013).  The Supreme Court decided 242 cases, 
57 (23%) of which divided judicial opinion, 27 (11%) of which resulted in a single dissenting 
judgment and 30 (12%) of which were divided case, where more than one Supreme Court 
Justice supported the minority position.  The divided cases included those cases that were 
close call, where a single vote decided the case, cases that were decided with judicial division 
of 3:2 or 4:3 (n = 20), and cases that included more than one Justice supporting the minority 
position but not a close call (n = 10). 
 
During this period, six of the Supreme Court Justices retired.
772
   On average, each individual 
Supreme Court Justices heard 96 cases, with a range from 51 (Lord Collins) to 133 (Lord 
Hope).  In the smaller subset of cases which divided judicial opinion, the Supreme Court 
Justices heard, 25 cases on average, with a range from 12 (Lord Collins) to 34 (Lord Hope). 
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In the cases that divided judicial opinion, with the exception of one case, Lord Collins 
consistently reached decisions in support of the majority position.
773
  The remaining Supreme 
Court Justices supported the majority position in an average of 67% of cases, Lord Phillips 
was more likely to support the majority position (91%) and Lord Kerr supported the majority 
position in less than half of these cases.  Indeed, Lord Kerr and Lady Hale were the most 
likely to deliver single dissenting judgments. 
 
Agreement was defined as when two Supreme Court Justices reached the same decision in a 
case.  This was calculated as a percentage of the total number of cases in which both Supreme 
Court Justices were on the bench.  On average, every pair of Supreme Court Justices heard 39 
cases together, but this ranged from 16 cases heard by Lord Collins and Lord Brown to 68 
cases heard by Lord Hope and Lady Hale.  Agreement was calculated for three different 
categories; 
1. Total Agreement: The percentage agreement in all cases heard by both Supreme 
Court Justices and includes both unanimous and divided cases. 
 
2. Divided agreement: This was a percentage agreement in cases heard by both 
Supreme Court Justices in which there was either a dissenting judgment or 
minority judgments. 
 
3. Minority agreement:  This was a percentage of agreement in cases heard by both 
Supreme Court Justices in which more than one Supreme Court Justice adopted a 
minority position.  
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7.8.1 A classification of Supreme Court Justices based on value profiles. 
To facilitate the value-based agreement analysis, the Supreme Court Justices were broadly 
categorised based on the dominant values in their proﬁles. In using broadly deﬁned 
categories, subtle differences will not be identiﬁed and differences associated with values not 
included in the categorisation will be missed.  However, the use of broad categories facilitates 
an analysis of whether Supreme Court Justices who express similar values reach similar 
decisions in cases that divide judicial opinion. 
 
As discussed above some values were not espoused in judgments and therefore were not used 
in the analysis.
774
  The most commonly coded values in judgments were universalism, self-
direction and tradition which accounted for 78% of the coding.  These values were used 
initially to identify Supreme Court Justices with similar values.  As conformity and tradition 
are closely related these values were categorised together.  
 
7.8.1.1 Tradition and conformity 
Three of the Supreme Court Justices espoused the values encompassed within tradition and 
conformity in their judgments at a level above average.   Those Supreme Court Justices who 
promoted tradition tended to be less likely than average to espouse values encompassed 
within universalism.  They tended to support decisions which affirmed tradition and 
conformity. These judges were Lord Hope, Lord Brown and Lord Rodger.   
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7.8.1.2 Universalism  
In contrast, two of the Supreme Court Justices, Lord Kerr and Lord Clarke were less likely 
than average to espouse values encompassed in tradition and conformity and more likely to 
espouse values encompassed within universalism.  These Supreme Court Justices were also 
more likely than average to reach decisions which favoured universalistic values and oppose 
decisions which affirmed values encompassed within tradition.   
 
If the study was simply limited to these three values, the Supreme Court Justices could be 
divided into three groups as follows; the traditionalists who supported values encompassed in 
tradition and conformity and opposed values encompassed in universalism.  The universalists 
who supported values encompassed in universalism and opposed values encompassed in 
tradition and conformity and those who do not consistently fit either pattern.  One other value 
is consistently expressed at a high level and that is self-direction. 
 
7.8.1.3 Self-Direction 
Values encompassed within self-direction include liberty, autonomy, independence and 
freedom.  These values contrast with those of power which include dominance over others.  
Although the coding for power was very low, Lord Mance consistently espoused values 
encompassed within self-direction and opposed decisions which affirmed the values 
encompassed in power.   
 
7.8.1.4 What about the remaining Supreme Court Justices? 
The analysis of values is more nuanced than the basic categorisation identified above.  
Indeed, although five of the Supreme Court Justices can be classified into the two broad 
categories, it is evident from the value profiles in the case studies that even within those 
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categories there are nuanced differences in the values not used in the categorisation.  Lord 
Clarke, although classified as a universalist, also espouses values encompassed within self-
direction. Indeed, Lord Mance is less likely than average to espouse values within tradition 
and conformity.   
 
The remaining Supreme Court Justices cannot be easily classified.  To assist classification, 
values espoused in extra-judicial speeches were analysed, and the value position supported by 
the Supreme Court Justices in the cases that divided judicial opinion was also used.  As 
discussed in chapter 6, the values espoused by Lord Phillips in his judgments were 
inconsistent with the decisions that he reaches.  Although he was not more likely than 
average to espouse values encompassed within universalism in his judgments, Lord Phillips 
was more likely to support a position that affirms the values encompassed within 
universalism.  Indeed, analysis of his extra-judicial speeches identified that almost half (47%) 
of all value statements were encompassed within universalism, including concepts of liberty, 
alternative approaches to custodial sentencing and early intervention programmes.  Lord 
Phillips, although unusual in his positive espousal of values encompassed within power, was 
less likely than average to espouse values encompassed within tradition and conformity.  
Lord Phillips was therefore categorised with Lords Clarke and Kerr, as a universalist. 
 
As discussed in chapter 6, Lady Hale espoused values encompassed in universalism and self-
direction, and analysis of 13 of her available extra-judicial speeches revealed a high 
expression of both values. The majority of her speeches have been in the area of human rights 
and equality, in which she espoused values that are encompassed in universalism and self-
direction, values which were reflected in her judgments.   Lady Hale also espoused values 
encompassed within self-direction. Lady Hale could align with either the Supreme Court 
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Justices who espoused values encompassed within universalism or Lord Mance, who 
espoused self-direction. Unlike the universalists, Lady Hale also espoused values 
encompassed within tradition.  This profile therefore does not align with those of the other 
Supreme Court Justices who espoused universalism but were less likely than average to 
espouse values encompassed in tradition. For this reason, Lady Hale was categorised with 
Lord Mance. 
 
Lord Walker was less likely than the other Supreme Court Justices to express values within 
his judgments.  However, even with the limited coding Lord Walker was more likely than 
average to espouse values within universalism, however as with Lady Hale he was not less 
likely to espouse values encompassed within tradition and universalism.  Analysis of the 
decisions of Lord Walker revealed that Lord Walker was more likely than average to reach 
decisions which affirmed the values within tradition and conformity.  Indeed, analysis of the 
decisions reached revealed that he supported conformity in 93% of cases.
775
  Dickson 
identified that Lord Walker was likely to adopt a restrained approach, with a preference that 
changes in the law are brought about by Parliament rather than making the changes himself.  
He also identified that Lord Walker was more likely to take a literal or positivist approach to 
interpretation of legislation.
776
  Both of these findings support the view that Lord Walker 
supported the values encompassed in conformity.  For this reason, Lord Walker was included 
with those Supreme Court Justices who espoused values encompassed within tradition and 
conformity although his value profile was unusual. 
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 Lord Walker supported conformity in 13 of the 14 cases in which it was opposed to any other value. 
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 B Dickson, 'Close Calls in the House of Lords' in Lee J (ed), From House of Lords to Supreme Court; 
Judges, Jurists and the Process of Judging (Hart Publishing 2011),  page 290 
315 
 
The final groupings based on the values espoused in judgments and extra-legal writing and 
the values supported in decisions are as follows (those highlighted in italics are those who do 
not match the profile exactly, some may also be aligned with a different grouping); 
 
 Tradition and conformity:  Lords Hope, Rodger, Brown and Walker. 
 Universalism: Lord Kerr, Clarke and Phillips. 
 Self-direction: Lord Mance and Lady Hale. 
 
7.9 Agreement in cases that divide judicial opinion:  Revealing difference. 
The study of personal values and agreement builds on the theory of agreement espoused by 
Sheldon Goldman in 1969, which assumed that ‘if judges agree most of the time (which they 
do) then the explanation of variance among them must lie in their differing values derived 
from divergent background experiences’.777  In doing so, this study not only examined 
agreement in all the cases decided, but examined agreement in the subset of cases that 
divided judicial opinion.  Studies of  Supreme Court decisions usually focus on agreement, 
typically used to examine unanimous decisions, with a focus on the court as a whole.  In 
analysing agreement in cases that divide, this chapter starts to examine the role of the 
individual in the Supreme Court within the context of panel decision making.  Indeed, this 
approach was used by Paterson to examine the voting relationships of the judiciary through 
the lens of judicial dialogue, which also centred on the role of the individual.  Paterson 
identified high and low degrees of agreement in all cases between certain pairs of Supreme 
Court Justices, which are affirmed in this study.
778
    
 
                                                 
777
 S Goldman, 'Backgrounds, Attitudes and the Voting Behaviour of Judges:  A Comment on Joel Grossman's 
Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions' (1969) 31 Journal of Politics 214  
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In Table 18, the agreement between pairs of Justices, identified by Paterson, was examined 
not only in all cases, but in the subset of cases that divided judicial opinion and minority 
decisions where more than one Supreme Court Justice supported the minority position, cases 
in which personal values may play a role.     For many of the pairs identified, a high degree of 
agreement in all cases was associated with a high degree of agreement in divided cases and 
minority decisions. However, this was not true for all pairings, and analysis of cases that 
divide judicial opinion revealed differences not previously highlighted.  For example, Lords 
Clarke and Dyson have a high degree of agreement over all cases, but in the four minority 
cases, they agreed on only one.   
 
Similarly, for the majority of pairings where there is a low degree of agreement in all cases, 
there was low level of agreement in cases which divided judicial opinion.  However, again, 
there was unexpected agreement. For example, Lords Kerr and Philips, who do not have a 
high degree of agreement overall, reached a high degree of agreement in cases with minority 
judgments. The variations in agreement associated with cases that divide judicial opinion, 
although a limited number of cases, reveals subtle differences that are not revealed by 
analysis of the entire case data set.  Indeed, it is in the cases that divide judicial opinion that 
values are more visible in legal judgments.  
 
7.10 Shared values reflected in agreement – Tacit diversity 
The data are set out in two tables. Table 19 presents the overall agreement between any pair 
of Supreme Court Justices in all cases and the agreement in cases that divide judicial opinion, 
while Table 20 presents the agreement in cases with more than one minority judgment.  
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As expected, overall there is a high degree of agreement in all cases between the Supreme 
Court Justices (Table 19). The agreement between Supreme Court Justices in each grouping 
was compared with the average level of agreement between all the Supreme Court Justices. 
The average agreement overall was very high at 84%, with average agreement in divided 
cases reducing to 53% and in minority cases reaching a percentage agreement of 44%.  In 
assessing whether there was a high or low degree of agreement, the agreement between pairs 
of Justices was compared to the average. 
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Table 18  Comparison between those identified as high/low level agreement in all cases. 
Highest Agreement All Cases Divided Minority Lowest Agreement All Cases Divided Minority 
Dyson-Walker 97% (29) 83% (6) 75% (4) Brown - Hale 65% (49) 23% (22) 0 (11) 
Clarke-Hale 93% (43) 70% (10) 100% (4) Hale - Rodger 72% (36) 23% (13) 0 (7) 
Dyson-Hope 94% (35) 82% (11) 60% (5) Kerr - Rodger 69% (29) 25% (12) 22%  (9) 
Clarke- Dyson 90% (31) 57% (7) 25% (4) Kerr - Mance 80% (41) 38% (13) 33% (9) 
Collins-Kerr 94% (17) 75% (4) 67% (3) Brown - Kerr 73% (55) 35% (23) 27% (11) 
Brown-Dyson 92% (38) 78% (14) 50% (6) Hale - Phillips 75% (48) 40% (20) 25% (12) 
Dyson-Phillips 94% (31) 82% (11) 86% (7) Brown - Clarke 72% (25) 30% (10) 0 (5) 
Hale-Mance 93% (54) 70% (13) 75% (8) Brown - Mance 82% (38) 36% (11) 0 (6) 
Clarke - Phillips 90% (38) 67% (12) 60% (5) Kerr  - Phillips 81% (37%) 63% (19) 67% (12) 
        
Rodger - Brown 91% (45) 76% (17) 80% (10) Dyson - Hale 73% (26) 30% (10) 25% (8) 
Walker- Brown 91% (46) 76% (17) 80% (9) Dyson - Kerr 77% (35) 53% (17) 75% (8) 
    Hale - Walker 82% (57) 47% (19) 40% (10) 
    Phillips -Walker 83% (36) 54% (13) 33% (9) 
    Rodger - Mance 80% (20) 55% (9) 33% (6) 
    Walker – Kerr 73% (34) 40% (15) 40% (10) 
This table highlights the difference between examining agreement in all cases and agreement in cases which divide judicial opinion.  Although broadly similar, in some cases 
for example Clarke – Dyson had a high degree of consensus overall but in cases in which there is a minority opinion there is a low degree of consensus.   Similarly, Lord 
Dyson and Lord Kerr have a low degree of consensus overall but a high degree of consensus in cases which divide. 
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Table 19 :  Consensus between Supreme Court Justices in all cases and cases which divided judicial opinion decided between October 
2009 – September 2013. 
 
       Agreement in cases which divided judicial opinion 
Supreme 
Court Justice 
Lord 
Phillips 
Lord Hope Lord 
Brown 
Lord 
Rodger 
Lord 
Walker 
Lady Hale Lord Kerr Lord 
Mance 
Lord 
Collins 
Lord  
Clarke 
 
Lord Phillips  67% (12)  68%  (10) 54% (11) 54% (13) 40% (20) 63% (19) 58% (12) 60% (5) 67% (12) 
Lord Hope 81% (26)  63% (22) 57% (8) 64% (22) 58% (19) 44% (18) 38% (13) 56% (9) 33% (12) 
Lord Brown 86% (44) 87% (60)  76% (17) 76% (17) 23% (22) 35% (23) 33%(12) 71% (7) 30% (10) 
Lord Rodger  85% (33) 86% (44) 91% (45)  70% (10) 23% (13) 25% (12) 55% (9) 50% (4) 20% (5) 
Lord Walker 83% (36) 88% (65) 91% (46) 91% (35)  47% (19) 40% (15) 47% (17) 70% (10) 38% (13) 
Lady Hale 75% (48) 88% (68) 65% (49) 72% (36) 82% (57)  48% (23) 70% (13) 50% (6) 70% (10) 
Lord Kerr 81% (37) 84% (64) 73% (55) 69% (29) 73% (34) 82% (67)  38% (13) 75% (4) 69% (13) 
Lord Mance 88% (43) 81% (42) 79% (39) 80% (20) 80% (46) 93% (54) 80% (41)  67% (6) 50% (12) 
Lord Collins 90% (20) 85% (33) 87% (16) 91% (22) 90% (29) 89% (27) 94% (17) 87% (23)  40% (5) 
Lord Clarke 90% (51) 84% (51) 72% (25) 85% (26) 82% (46) 93% (43) 88% (32) 86% (46) 89% (28)  
 
The data is presented as a percentage agreement with the number of cases heard by any pair of Supreme Court Justices presented in brackets.  
Cases which divided judicial opinion included cases with single dissenting judgments and cases with more than one minority judgment. 
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Table 20:  Consensus between Supreme Court Justices in cases in which more than one Supreme Court Justice supported a minority 
position in cases heard between October 2009 – September 2013. 
 
Supreme 
Court 
Justice 
Lord 
Phillips 
Lord Hope Lord 
Brown 
Lord 
Rodger 
Lord 
Walker 
Lady Hale Lord Kerr Lord 
Mance 
Lord 
Collins 
Lord  
Clarke 
 
Lord  
Dyson 
Lord Phillips  57 %(7) 60% (10) 33% (6) 33% (9) 25% (12) 67% (12) 43% (7) 50% (4) 60% (5) 86% (7) 
Lord Hope 57% (7)  45% (11) 43% (3) 65% (14) 54% (11) 60% (10) 14% (7) 43% (7) 20% (10) 60% (5) 
Lord Brown 60% (10) 45% (11)  80% (10) 80% (10) 0% (11) 27% (11) 0% (6) 66% (6) 0% (5) 60% (5) 
Lord Rodger  33% (6) 43% (3) 80% (10)  67% (6) 0% (7) 22% (9) 20% (5) 33% (3) 0% (4) 33% (3) 
Lord Walker 33% (9) 65% (14) 80% (10) 67% (6)  40% (10) 40% (10) 33% (9) 67% (6) 22% (9) 75% (4) 
Lady Hale 25% (12) 54% (11) 0% (11) 0% (7) 40% (10)  60% (15) 75% (8) 50% (4) 100% (4) 25% (8) 
Lord Kerr 67% (12) 60% (10) 27% (11) 22% (9) 40% (10) 60% (15)  33% (9) 67% (3) 71% (7) 75% (8) 
Lord Mance 43% (7) 14% (7) 0% (6) 20% (5) 33% (9) 75% (8) 33% (9)  33% (3) 57% (7) 50% (4) 
Lord Collins 50% (4) 43% (7) 66% (6) 33% (3) 67% (6) 50% (4) 67% (3) 33% (3)  50% (4) 100% (3) 
Lord Clarke 60% (5) 20% (10) 0% (5) 0% (4) 22% (9) 100% (4) 71% (7) 57% (7) 33% (3)  25% (4) 
 
The data is presented as a percentage agreement with the number of cases, in which there was more than one Supreme Court Justice supporting 
the minority position, heard by any pair of Supreme Court Justices presented in brackets. 
 
321 
 
7.10.1 The Traditionalists:  Lord Hope, Lord Rodger, Lord Brown and perhaps Lord 
Walker. 
The traditionalists supported values encompassed within tradition and conformity and 
opposed values encompassed within universalism.  Application of these criteria identified 
three Supreme Court Justices; Lords Hope, Rodger and Brown.  Again, if this value based 
grouping was accurate, then there would be a high degree of agreement between the decisions 
reached by these Supreme Court Justices.   
 
There was an above average level of agreement between the Supreme Court Justices, with 
Lords Hope and Brown reaching the same decision in 87% of cases, Lords Hope and Rodger 
in 86% of cases, Lords Rodger and Brown in 91% of cases decided by both Supreme Court 
Justices.
779
  There was also a high level of agreement between these Supreme Court Justices 
and Lord Walker, with agreement between Lords Walker and Hope of 88%, Lords Walker 
and Rodger of 91% and Lords Walker and Brown of 91%.  Indeed, the average agreement 
between the Supreme Court Justices was 88% (mean = 49 cases) without Lord Walker and 
89% with Lord Walker (mean = 49 cases).   
 
The pattern of agreement is more profound when the data set is reduced to those cases which 
divide judicial opinion.  Indeed, in this data set the average agreement between the Supreme 
Court Justices was 68% (mean = 16 cases). This was higher than the overall average 
agreement in this data set of 53%.    This pattern exists even if cases with a single dissent 
were excluded, with an average agreement of 64% (mean= nine cases) again significantly 
higher than the average for this data set of 44%.   
                                                 
779
 Of note, Lords Rodger and Hope almost always agreed on Scots Appeals.  Although the Justices were more 
likely to disagree on English Appeals, the agreement was still above average. A Paterson , Final Judgment.  The 
Law Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing 2013) 
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7.10.2  The Universalists:  Lord Phillips, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke 
The universalists supported values which are encompassed in universalism and opposed 
tradition and conformity.  The application of these criteria identified three Supreme Court 
Justices; Lords Phillips, Kerr and Clarke.  Again, if the grouping was accurate then a high 
degree of agreement between these Supreme Court Justices would be expected.   
 
As predicted there was a high degree of agreement in decision making between the 
universalists. In all of the cases combined, there was an average of 86% agreement between 
the decisions reached by Lords Phillips, Kerr and Clarke.  The level of agreement was more 
significant when the cases which divided judicial opinion were analysed, revealing an 
average of 66% agreement between the Supreme Court Justices in an average of 14 cases, 
compared to the average of 53% for all Supreme Court Justices.  This level of agreement was 
maintained when cases were limited to those in which more than one Supreme Court Justice 
held a minority position.  In these cases, the percentage agreement was 66% (mean of eight 
cases per pairing) compared to the expected agreement of 44%.   
 
7.10.3 Self-direction : Lady Hale and Lord Mance  
Lord Mance and Lady Hale supported the values encompassed in self-direction and were 
less likely to affirm those encompassed within power.  There was significant agreement 
between the decisions that these two Supreme Court Justices reached, with 94% agreement in 
the 54 cases that they heard together.  In the 13 cases that they heard that divided judicial 
opinion, Lord Mance and Lady Hale agreed in 70%, while in the eight majority decision 
cases that they heard, they agreed in 75%.
780
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 Brice Dickson identified a pattern of joint dissent between Lord Scott and Lord Mance.  Indeed, he identified 
an agreement between Lord Scott and Lord Mance of 93% which is similar to the agreement identified between 
Lord Mance and Lady Hale.  This would suggest that Lord Scott may have shared similar values.  The Supreme 
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7.10.4 Do Supreme Court Justices who espouse opposing values reach opposing 
decisions?  
The traditionalists hold opposing values to the universalists; therefore it would be predicted 
that there would be a low degree of agreement between the decisions reached.  Indeed, there 
was overall a lower level of agreement, with an average agreement of 79% in all cases, 
between the universalists and the traditionalists.  In cases that divided judicial opinion, this 
was reduced to 42%, and further reduced to 28% in minority decision cases, lower than the 
average agreement of 44%.  These data suggest that Supreme Court Justices with opposing 
values are less likely than average to agree in cases which divide judicial opinion.  Of note if 
Lord Philips was excluded from this analysis, the level of agreement would have further 
reduced to 33% (divided cases) and 23% (minority cases).
781
 
 
Despite, the overt lack of diversity on the Supreme Court bench, this chapter reveals diversity 
in values on the Supreme Court bench.  Indeed, there were stark differences in the value 
profiles of some of the members of the Supreme Court bench.  However this chapter also 
reveals that Supreme Court Justices who have similar value profiles will reach similar 
decisions in cases which divide judicial opinion confirming the close link identified in 
chapter 6 between personal values and judicial decisions.  This analysis contributes to the 
debates surrounding judicial diversity but also has significant implications on Supreme Court 
procedure particularly the selection of panels.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Court data set selected for this study did not have sufficient data to facilitate this analysis, although this may be 
addressed in the future using a data set from the House of Lords. B Dickson, Judicial Activism in Common Law 
Supreme Courts (Oxford University Press 2007); B Dickson, 'Close Calls in the House of Lords' in Lee J (ed), 
From House of Lords to Supreme Court; Judges, Jurists and the Process of Judging (Hart Publishing 2011) 
781
 In his analysis, Brice Dickson identified a high level of disagreement between Lord Walker and Lord Mance, 
indeed this study also identified a low agreement between Lord Walker and Lord Mance, with only 50% 
agreement in cases which divide judicial opinion and only 37% in minority cases. 
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7.11 What does the study of personal values contribute to the diversity debate? 
Lady Neuberger highlighted in her report that ‘judges drawn from a wide range of 
backgrounds and life experiences will bring varying perspectives to bear on critical legal 
issues.’782  Despite acknowledgement of the breadth of experiences that can contribute to a 
more diverse judiciary, empirical studies surrounding judicial diversity have had a narrow 
focus on overt diversity, overt characteristics and on how the judiciary is seen. To date, the 
debates surrounding a more nuanced approach to “difference” in judicial decision making has 
been limited to theory and centres on the decision making process rather than the outcome.   
This study reveals value diversity on the Supreme Court bench.  Indeed, there were stark 
differences in the value profiles of some of the members.  The variation in value expression 
was reflected in the decisions reached with those Justices who have similar value profiles 
reaching similar decisions in cases that divide judicial opinion.  
 
Personal values reflect different backgrounds and life experiences and the study of judicial 
values reveals that despite the lack of overt diversity, there was evidence of inherent tacit 
diversity and a variety of different perspectives.   This chapter confirms the association 
between these tacit influences, decision making and the decisions of the Supreme Court.  It 
further highlights the association between the influence of values on cases which divide 
judicial opinion, cases where the outcome is uncertain and the exercise of judicial discretion.  
 
The presence of tacit diversity does not diminish the importance of diversity related to overt 
characteristics, overt diversity.  The arguments that a Supreme Court bench that does not 
reflect society serves to discriminate directly or indirectly and may lack democratic 
legitimacy remain.  Those arguments centred on legitimacy rely necessarily on the public 
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perception of the judiciary and how the judiciary are seen.  Indeed, the Neuberger report 
highlighted the strength of these legitimacy arguments, which make a strong case for overt 
diversity, and advocate that in a democratic society it is unacceptable for an unelected 
institution that has the power of the judiciary, to be drawn from a narrow, homogenous group 
that does not reflect the diversity of society.
783
   Indeed, in his most recent book Stephen 
Beyer, discussing the US Supreme Court, argued that the legitimacy of the Supreme Court 
rests in the confidence of the people in the institution, an overtly unrepresentative institution 
may result in lack of confidence and ultimately lack of democratic legitimacy.
784
  It is 
difficult to argue that the presence of tacit diversity will change the public perception of the 
judiciary.  However, a focus on overt characteristics alone serves to limit the debates 
surrounding judicial diversity, fails to recognise the importance of inherent characteristics on 
judicial decision making and diminishes the importance of the Supreme Court Justice as an 
individual. 
 
The study of personal values has highlighted the limitations of the debates that focus simply 
on demographic characteristics and suggests that gender and class provide a very narrow 
view of diversity.  Indeed, the limitations of the focus on gender and the ‘unique voice’ 
argument, which argues that all women speak with one voice and this voice is unique to 
women, are evident in this research.  It is possible that overt characteristics such as gender 
and race may influence decisions through personal values.   Indeed, at a population level 
gender does influence values with studies demonstrating that a population of women are 
more likely than males to express concern and responsibility for the well-being of others and 
less likely than males to accept materialism and competition, which is reflected in the values 
endorsed, with women attributing more importance to universalism, conformity and security 
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than men.
785
  Although this variation is modified in women who achieve high levels of 
success in their chosen career, who do not reflect the values espoused by women in the 
population in general, these women still affirm different values to men.
786
   
 
But population studies do not reflect the nuanced differences of individuals.  The alignment 
of values between Lady Hale and Lord Mance undermines the argument that one individual 
female will reflect the values of a population and highlights the limitations associated with 
the use of population studies to identify the characteristics of the individual.
787
  As Lady Hale 
suggests, 
 
We should not expect women judges to ‘make a difference’ or that men and women 
‘judge’ differently; ‘the great majority of judgments I have written or spoken would 
just as easily have been written or spoken by a man.
788
  
 
 The study of personal values suggests that gender alone cannot be used as a proxy for the 
many life experiences that influence personal values.  Male and female Supreme Court 
Justices may have a range of life experiences that have a profound effect on their values and 
their decision making.  These findings support the theoretical “difference” arguments made 
by Lady Hale, Rackley and others, that gender is but one facet of the many different 
perspectives that female judges bring to the decision making processes.
789
  Indeed these 
experiences extend beyond overt demographic characteristics.  
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The study of personal values highlights the limits of arguments that centre on overt 
characteristics alone.   This is equally true for the diversity arguments that centre on class.  
These arguments serve to diminish the importance of the individual.   Views such as those 
espoused by JAG Griffiths in his book The Politics of the Judiciary, where he argues that 
judicial decision making is a consequence of a class-conditioned perspective, treat the 
judiciary as homogenous and interchangeable.
107 
 Although class and education may 
influence values, it is clear that values are more nuanced than class and education alone. 
Indeed, this study suggests that the Supreme Court Justices are more diverse in their values 
than the white Oxbridge stereotypes.    In treating the judiciary as a homogenous group, the 
significant influence of the individual on decisions in cases that divide judicial opinion may 
be lost.  This chapter highlights tacit diversity in the Supreme Court.  In doing so, it serves to 
contribute to the broader discussions of judicial diversity, but also recognises the importance 
of the individual and the exercise of judicial discretion.    
 
Although there was more variation in the value expression and associated decisions by the 
Supreme Court judiciary than would be suggested by their demographic profiles alone, there 
were also patterns of value expression and decision making that were shared by individuals.  
This finding suggests that although there is an unseen diversity in the judiciary, this is still 
limited and raises questions of judicial selection at two levels; judicial appointments and 
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panel selection.  Although both could constitute a thesis in their own right, it would be remiss 
not to briefly set out the potential implications of tacit diversity on both of these areas.   
7.11.1 What do values mean for judicial selection? 
Higgins and Rubin argue that ‘judges may be selected so that the values which they choose to 
impose on society are in fact the values consistent with the certain interpretations of the 
common law.’790  This study is not suggesting the judicial appointments should be made 
based on values, or that there should be an introduction of a ‘confirmation hearing’ approach.   
Indeed, to incorporate psychometric testing of values into the selection process would require 
a determination of which values the judiciary should espouse and affirm and a prediction of 
the influence of the external and internal modifiers on value expression.   
 
 
However, questions of diversity relate to questions of justice and Cameron, Cummings and 
others suggest that a diverse bench reaches more ‘just’ decisions.791  The more diverse the 
values espoused and affirmed by the judiciary, the more values of society will be reflected in 
the judicial decisions.  Although this study did find some variation in both the values 
expressed and the related decisions of the Supreme Court judiciary, this study suggests that 
this diversity could be enhanced by drawing from a population with more diverse 
backgrounds and life experiences.  Personal values are influenced by life experiences, a 
diversity of life experiences including gender, race and other factors will allow different 
voices to be heard and although these voices may not be distinctive to gender, or education or 
                                                 
790
 JM Scheb II and W Lyons, 'Judicial Behaviour and Public Opinion: Popular Expectations Regarding the 
Factors that Influence Supreme Court Decisions' (2001) 23 Political Behaviour 181,  page 137 
791
 CM Cameron and CP Cummings, Diversity and Judicial Decision-Making:  Evidence from Affirmative 
Action Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals 1971 - 1999 (Princeton University Working Paper, 2003); JP 
Kastellec, 'Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts' (2013) 57 American Journal of Political 
Science 167. 
329 
 
class, the more diverse life experiences of the judiciary, the more likely diverse values will be 
represented on the judicial bench and these will be reflected in the decision making process. 
7.11.2 Values, agreement and panel decision making. 
In an interview in 2011, Lord Phillips highlighted the importance of panel selection on case 
outcomes: 
If you sit five out of the twelve Justices and you reach a decision 3:2 it is 
fairly obvious that if you had a different five you may have reached a 
decision 2:3 the other way.  This is one of the reasons when we have a 
really important case we sit more than five, seven or even nine.
792
 
The UK Supreme Court engages in decision making in panels of five, seven or nine judges.
793
 
The majority of cases are heard by a panel of five Supreme Court Justices (78%), with 16% 
heard by a panel of seven and 6% (14 cases) heard by a panel of nine Supreme Court 
Justices.
794
  Lord Hope in a speech discussing the Supreme Court highlighted the factors that 
influence the decision to hear cases in panels greater than five:  
The default position is that we sit in panels of five.  But our practice is to 
sit in panels of seven or nine if the Court is being asked to depart from a 
previous decision, or there is a possibility of its doing so, or if the case 
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raises significant constitutional issues or for other reasons is of great 
public importance.
795
 
The position of the Supreme Court is that Supreme Court Justices are selected based on 
availability and largely at ‘random although there is some consideration given to including 
Justices with specialist experience in the area of law raised by the appeal’ adopting an largely 
interchangeable approach.
796
  Notwithstanding this stated position, it has been suggested that 
the area of expertise has a significant influence selection for judicial panels.  Lord Hope 
emphasised the use of the ‘selective approach’ in panel selection: 
The selective approach raises questions as to which Justice should sit on 
which case. Courts which always sit en banc, such as the US Supreme 
Court, do not need to address this problem. Nor do courts whose function 
is limited to dealing with constitutional issues in which all its members 
have equal expertise. As we take all sorts of cases, we have to decide upon 
the membership of the panel for each case individually. It has been 
suggested that we should sit in rotation or that the Justices should be 
chosen for each case at random. But that approach would mean 
abandoning the convention that the two Scots Justices sit on all appeals 
from Scotland, if available. It would also risk depriving the panels of the 
assistance of those members of the Court who had expertise in the point at 
issue. One might end up with a criminal appeal from the Court of Appeal 
in England, for example, being heard by five Justices who had never sat in 
an English criminal court at all. So here too a selective approach is being 
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adopted, as it was in the House of Lords, under the supervision of the 
President and the Deputy President. The result is that the panel will 
normally include at least two Justices with experience in the area of the 
law that is the subject of the appeal.
797
 
Indeed, the pattern of frequency of hearings between Supreme Court Justices suggests that 
this ‘selective’ approach is often in practice in the Supreme Court.  The findings of this study 
have significant implications for the ‘selective’ approach.  As discussed, although there is 
variation in the values and decisions of the Supreme Court Justices, there is also similarity.  It 
could be conceived in cases heard by a panel of five, three of the Supreme Court Justices 
hearing the case could share the same value priorities and reach the same decision. This idea 
is supported by the principle of conversion, a systems theory concept, which suggests that 
judges convert inputs into case outcomes and that ‘common values and common background 
experiences impel towards agreement.’798   
 
This sharing of value priorities may be enhanced by the shared experiences of practice.  
Research into personal values in a corporate context, suggests those who achieve success 
quickly in their chosen area do so in part due to an alignment of their personal values with 
those of the corporation.
799
  Although not empirically assessed, theoretically this principle 
may also apply to members of the judiciary who have all achieved success in their chosen 
area of practice.  Those who achieve success in a particular area of law may have shared 
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value priorities which would lead them to a high degree of agreement.   For example, those 
who engage in practice in the area of human rights may have different inherent values 
priorities to those who achieve success at the commercial Bar.  In using the ‘selective’ 
approach there is potential to skew the decision making process in favour of the values which 
are held in high regard in a specific area of law.  Similarly, appointments to the Supreme 
Court Judiciary from one area of law may also serve to skew decisions in favour of specific 
values.  The early Supreme Court had a significant number of Justices who practiced at the 
Commercial Bar, however recent retirements and appointments have served to reduce this 
potential influence. 
 
Although, the importance of experience and unique knowledge is recognised, this study 
suggests that panels should be assigned randomly and if there is a requirement for an area of 
expertise in a case this should be provided by a single Supreme Court Justice.  If more than 
one is required then a larger panel should be convened.  In choosing random selection, there 
is potential to reduce the influence of one particular set of value priorities on the final 
outcome. 
 
This chapter provides further evidence of the value: decision paradigm at work in the 
Supreme Court.  The analysis reveals a range of value priorities among the Supreme Court 
judiciary.  The evidence of difference in value priorities suggests that despite the lack of overt 
diversity, there is tacit diversity in the Supreme Court which is related to decision making.  
Indeed, in cases which divide judicial opinion, diversity of values may underpin the decision 
making process.  These findings extend the debates surrounding judicial diversity and judicial 
selection. 
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8 Chapter 8 
The role of values in judicial decision making in the Supreme 
Court 
 
 
At the start of this thesis was a letter on behalf of Lord Dyson, Master of the Rolls, which 
stated: 
Your research proposes to examine the relationship between the personal 
values that a judge may hold and the role these play in decision making.  
As you will be aware, on appointment to judicial office all judges take the 
judicial oath and undertake to ‘do all manner of people after the laws and 
usages of this realm without fear or favour, affection or ill will.’  It is 
therefore our view that judges administer the law in accordance with the 
judicial oath and any perception that judges allow matters other than the 
evidence and arguments presented in the court to influence their decision 
making could potentially undermine public confidence in the judiciary.
800
 
This thesis demonstrates that despite the external and internal constraints imposed by judicial 
procedure and the judicial oath,  judicial decision making is influenced by matters other than 
the evidence and arguments presented in the court.  The judicial oath and the limits it imposes 
serve to constrain conscious decision making processes, but members of the judiciary, as with 
any decision makers, are the subject of psychological influences on decision making and this 
thesis demonstrates a role for one such influence, personal values, on the decision making of 
the Supreme Court.  
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The influence of personal values on judicial decision making is mediated through the exercise 
of judicial discretion.  It has long been accepted that in reaching a decision in hard cases a 
judge may exercise discretion, and as Lord Bingham suggests this is particularly true when a 
case is ‘governed by no rule of law, [and] its resolution depends on the individual judge’s 
assessment (within such boundaries as have been laid down) of what is fair and just to do in 
the particular case.’801  It is in these cases, where the outcome is not clearly dictated by legal 
rules and principles, that the exercise of discretion may play a particularly significant role.  
By definition, hard cases populate the docket of the UK Supreme Court and although it is 
impossible to accurately quantify the number of cases where the exercise of judicial 
discretion played a role in the final outcome, it may be speculated that judicial division on the 
result is an overt manifestation of the exercise of discretion.  Such cases account for almost 
one quarter of all cases decided by the UK Supreme Court at the time of this analysis.   
 
The psychological value framework developed in this thesis provides a novel method of 
analysing and understanding difference in judicial decisions and a unique insight into the 
subconscious influences that underpin the judicial decision making processes.  Value content 
analysis of legal judgments demonstrates a relationship between the exercise of judicial 
discretion, values and judicial decisions in cases which divide judicial opinion.  The value 
analysis identified a differential pattern of values expressed in the majority and minority 
judgments of cases that divided the Supreme Court.  This value: decision paradigm was 
replicated in a study of legal academics which demonstrated an association between personal 
values and legal decision making.  The pattern of differential expression was not limited to 
‘close call’ cases.  Indeed, this research identified evidence of competing values in the 
judgments of all the cases analysed that divided judicial opinion.  In reaching a decision, at 
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least one not governed by legal rules and precedent, a judge will support one or more values 
above another.  This research suggests that a judicial decision in cases that divide judicial 
opinion is not simply a decision between one position or another but a more detailed nuanced 
balancing of competing values.   
 
The scrutiny of cases where an individual Supreme Court Justice dissented alone, or those 
cases which resulted in outcome consensus but division within the reasoning, facilitated the 
analysis of value expression within the context of uncertainty.  Posner suggests that 
‘uncertainty is a salient feature of [the US] legal system.’802  It is equally salient in the legal 
systems of Scotland, England and Wales.  The analysis of these cases revealed an association 
between the expression of values in legal judgments and judicial perception of legal 
uncertainty.  Uncertainty is central to the dual system model of decision making proposed by 
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky.
803
  This model encompasses two systems, system 1 the rapid, 
intuitive part of the process which includes the ‘gut instinct’ or affect heuristic and system 2 
the more conscious deliberative reasoning processes.
804
  The affective response is a rapid and 
instinctive response to a trigger and in the judicial decision making context the trigger is the 
evidence and law surrounding a case.  This response which reflects individual personal 
values, frames the system 2 response.  The initial system 1 response can be affirmed, rejected 
or modified by the systematic deliberation and reasoned decision making of system 2.  It is in 
decisions where uncertainty remains after deliberation, that the influence of the system 1 
response is the strongest and the final decision reflects the initial affective response and 
personal values.  The results of the value: decision analysis suggest that although the law 
provides the basis for framing and constraining judicial discretion, in difficult cases where 
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there is a perception of uncertainty, the personal values of individual judges’ influence how 
judicial discretion is exercised and may influence the outcome of the case.  As such, this 
study situated the judicial decision making process within the limits of the legal system and 
unlike the attitudinal models of judicial decision making does not suggest that the influence 
of intrinsic subconscious personal preferences and motivations are without constraint.   
 
The constraints exerted by legal principles and rules are not the only constraints and 
influences on judicial decision making and the interpretation of judicial decision making 
within the context of psychological systems facilitates a more detailed understanding of these 
role of constraints and incentives.
805
   Studies of judicial behaviour suggest that external 
extra-legal factors including institutional factors such as collegiality can influence judicial 
decisions.  The psychological systems model of decision making also recognises the potential 
influence of external factors which can modify the influence of subconscious responses on 
the final outcome.  This thesis presented two cases studies in which the value: decision 
making paradigm was modified and drawing on psychological and judicial behavioural 
studies speculated on some of the external influences that may have modified the final 
outcome.  Despite these external and internal limitations on the influence of values on legal 
judgments, this thesis demonstrates that even with the restrictions placed on the judiciary by 
the judicial oath, in the majority of cases which divided judicial opinion, individual members 
of the Supreme Court judiciary reached decisions which aligned with their espoused values. 
 
In recognising the psychological influences on judicial decision making, this study also 
considered the members of the Supreme Court judiciary as individuals within a collective 
decision making process.  The analysis of individual decision making revealed that there was 
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diversity in the espoused value hierarchy of individual Supreme Court Justices and this 
diversity was reflected in the decision making of the Supreme Court.  Indeed, despite the lack 
of overt diversity, there is diversity of values on the Supreme Court bench.  This finding 
extends the debates surrounding judicial diversity.  The diversity of values espoused and 
affirmed in the decision making of the Supreme Court bench should be celebrated.  However, 
the diversity is limited and this research supports the calls for wider diversity on the bench, 
but suggests that the definition of diversity should be extended beyond overt visible 
characteristics to include the diversity of life experiences which reflect in personal values.  
 
It has been argued for decades that extra-legal factors including facets of the judicial 
personality including judicial morality, activism and political ideology influence judicial 
decision making.
806
  These early studies were limited to the overt manifestations of individual 
characteristics such as gender and framed judicial decision making as a conscious binary 
decision between for example one political position or another.  Although these facets of the 
judicial personality are underpinned by individual personal values, this research provides a 
more nuanced understanding of judicial decision making and the conscious and subconscious 
facets of the judicial personality which influence that process.  
 
This thesis has demonstrated, despite significant constraints and limitations, the influence of 
personal values, mediated through intuition, on the decision making process in the Supreme 
Court.  The influence of intuition and values in judicial decision making is not necessarily 
adverse.  Indeed, Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich argue that ‘removing all intuition from 
judicial decision making is both impossible and undesirable because it is an essential part of 
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how human brains function.’807  Personal values mediated through judicial intuition, reflect 
the humanity of those who have to make these difficult decisions as highlighted by Lord 
Sumption; 
The judiciary's instincts are moulded by their experience of individual 
cases, many of which have involved profound human tragedies to which 
no judge could be indifferent.
808
 
In cases where the decision is not clearly dictated by law, the members of the Supreme Court 
judiciary are required to exercise discretion and to reach a decision.  In doing so the judiciary 
are subject to subconscious influences of decision making.  These subconscious influences 
are inevitable in judicial decision making where the law is uncertain.   
 
The acknowledgment of these influences on judicial decision making may lead to better 
insight into judicial reasoning and a more nuanced understanding of judicial diversity and 
division.  Indeed, acceptance and acknowledgement of the important role of personal values, 
subconscious influences and judicial humanity on judicial decision making would render the 
judicial process more transparent and should serve to enhance public confidence rather than 
diminish it. 
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10 Appendix 
 
Vignette based on R (on the application of E) v. JFS Governing Body [2009] UKSC 15. 
 
The Jewish Free School (JFS) is a highly regarded state funded school which is 
oversubscribed. The admission policy is based on the requirement that students are 
recognized as Orthodox Jews as defined by the Office of the Chief Rabbi (OCR). The OCR 
applies the matrilineal test. This requires that the mother of the child be either an Orthodox 
Jewess or converted to Judaism in compliance with Orthodox methods. 
 
Boy X is raised as an Orthodox Jew by his father, a recognized Orthodox Jew. His mother 
was raised as a Catholic and she converted to Judaism under the auspices of a non-Orthodox 
Synagogue. She is a practising Jew. Her conversion is recognized by Masorti, Reform, and 
Progressive Jews but not by the OCR. As his mother was not recognized as a Jew by the 
OCR, Boy X was denied admission to the school. 
 
The Court of Appeal decided that the JFS admissions policy had directly racially 
discriminated against boy X contrary to the Race Relations Act 1976 s.1. A breach of the 
Race Relations Act 1976 requires that the admission criteria discriminate against a person 
based on racial grounds. The definition of racial grounds in s. 3 of the Act is limited to 
colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins. 
 
It was held in the Court of Appeal that, as Boy X was descended from an Italian Catholic, his 
ethnic origins could not include a matrilineal connection to Orthodox Jewry required by the 
OCR. As the descent required by the OCR traced back to racial or ethnic origins, the 
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admission criteria discriminated against an ethnic group and was in breach of the Race 
Relations Act 1976 s. 1. 
 
The JFS argue that there is a Jewish ethnic group but it is not defined by the OCR criteria. 
The JFS argue that the Jewish ethnic group encompasses all those who are identified or 
identify themselves as Jews, regardless of whether they are recognized as Orthodox Jews by 
the OCR. The JFS argued that discrimination against this ethnic group would be racial 
discrimination. The JFS claimed that the OCR matrilineal test identifies a subset of the 
Jewish ethnic group. As the test only identifies a subset of an ethnic group, the test is not of 
ethnic origin.  The JFS argue that the OCR criteria assess religious not ethnic origin and 
therefore the selection criteria are legally valid and similar to other religious schools. 
 
 
Question 1:   Did the admissions policy breach the Race Relations Act 1976 s. 1? 
 
Question 2:  What factors do you consider important in reaching this decision?  
Please rate each factor on the scale based on its importance in your decision.   
 
Factors are rated on a scale from – 1 (irrelevant) to 7 (extremely important) 
 
1. Social justice (The principle of a society which is based on equality and fairness)  
 
2. Authority of the State (Respect for authority of legislature and executive) 
 
3. Transparency in the law (Law must be accessible to the public) 
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4. Limits on power (Limits on the power of governing bodies) 
 
5. Individual responsibility (Individual responsibility for actions and duty to others in 
society)  
 
6. Limits on the obligations of the State (Recognition that the obligations of the State to 
the individual cannot be without limitation) 
 
7. Reduction of costs to society (Reduction of the financial and social costs to society) 
 
8. Equality (Equal treatment and rights for all people regardless of their difference) 
 
 
9. Benefit to society (Recognition that an action may benefit society rather than the 
individual). 
 
10.  Tolerance of others beliefs (A fair, objective, permissive attitude towards those 
whose judgments, beliefs, practices, race or religion differ from one's own) 
 
11.  Duty to conform to rules (Duty of individual or group to conform with the 
rules/regulations/laws governing society as a whole) 
 
 
12. Respect for tradition (Feeling or showing deferential regard for inherited, established 
or customary pattern of thought, action or behaviour (religious, legal, social) 
 
13. Autonomy (Independence or freedom of will of the individual) 
 
14. Freedom of enterprise (Freedom of private business to operate for profit in a 
competitive system without interference by government beyond regulation necessary 
to protect the public interest and the national economy) 
 
 
 
  
377 
 
 
